The Minute Book
Tuesday, 31 May 2016

Militia Uniforms
Topic: Canadian Militia

What the militia want is a full dress uniform which will be ornamental and a working uniform which will be useful.

Militia Uniforms

Ottawa Citizen, 8 February 1902

The Canadian Militia Gazette, commenting on the opposition in militia circles to the continuation of the practice of the Canadian authorities blindly following the perennial chopping and changing of uniform and equipment by the British war office, says:—

That practice has been one of the most insane of our practices—insane, because it is not suited to the condition of our organization; insane, because it is not suited to our climatic conditions; insane, because under it the officers of a regiment are never "uniformed," though they may be dressed; insane, because it is inordinately expensive. Not today, nor yesterday, but for years, observing militia officers have seen the folly of it. The recent war office letter of warning to which our correspondent refers (it is not yet a regulation to be acted on) has created an unwonted furore in Canada. Why this is I fail to see, for the change which it foreshadows cannot apply to our militia unless it is adopted by the Dominion authorities. The mere publication of the letter (for general information) is not an adoption.

The reason the system has been pursued is because the militia has never been consulted on the subject and had to blindly submit to orders. There would have been no "unwonted furore" in this instance if the Citizen had not lifted up its voice against it, and the Gazette knows quite well that the changes foreshadowed in the "cautionary order" would have gone through. As a matter of fact some of the changes have already been made. The sabretache has been abolished, though it is decidedly ornamental in full dress and much more useful than the sword and belts because you can carry despatches and other papers in it. What the militia want is a full dress uniform which will be ornamental and a working uniform which will be useful. The minister should put his foor down.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Monday, 30 May 2016

Sir Garnet Wolseley
Topic: Wolseley Barracks

Sir Garnet Wolseley

The New Adjutant-General of the Imperial Forces

The Toronto Daily Mail, 24 December 1881

Sir Garnet Wolseley, the newly-appointed adjutant-general of the Imperial army, is well known to every Canadian, having been actively engaged as assistant quartermaster-general in Canada in 1870-71, and in the former year commanded the Red River expedition. Sir Garnet Wolseley is the eldest son of the late Major G.J. Wolseley, of the 25th Regiment of Foot, and grandson of the late Sir Richard Wolseley, Bart., of Mount Wolseley, in the county of Carlow, a member of the ancient house of Wolseley of Wolseley, on the county of Stafford, one of whose younger sons went to Ireland as a captain in King William's army, and who fought by the King's side at the battle of the Boyne, and was created a baronet for his service.

Sir Garnet was born in the vicinity of Dublin in June, 1833, and is therefore only 48 years of age. He obtained his commission in 1852, and left England to take part in the Burnah war the same year. He was severely wounded in action during this war, and had the honour of being favourably mentioned in the despatches of the general in command of the expedition. He subsequently returned home, and having recovered from his wounds, was able to take part in the Crimean war, arriving at Sebastopol in December, 1854. From the time of his arrival in the Crimea till the fall of Sebastopol he served in the trenche s as an engineer, and was again honoured on several occasions by being mentioned in despatches. He was on duty in th trenches on the memorable 18th of June, 1855, and on the 30th of August was badly wounded in a sortie.

On the conclusion of the war he sailed for China with his regiment, and was shipwrecked during the voyage. He saw considerable active service in India during the mutiny of 1858-59, and was present at the siege and relief of Lucknow, and at the defence of Alumbagh. He afterwards held the position of Quartermaster-General under general Sir J. Hope Grant in the province of Oudh. In 1870 he was in China as Assistant Quartermaster-General during the war, and was present at the storming of the Taku forts. After this he was sent to Canada, and his career since then is pretty well known to every Canadian. Sir Garnet has always spoken of the Canadian volunteers in the highest terms, and considers that with proper training they would make as fine soldiers as are to be found anywhere.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Sunday, 29 May 2016

Desirable Traits of a Leader
Topic: Leadership

Desirable Traits of a Leader

Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-14; Training Guide for Commanders of Company Sized Units; 31 July 1967

a.     Bearing. Creating a favorable impression in carriage, Appearance, and personal conduct at all times.

b.     Courage (physical and moral). A mental quality which recognizes fear of danger or criticism, but enables the individual to meet danger or opposition with calmness and firmness.

c.     Decisiveness. Ability to make decisions promptly and then express them in a clear and forceful manner.

d.     Dependability. The certainty of proper performance of duty with loyalty to seniors and subordinates.

e.     Endurance. Mental and physical stamina measured by the ability to stand pain, fatigue, distress, and hardship.

f.     Enthusiasm. The display of sincere interest and exuberance in the performance of duties.

g.     Initiative. A quality of seeing what has to be done and commencing a course of action.

h.     Integrity. Uprightness of character and soundness of moral principle: the quality of absolute truthfulness and honesty.

i.     Judgment. Weighing facts and possible solutions on which to base sound decisions.

j.     Justice. Being impartial and consistent in exercising command.

k.     Knowledge. Acquired information including professional knowledge and an understanding of your subordinates.

l.     Loyalty. Faithfulness to country, the Army, your unit, your senior, and subordinates.

m.     Tact. The ability to deal with others without creating offense.

n.     Unselfishness. The avoidance of providing for one's own comfort and personal advancement at the expense of others.

 

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Updated: Sunday, 29 May 2016 12:06 AM EDT
Saturday, 28 May 2016

Iron Rations for Troops (US Army, 1895)
Topic: Army Rations

Iron Rations for Troops (US Army, 1895)

Emergency Diet for United States Soldiers
Independent of Supply Trains
Carrying His Own "Grub"—Foods Condensed by Evaporation—But tons of Coffee and Tea—Concentrated Loaves of Bread, and Soups in Cigarette Packs—The Kola Nut for Military Purposes

Hartford Weekly Times, 24 October 1895

Within a few weeks from now United States soldiers will be provided for the first time with an "iron ration." The boards appointed to consider the question of emergency foods, representing the various departments of the army, are sending in their reports, upon which final conclusions will be based. Problem: To make up a food package of small bulk, which shall render the fighting man independent of supply trains for a short period, in case of an exigency such as might arise from his being wounded or cut off with a detachment from the main command.

"Experiments in this line are being made by all the great powers," said Major Woodruff at the War Department yesterday. "They are trying everything imaginable for the purpose. Here, for example, is an element of the British emergency ration. It looks like a dog biscuit, doesn't it? Three ounces it weighs, and it is four inches square. It is composed simply of whole wheat solidly compressed. A condensed loaf of bread you may call it. The French have a new ‘war bread,' which is to replace hard tack for the use of their army. Its ingredients and the processes for making it are a secret. When a piece of it is put into hot water or soup, it swells up like a sponge, and it is said to be virtually the same as fresh bread.

"In future wars the utmost efforts will be made to furnish the troops with fresh articles of dier in the field. Dried foods are only suitable for emergency foods. Germany and France, by the help of cold storage, have perfected arrangements for shipping fresh beef to the front by rail. When practicable, fresh bread will be forwarded daily to the fighting line. This was done from Washington to the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War. The French government has constructed a number of bakeries on wheels for use in campaigns—wagons, that is to say, containing ovens and all necessary appliances, so that bread may be made on the march.

"For emergency rations, evaporated vegetables have been tried, but not with great success. They are not nutritious enough, and they do not keep well. Here is a one-pound can of evaporated onions. Smells strong, doesn't it? It ought to, inasmuch as it represents ten pounds of fresh onions. In the same way potatoes, carrots, turnips and cabbages are put up. Desiccated foods are now being produced on an enormous scale by many firms in this country and abroad. A good thing which we may adopt if this desiccated beef. One ounce of it is equal to five ounces of ordinary meat, because it is absolutely water-free. It is too hard to cut with a knife without trouble, and so the soldier chops off a small hunk of it. He puts the piece into a little machine like a coffee mill and grinds it up. It comes out in fine shavings, ready to be eaten on bread or to be used for soup stock.

"Beef-tea, used as a stimulant, is a good thing for soldiers. For an emergency ration, it is put up in capsules, one of which makes a cup. Each capsule contains the necessary seasoning and costs two cents. Beef-tea contains almost no nutriment, but only the flavoring and stimulating qualities of the meat. When a person is informed that a teaspoonful of extract represents several pounds of beef, he infers that it is equally nourishing. The truth is that the nourishment is left behind in the boiler. A human being will starve to death on an unlimited supply of beef-tea. The most important element of the British iron ration is pemmican—a preparation of beef, fat and salt. Its manufacture is a secret. It is put up in tin cans of four ounces, equal to one pound of meat, and is eaten without further cooking. However, it may be made into a hash or soup by boiling it with vegetables. It keep sound for years, though exposed to air. With the pemmican goes a can of the same size, containing a mixture of cocoa and honey.

"It is certain that canned foods will play an important part in future wars. The Belgian iron ration is a ten-ounce cut of corned beef put up in a liquor that is flavored with vegetables. The German emergency ration is a one-pound can of preserved meat, with hard bread and pea sausage. A biscuit composed of meat and flour has been tried for the German army, but the soldiers would not eat it. The biscuit was supposed to furnish the fighting man with everything that was necessary for his physical support, water excepted. To be satisfactory, a ration must be palatable as well as wholesome and nutritious. A dietary for troops cannot be settled on a basis of theory alone; it must be tested in practice. What will satisfy soldiers of one nation may not suit those of another.

"Very likely, United States soldiers would not put up with the German ‘erbswurst.' Yet that species of pea sausage is said to have been a leading cause of the success of the German arms in the Franco-Prussian war. Without it the troops could not have endured the fatigues to which they were subjected. The sausage is made pf pea-meal, fat and bacon. It was devised by a German cook, from whom the invention was purchased by the government for $25,000. The secret lies in the method of preparation by which the article is rendered proof against decay. It was first used on a large scale by the second army under Prince Frederick Charles. A factory established at Berlin put up enormous quantities of these sausages and other preserved meats, furnishing to the troops 40,000,000 rations. Each sausage is eight inches long, and makes twelve plates of nutritious soup. There could hardly be a better emergency ration.

"Among other things under consideration by our own War Department are condensed soups. This little packet, which looks somewhat like a bundle of cigarettes, contains just three ounces of desiccated pea soup. You observe, it is so compressed as to be quite hard. I break it up and throw it into this saucepan. To it I add one quart of water, and I place it on the gas stove here to boil. For flavoring, though it is not necessary, let us add a small quantity of these evaporated onions. In the course of fifteen minutes I will offer you a plate of every excellent pea soup. Soups, you understand, are most useful in rations. For health it is not sufficient to put a certain amount of nutriment into the body; the stomach must be distended. Soup does that. Incidentally, the soldier who consumes one of these rations absorbs one quart of sterilized water.

"Condensed soups may be purchased in tablets three inches square and half an inch thick. Each tablet weighs four ounces, and makes six plates of soup. In food value one tablet is equal to one and three-quarters pounds of potatoes. Bean, mock-turtle, green-corn, barley and potato soups are desiccated in this form. Tomato, vegetable, and fish chowder soups are similarly prepared. What do you suppose this is? It looks like a button, doesn't it? It is a cup of tea condensed. All you have to do is drip it into a cup of hot water and stir it up. The sweetening is in the bottom with the tea. No, the sweetening is not sugar, but a coal-tar product called ‘saccharine,' which is more than 200 times as sweet as sugar. Thus the quantity added needs to be very small. Coffee is put up in the same way, with saccharine, as well as in a shape that looks like black molasses.

"An iron ration is a short-weight and highly concentrated diet intended to cover only a brief period. It is not to be used except when the regular food supply cannot be obtained. Supposing the army supplies to be regularly furnished, the fighting man ought to return from the campaign carrying in his haversack the same emergency ration with which he started our originally. But it may happen that his regiment or brigade is cut off from the main body, and in that case the emergency rations may be literal salvation. Or he may be left wounded on a field of battle, unable to obtain anything to eat for days, unless he has it with him. During the recent war with China the Japanese found emergency rations a necessity of active service. An army, or a large part of it, may be thrown rapidly forward to hold a position and it takes a week or or more to make roads so as to get supplies to the front. This very thing occurred at Vicksburg, where for lack of emergency rations, Grant's men suffered severely from hunger.

"No army in the world is so well supplied with food as ours. During the Civil War the management of the Union commissariat was a model, On one occasion president Lincoln said to the commissary general of the army: ‘I rarely hear of your department. It works like a well-regulated stomach, so that one scarcely knows one has it.' It is high time then, that our troops should be provided with emergency rations. One of the questions to be decided is whether the ration shall be carried at the belt or in the haversack. Three days' allowance, weighing two and a half pounds, may be packed conveniently in a sealed tin and attached to the belt. The tin is readily opened with the finger and serves as a cooking utensil. A typical iron ration for one day would consist of five ounces of oatmeal, a tablet of coffee, a quarter ounce of salt, and a five-ounce soup tablet composed of dried beef, pea meal, potatoes and suet.

"Soldiers suffering from hunger may be supplied with small quantities of alum, a pinch of which taken from time to time contracts the stomach. Thus the organ, not requiring so much to fill it, can get along with less than the normal diet for a while without complaining. A trouble about condensed foods is that soldiers are apt to eat too much of them, not realizing their concentration. I have known men to devour a quantity of compressed wheat-cake and then drink a lot of water, the result being very distressing. Foods may be arranged for a field ration so that the fighting man will have the exact amounts of all the elements required for the support of life, and yet certain things will be missing whose absence brings disease and death. A percentage of indigestible matter is necessary for the digestive organs to work upon. If the concentrated food be a powder or a liquid, no solids being furnished, a law is violated. There is no chewing, and without mastication saliva, which is one of the most important digestive fluids, is not secreted and poured into the stomach. A human being ordinarily will secrete from a quart to three pints of saliva, mostly at meal-times, in twenty-four hours. The soldier fed on liquids only will suffer from diarrhea and colic.

"Stimulants are necessary to soldiers. They keep up their cheerfulness and enable them to endure fatigue and privations. Depressed troops do not fight well. Accordingly, tea and coffee are included in emergency rations. It seems not unlikely that the kola nut may be used for military purposes, on account of its wonderful power as a stimulant, reviving the exhausted, mitigating hunger and thirst, and enabling men to do much more work. It acts in an exaggerated manner like tea of coffee, without producing any subsequent reaction or bad effects. South American Indians use the cocoa leaf for this purpose on long marches without food across the pampas; but the cocoa is dangerous. The kola is equally efficient and is harmless. Already experiments have been made in the French army with so-called accelerating rations, composed of kola nuts, flour and sugar in cakes. But they proved a failure because they were made from worthless dried nuts

"The kola nut, to be worth anything, must be fresh. Before long, doubtless, it will be a common commercial article. It is successfully cultivated in the West Indies and along the adjacent shores of South and Central America, where it is consumed in immense quantities, almost replacing teas, coffee and alcohol. It is the fruit of a large tree, and is about as big as a horse-chestnut, growing in pods of three to eleven nuts in a pod. Undoubtedly the tree would grow in southern California, and very likely it might be cultivated in the Gulf states. Chewing the nut stimulates the brain and acts as a tonic on the muscles. Its peculiar action is due to a specific alkaloid called ‘kolanin,' which has not yet been isolated in a pure state. In military life the use of the kola would be limited to rare occasions, as in forced marches or just before a battle. If two equal armies face each other, and one, by help of the kola, can do one-tenth more than the other, it will be successful, other things being equal. For, if there are 250,000 men engaged on each side, the effect will be the same as a reinforcement of 25,000 men."

Rene Bache

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Friday, 27 May 2016

Canada's Great War Naval Service
Topic: RCN

The Naval Service

Canada's Part in the Great War, 3rd Edition, Issued by the Information Branch, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, May 1921

Cruisers

At the outbreak of war in 1914 the Canadian Government possessed only two naval vessels, the Niobe, a cruiser of 11,000 tons displacement, with a main armament of sixteen 6-inch guns, stationed at Halifax, and the Rainbow, a small cruiser of 3,600 tons displacement, armed with two 6-inch, six 4.7-inch, and four 12-pounder guns, stationed at Esquimalt, on the Pacific. The Rainbow, which was ready for sea, patrolled, with other ships on the Pacific stations, as far south as Panama, and captured several ships carrying contraband of war. After the entry of the United States into the war, she became depot ship on the Pacific coast. The Niobe was made ready for sea in September, 1914, and remained in commission one year, during which she steamed over 30,000 miles on patrol duty. She afterwards became depot ship in Halifax.

Smaller Vessels

At the beginning of hostilities, various small craft were taken over by the Naval Department from the Departments of Marine and of Customs, and were armed and manned from the R.C.N.V.R. for the performance of patrol duties off the Atlantic coast. Two submarines, which were bought just before the declaration of war, patrolled the approached to Victoria and Vancouver and helped in keeping Admiral von Spee's squadron away from the Pacific ports. H.M. sloop Shearwater was taken into the Canadian service as mother ship to these submarines and, in the summer of 1917, these the vessels went, by way of the Panama canal, to Halifax.

Trawlers And Drifters

A patrol and mine-sweeping service was carried on after the outbreak of war. The vessels used first were Government and privately owned vessels which were taken over and equipped for the purpose. Some of these were placed at the disposal of the Government free of charge. Early in 1917 the Department of the Naval Service undertook to have 60 trawlers and 100 drifters built in Canada for the Imperial Government. These vessels were built at various places on the St. Lawrence and the Great lakes; many of them were in service in Canadian and European waters in the year 1917, and all were in service in 1918.

The area patrolled under the Department stretched from the straits of Belle Isle to the Bay of Fundy, and from Quebec to east of the Virgin Rocks. Within this area the Department had control of patrols, convoys, mine-sweeping, the protection of fishing fleets, etc. only one large vessel was lost by enemy attack in this area.

At the date of the armistice the vessels in the Canadian Naval Service were as follows:—

On The Pacific

H.M.C.S. Rainbow, depot and training ship; H.M.S. Algerine, sloop; auxiliary patrol ship Malaspina; several motor launches tor harbour defence.

On the Atlantic

H.M.C.S. Niobe, depot and training ship; H.M.C.S. Shearwater, submarine depot ship, and two submarines; H.M C.S. Grilse, torpedo-boat destroyer; nine auxiliary patrol ships, forty-seven armed trawlers, fifty-eight armed drifters, eleven armed mine-sweepers and tugs, and a large flotilla of motor launches.

Personnel

The crews of these vessels consisted of men from all parts of Canada, principally members of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve. At the date of the armistice the personnel of the service was:—

  • Officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy, 749.
  • Officers and men of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, 4,374.

Naval College

Canada is fortunate in the possession of a small but excellent Naval College. More than 50 officers who passed out of the College as cadets served in either the Imperial or Canadian Navy. Many of them have gained distinction, and four lost their lives in the battle of Coronel.

Canadians in the Imperial Naval Forces

In addition to the men serving on Canadian vessels, over 1,700 men were recruited in Canada for the Imperial Navy, 73 Surgeon Probationers and a number of Hydrographic Survey Officers were sent from Canada, and 580 Canadian enrolled as Probationary Flight Lieutenants in the Royal Naval Air Service, before recruiting for the Royal Air Force began in Canada. More than 500 Canadians holding commissions in the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve were in the British Auxiliary Patrol and similar services.

Naval Air Service

The Royal Canadian Naval Air Service was established in the summer of 1918, with stations at Halifax and North Sydney. It co-operated with the United States Naval Aviation Corps in patrolling the coast and escorting convoys through the danger zone.

Wireless Service

The Canadian Radiotelegraph Service controlled about 200 stations ashore and afloat. Several new stations were erected or taken over by the Department of Naval Service, and there was an unbroken chain of radio communication from St. John's Newfoundland, to Demerara. The Department opened a training school for wireless operators, from which about 200 men were sent out for service in all parts of the world.

Dockyards

Important refitting, repairing and supply work was done ny Canadian dockyards. Large refits of Imperial and other ships were made at Esquimalt, including H.M.S. Kent, after the battle of the Falkland Islands, and the Japanese Battleship Asama, after grounding the coast of lower California. Several large cruisers were refitted at Halifax and Montreal. Other work included the defensive armament of merchant ships, the refitting of transports for troops, horses, and special cargo, and the loading and securing on ships' decks of 600 launches, tugs, etc., of large size.

The Halifax dockyard was seriously damaged by the explosion in the harbour on December 6, 1917, but immediate steps were taken to enable the services of the yard to be carried on.

Stores

The Canadian Naval Service provided supplies for the ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and for a number of Imperial and Allied ships in Canadian waters, as well as many of the requirements of H.M. dockyards at Bermuda and Hong Kong. Large supplies were shipped from Halifax dockyard for provisioning the fleets in European waters. A large coaling depot was established at Sydney for the use of patrolling vessels and of all convoys leaving the St. Lawrence.

Researching Canadian Soldiers of the First World War


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Thursday, 26 May 2016

Exhaustible Infantry
Topic: Soldiers' Load

Exhaustible Infantry

Commentarty of Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter of 1950-51, S.L.A. Marshall, October 1951

In the Korean fighting, the average combat soldier, when his total load is somewhere between 38 and 45 pounds (including clothing), gets along fairly well and can march a reasonable distance, engage, and still remain relatively mobile. When the load goes above 50 pounds, he becomes a drag upon the company.

Fighting Load

In the attack, the infantryman carries his weapons, ammunition, intrenching tool, filled canteen, and first-aid pack. This is the shake-down infantry load in Eighth Army operations. Because of the steepness of the ridges, and the fatigue which comes of climbing prior to engagement, such things as rations and bedding, usually regarded as "necessities" for the fighting man, are not carried forward by the attack force. Where the developments in the situation and the availability of support personnel permit it, food and bedrolls are got up to the attack force by supply parties somewhere along the course of the fight.

But often as not these arrangements are frustrated by an untoward course in the fighting. In consequence men go hungry and miss out on sleep. Neither shortage is regarded by the infantry within Eighth Army as a cruel and unusual hardship. The men take these things in stride, and when the pressure is eased and conditions are nearer normal again, they boast about what they have undergone. During the winter fighting, when the night temperatures were ranging between 5º and 20º, companies in the attack were not infrequently committed without overcoats or bedrolls, and minus rations, despite the tactical prospects being that supply in these things might not get up to them until the following morning.

They commonly appeared far more willing to risk a proportion of loss from frostbite than an endangering of the unit as a whole through failure of ammunition supply. The length of the approach march and the nature of the terrain occasionally permitted wearing either the overcoat or parka, or carrying the sleeping bag, but rarely both. Which it was to be was a matter for company decision. The battalion commands usually strove to get food and bedrolls forward to companies in the attack prior to darkness, though in fact the detail of this work would frequently fall upon the rear echelon of the company directly concerned. As often as not these efforts were thwarted by circumstances beyond anyone's control.

Ranks understood the problem and were not demoralized by the lack of food and warmth. They blamed no one; frequently they praised the earnest, but negative, effort of the supply parties which had failed them.

In the course of all of the critiques of Eighth Army infantry, though this situation was many times repeated, there was not one single instance in which troops took a bitter or complaining attitude when speaking of their comfort shortages during engagement. The universal reaction was: "That was how it happened. There was no help for it. We weren't hurt by it and we'll probably have to do the same thing again."

The Natural Load

The Korean research indicated that there is a natural limit imposed on what the average infantry soldier carries in fighting supply by what he has discovered about his own physical resources under varying conditions of stress. This is best judged by what happens within the average infantry company after it has been through repeated engagements, has shaken out all excess material, and has got down to fighting weight.

The infantry soldier will not carry more than two grenades, even though his senses tell him he is heading into a fight where grenades will be needed. In fact, though Korean operations are a grenade-using type of warfare, there was not found one infantry soldier in the whole of the Eighth Army who consistently carried more than two grenades. The average was slightly under two per man, since some individuals carried only one. The fatigue of the march was the determinant in this requirement. Decision as to what munitionment should be carried rested usually with the company commander, and after he became broken in he did not press men to carry more than they thought they could handle without risking exhaustion. It remained for the unit to take care of the reserve through company supply.

For men with carbines, the natural load was four clips; for men with Mls, between 94 and 120 rounds. These averages were general throughout all commands, and there was no marked deviation in any company unit. What loads were carried forward for the mortars and machine guns, etc., depended altogether upon the general circumstances, including how far the supply vehicles could drive forward and the availability of extra carriers. However, in the average circumstance the machine guns had 3 to 4 boxes of ammunition per gun, and the 60-mm mortars were supplied with between 50 and 100 rounds. BAR men averaged between 6 and 8 clips. Riflemen in the squad were markedly willing to carry extra ammunition for the BAR man.

Burden Limit

Weighing out this load of ammunition, along with the weapon, full canteen, uniform, etc., means that the average infantry fighter in Korea was carrying a handicap of approximately 40 pounds. This weight was sustainable, that is to say men so weighted could preserve tactical unity during an average march into enemy country, when fire was imminent. (A tabular discussion of march limits under fire conditions was included in Chapter IV.)

But it was also observed that among the men who were carrying weights in excess of 50 pounds there was an onset of straggling before the march was half completed. This served as a drag upon the general movement as other files peeled off to provide them with greater security. Solely because of the disproportionate weights, in an extended march it would sometimes be from 30 to 40 minutes after the head of the column had arrived on the objective when the tail closed in. These last to arrive would also be in the greatest state of fatigue. They included radio men, mortar ammunition carriers, mortar crews in general, and the flamethrower, though the latter's burden would have to be shifted from man to man in the course of the march because of its weight. The recoilless crews also did heavy labor, and were late in closing, if the march was extended.

Because mortar positions are characteristically in defilade, on low ground, to the rear of the defended ridgeline, this was not a frequent cause of tactical disarrangement in short marches. Its penalties became obvious only when infantry was put far across country over which organic transport could not follow because the country was unroaded.

Operations in Korea prove that Department of the Army and Office of Chief of Army Field Forces concern over the problem of the infantry burden is wholly justified, and that present staff processes and logistical arrangements fall seriously short of the standards requisite to providing our main fighting arm with an optimum mobility.

This problem has only a marginal solution. It cannot be solved in total. Infantry, by nature of its role in combat, must remain heavily burdened. The best that may be hoped for is that through re-examining our staff processes and reappraising our material and human resources, we can insure a system whereby the fighting load is made tolerable in the main.

When Korean operations began, we were no better prepared to initiate a sound economy within the infantry force than we were prior to World War I, despite the wealth of experience gathered meanwhile. The record shows that the expeditionary troops carried personal loads under which they could not fight and which they were in no position to store. Many of the items which they were compelled to carry were unsuited to the season; others were unsuited to fighting operations within the peninsula; still others were of questionable value at any time in any situation. Furthermore, during the winter operations, there was no sign that the supply staff within the replacement system had adjusted itself to the needs of the Korean fighting. Men struggled, and wore themselves down, carrying into the Theater items of equipment which were never used by the combat units. This applied especially to clothing issues. There was no indication that anyone had gone forward, studied what was being done on the ground, and then revised &pply procedures to conform with needs. The net result was that tactical commanders had to shake down the replacements, take away all of the unnecessary gear, and then either jettison it or find a place to store it. As invariably happens, whenever there is an impractical issue of equipment, time and personnel are wasted right down the line.

Most of this excess was thrown away a waste to the Army and to the American people. This wastage cannot be called the consequence of a bad supply discipline within the troops; it was due to faulty staff work and inadequate survey of the supply requirement by the command. Into the discard of items not really needed went also other items for which there was a genuine requirement a little later.

This is the invariable extra penalty which comes of serious overloading. Green troops do not have the ability to recognize what material is essential under the conditions of the fight. In the hour of emergency, they react only to what is needed for survival in the immediate situation. Therefore excessive loading will always lead to an undiscriminating shucking-off of the weight which presses them down. There is no safeguard against this except to load them properly in the first place.

Outfit by Popular Demand

As the Eighth Army became acclimated to its problem, the troops became knowing about their own main needs. Personal decision is probably the main influence in what the American infantry fighter carries along into battle of the multifarious supply in clothing, living and survival gear, and carrying equipment which are available to him. That may not be the way it should be, but that's how it works out in practice. If the majority of men don't want shelter halves, see no use in the light pack, and won't carry blankets when they see a chance to get sleeping bags, their feelings pretty much dictate how the unit ultimately is equipped. So it is that how the Army becomes outfitted after it has been long afield is pretty much a popular verdict on the utilitarian value of all equipage. And that verdict cannot be disregarded!

Under the stress of combat, such stock items as the meat can and the pack (the pack has proved highly useful in other wars but didn't meet the particular need in Korea) are found to be surplus weight, and so troops will not carry them forward. Too late the practical need for yet other items which had been thrown away in the early stages becomes recognized; they then have to be re-requisitioned.

In these particulars, Korea differs hardly at all from American experience in other wars of this century. But since it followed World War II by only five years, its main lesson might well be that an Army loses its "know-how" almost at the speed of light, and that the task of keeping staff procedures keyed up in the interim is far more complex than we think.

As the Eighth Army moved into the winter, its infantry forces did not remain overburdened; they were in fact traveling too light for the exigencies of the winter situation. Heavy weapons in the infantry line could not be assured a sufficient supply of ammunition. Troops in line often went hungry. The hilltop defenses had to get along without wire, mines, and tripflares. And so on.

Command Load

It must be said of the average regimental and battalion commander of infantry in Korea that he tends to carry along an excessive and extravagant load of personal equipment, and that any effort he may make toward encouraging his troops to lighten themselves for the furthering of mobility is therefore invariably at odds with his personal example. It is not enough that he must carry along a cot and sleeping bag; usually, he also carries an air mattress, pillow, spare bag, and several extra blankets. The quota is seldom one wash basin, one jerry can, one light, etc.; there will be several of each item. The same applies to trunk lockers and other dunnage. What the unit packs along for the comfort and convenience of the commander will probably be in average weight somewhere between 200 and 300 pounds. So long as one commander does it, and the excess is not reduced by any stricture from higher command, the others can be expected to follow suit. For social reasons there is a considerable rivalry about these things; one of the seeming satisfactions in command is the feeling of being relatively better off than one's fellows working at the same level. That is a human failing, but it is a failing none the less, when in field operations the services of more than one vehicle and the work of two or three men are required to shift the living gear of one officer every time that there is a displacement of the CP. With some of our commanders this was not necessary. They kept their gear at a minimum and had little more comfort than their troops. Still, this was not the common practice.

What Might Be Done

Toward the affording of partial relief to the troops in line, and the over-all strengthening of the defensive situation, there were two lines of approach which might have been taken by the staff, without looking beyond resources already at hand. They were:

  • Organization of Korean porterage on a semimilitary basis, and
  • Total coordination of all supplementary carrying resources within the Division structure to put them at the service of the battalions in the attack.

Neither of these approaches was immediately subjected to study and then The first was neglected despite its obviousness, probably given systematic application. because our Army is not colonially experienced and does not have an instinct for primitive methods. The second broad avenue was overlooked, perhaps because its prerequisite is a radical overhaul in American staff thinking. We bend over backwards in respecting the integrity of small-unit command and process within any larger component, seldom stopping to question whether the safety of all units might not depend finally on seeing the Division as a whole, and using its other parts to the utmost in an effort to get its fighting elements forward relatively fit and ready for the fight. The Regiment sweats to get its two battalions of the attack into the right ground, supplied with all that they need to fight and to endure. Meanwhile, at the rear, there are QM, Ordnance, and other service elements, with broad backs and many vehicles, and on that particular day they have no truly critical chores. To what extent better interior organization can improve the economy will never be known until it is put to the test. We make it work when confronted by a great emergency such as the Ardennes surprise. But we never attempt to apply the same principle in routine operations with the major purpose of conserving the fighting elements.

As a first step toward reform of the infantry supply problem, it is suggested that Logistics, basing upon the Korean supply studies, should proceed to categorize all infantry equipment as follows:

1.     Equipment which must move with the infantry soldier in any fighting situation, such as his arm, canteen, aid pouch, ammunition belt, pants, boots, etc.

2.     Equipment which he will have to carry personally in the interests of survival when subjected to extremes in climate, weather change, etc. These are kept in organizational supply and issued to him when required by the immediate conditions. They affect his personal responsibility and organizational logistics in that as his load increases; other means must be found for transporting the unit's residual weight.

3.     Equipment composing the residual weight within the company (Mortar ammo in excess of a definite figure, mines, wire, etc.), which, while required in the fighting situation, cannot be manhandled by the company without excessive impairment of its fighting powers. The estimating of residual weights should be based upon the muscular potential in summer heat, or extreme winter cold, when the soldier is heavily weighted with his own clothing, and not upon what troops can do in temperate weather under the most favorable conditions. Once the residual weights are analyzed and described, all further procedure should be based on the assumption that when these materials cannot be moved to the scene of action by organic transport, it is the responsibility of higher command to make the arrangements by which they will be got forward for the benefit of the company.

4.     Equipment which has proved impractical or of little utility under the stress of field conditions and should therefore be eliminated.

5.     Equipment which has a practical purpose (such as the web cartridge belt) but is imperfectly suited to that purpose and should therefore be modified.

In the Korean fighting, the average combat soldier, when his total load is somewhere between 38 and 45 pounds (including clothing), gets along fairly well and can march a reasonable distance, engage, and still remain relatively mobile. When the load goes above 50 pounds, he becomes a drag upon the company. That was what was anticipated in theory and it has proved itself in practice. The calculating of the residual weight should assume an average 40-pound carry for the soldier. If, when that is done, such personal items as blankets, bedrolls, etc., cannot be fitted into the individual load, they should be classified as residual weight and it should be the duty of This was how it was handled many higher authority to arrange for their porterage. times during the winter fighting, except that already overburdened battalion and company commanders had to organize the makeshift arrangements.

Reform must begin at the top. Providing greater mobility to troops in the attack is primarily a problem for the division. The coordination of all division resources toward that end can be achieved only through the commander's staff. At first glance, it might be questioned whether this is a responsibility of G-3 or G-4. The best solution would require that they approach it jointly, with G-3 having the ultimate responsibility because of his closer tie-in with the daily progress of fighting operations and the peculiar authority which he exercises in this field. There is the capital risk that the experiment might be regarded as just another problem in transportation, routinely assigned to the division MT officer, and thereby die a sudden death.

As for the need that we do a better job in the analysis and use of all indigenous transport resources, our Korean failure is an example which commends itself to General Staff attention. The subject needs to be given continuing emphasis at Leavenworth, Benning, and at all other points where staff thinking is shaped. The same problem will certainly arise wherever we may engage in future. To be outnumbered on the fighting side in war becomes an insuperable handicap unless extreme ingenuity is used in the organization of all resources in meeting the logistical problem.

That we have exceeded all others in motorization but makes it more difficult for us to think about what can be done with animals and people. But the effort must be made, lest another opportunity be missed.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Wednesday, 25 May 2016

Some Difficult War Names
Topic: CEF

Some Difficult War Names

How They Are Pronounced

The Sydney Mail, 23 December 1914

Although this article isn't specifically about the CEF, it has been tagged as such to keep it with other First World War material.

Study of the war news and maps leaves the newspaper reader in the dark as to how the names of many of the places referred to should be pronounced. When the Germans first crossed into Belgium discussions were common on the question of pronunciation. One said Leeje, the other Li-eeje. Neither was right. The battered fort is pronounced Le-azh. Similarly there have been disputed as to what Ypres should be called. It has to suffer anything from Y-preeze to Yipray. Its now scattered townspeople call it Ee-p'r. The following list shows the correct pronunciation of some of the chief centres of fighting:—

Belgium

YpresEe-p'r
DixmudeDe-mud or Dis'mud (u heavy)
ThouroutToo-roo
LiegeLe-azh (a heavy)
BrugesBroozh
CharleroiSha-leh-rwa
GhentGent (French Gong)
Ostend(Accent on second syllable.)

France

RheimsReemz (French Rahnz)
LilleLeel
ArmentieresAr-mong'te-air
AisneAin
OiseWahs (a as in far)
MeuseMuz (u as in fur)
Arras(Accent on second syllable.)
CompeigneKom-pe-ain (e light)
La BasseeLah-bas-say (final a heavy)
CalaisKal'ay (final a heavy)
Vosges (long o)

Russia

WloclawekVlotslavek
PrzemyslZhem-is'l
JaraslauYa-ro-slow (final o obscure)
KielceKyel-tsch
CzenstochowoChens-to-kova
CracowKrako (a and o heavy)
WartheVar-the
WarsawVar-sha'va (accent on middle syllable)

While the above conveys the nearest approach to the local pronunciation that can be given in ordinary English characters, it is not considered incorrect to pronounce a foreign name or word in the manner in which the English spelling would ordinarily indicate; for none could be expected to memorise the peculiar pronunciations of every language on earth.

Researching Canadian Soldiers of the First World War


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Some Difficult War Names
Topic: CEF

Some Difficult War Names

How They Are Pronounced

The Sydney Mail, 23 December 1914

Although this article isn't specifically about the CEF, it has been tagged as such to keep it with other First World War material.

Study of the war news and maps leaves the newspaper reader in the dark as to how the names of many of the places referred to should be pronounced. When the Germans first crossed into Belgium discussions were common on the question of pronunciation. One said Leeje, the other Li-eeje. Neither was right. The battered fort is pronounced Le-azh. Similarly there have been disputed as to what Ypres should be called. It has to suffer anything from Y-preeze to Yipray. Its now scattered townspeople call it Ee-p'r. The following list shows the correct pronunciation of some of the chief centres of fighting:—

Belgium

YpresEe-p'r
DixmudeDe-mud or Dis'mud (u heavy)
ThouroutToo-roo
LiegeLe-azh (a heavy)
BrugesBroozh
CharleroiSha-leh-rwa
GhentGent (French Gong)
Ostend(Accent on second syllable.)

France

RheimsReemz (French Rahnz)
LilleLeel
ArmentieresAr-mong'te-air
AisneAin
OiseWahs (a as in far)
MeuseMuz (u as in fur)
Arras(Accent on second syllable.)
CompeigneKom-pe-ain (e light)
La BasseeLah-bas-say (final a heavy)
CalaisKal'ay (final a heavy)
Vosges (long o)

Russia

WloclawekVlotslavek
PrzemyslZhem-is'l
JaraslauYa-ro-slow (final o obscure)
KielceKyel-tsch
CzenstochowoChens-to-kova
CracowKrako (a and o heavy)
WartheVar-the
WarsawVar-sha'va (accent on middle syllable)

While the above conveys the nearest approach to the local pronunciation that can be given in ordinary English characters, it is not considered incorrect to pronounce a foreign name or word in the manner in which the English spelling would ordinarily indicate; for none could be expected to memorise the peculiar pronunciations of every language on earth.

Researching Canadian Soldiers of the First World War


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Tuesday, 24 May 2016

Meals as Important as Tactics
Topic: Army Rations

Problem of Meals for Army Important as That of Tactics

Each Soldier Carries His Iron Ration, To Be Used in Emergency

The state must ensure the entire supply for the whole army day by day.

The Milwaukee Journal, 1 November 1914
By the Journal Military Expert

The problems of the commissariat of an army are as important as those of masterly tactics in the field. Napoleon said, "An army travels on its stomach."

The provisions of an army are cared for by one or more administrative departments. Its duty is to procure, take care of and distribute all supplies necessary to keep the troops in health and strength. A certain plan co-operating with the war plan of the general staff must be laid out and the following are the cardinal points to be considered.

1.     The resources of the scene of wat and the facility to make use of them.

2.     The time of the year and the climate.

3.     the nature of the war, if offensive or defensive.

4.     The length of the communication lines.

5.     The rapidity of the tactical movement of the troops.

6.     The nearness of the enemy.

7.     The attitude and character of the inhabitants.

State Must Assure Supplies

The state must ensure the entire supply for the whole army day by day. The supplies must come continuously for the full number of men and animals, without regard as to whether one or the other army corps be in need of fresh supplies or not. In this war this problem may become more difficult each day, as provisions, which usually are not contraband, may become contraband of war when destined for the military or naval forces.

The right of armies to take from the enemy's country is indisputable. Military necessity permits the enforcement in an enemy's country of all measures to assist in conducting the war.

The work of the administrative department into three spheres of action:

1.     The service performed in the rear of the army, established in the national territory of in the occupied country.

2.     The service of the line of communication. Replacement of stores consumed by the army and the transportation, maintenance, quartering of troops, prisoners and wounded and the protection of these lines.

3.     The supply of the troops in the field during active operations.

Work in Conjunction

Although entirely separated these three work in conjunction. All lines of communication are under supervision of a general officer. He is assisted by a large staff and a competent force of arms to preserve order along the line of communication, guard the depots of supply and protect the line from attacks by the enemy. Such officer is subordinate to the commander of the troops in the field.

The German soldier is well fed. Every morning he gets a hot breakfast; at noon he gets hot lunch and in the evening a hot supper. These rations are placed in small tin cans, where they remain good for years. These cans are labelled and the contents are good for twenty years. One can contains enough soup for one meal for two men.

For emergency soldiers have the "iron ration." This consists of one box of canned meat, three boxes of coffee, a package of canned vegetables, a package of biscuits and a salt and pepper box.

Also Emergency Rations

The "iron ration" of the British soldier consists of one pound of preserved meat, twelve ounces of biscuit, five-eighths of an ounce of tea, two ounces of sugar, one-half ounce of salt, three ounces of cheese and one ounce of meat extract. Besides this "iron ration," the British soldier also has an "emergency ration." This consists of chocolate with added plasmon or other equally suitable milk proteid.

The food is wrapped in vegetable parchment paper and packed in tins each containing six and one-half ounces. The ration is not to be opened except by order of an officer or in extremity. It is calculated to maintain strength for thirty-six hours, if used in small quantities.

The armies of Germany, Austria, Great Britain, France and Russia have field bakeries and field kitchens, A field bakery has six to twelve ovens with all necessary equipment. The six ovens of a German field bakery can produce 16,000 loaves a day.

The portable field kitchen is adopted by the French, Russian, British, German and Austrian armies. The British field kitchen is a two-horse vehicle. It cooks for 250 men, allowing ten quarts of hot food for every twelve men. The rear part of the wagon contains a fire and four cooking pots in addition to a hot water boiler. Groceries also are carried. In this war, where men have to endure enormous hardships, and where they prefer to sleep rather than wait for food which had to be prepared at the end of a long march, the use of the field kitchen proved very advantageous.

The horses carry their "iron ration," from twelve to fifteen pounds of corn. The other forage is carried in the supply columns.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Monday, 23 May 2016

The Canadian Expeditionary Force
Topic: CEF

The Canadian Expeditionary Force

Canada's Part in the Great War, 3rd Edition, Issued by the Information Branch, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, May 1921

In the late summer and early autumn of 1914, the First Canadian Division of 33,000 men was raised and sent across the Atlantic. It left Gaspe Bay on October 3, and, after nearly three months of additional training in England, landed in France, at St. Nazaire, on February 11, 1915. The Second Division was formed immediately and landed in France on September 14, when the Canadian Army Corps was formed. The formation of the Third Division was authorized just before Christmas, 1915, and the Division was in France early in 1916. The Fourth Division joined the Canadian Corps in the middle of August, 1916. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade appeared in France in 1915. After the completion of the Canadian Army Corps the policy of the Dominion was to maintain a comparatively small number of divisions, but always to keep these at full strength, in order that the troops might have the encouragement of full ranks.

Enlistments

The total number of men enlisted in Canada from the beginning of the war to November 15, 1918, was 595,441. The details are:—

Obtained by voluntary enlistment465,984
Drafted or reported voluntarily after the Military Service Act came into force83,355
Granted leave or discharged24,933
Overseas service other than C.E.F.:—21,769 
Royal Air Force12,902 
Imperial Motor Transport710 
Inland Water Transport4,701 
Naval Service2,814 
Jewish Palestine Draft42 
 595,441

The distribution of these men was as follows:—

C.E.F. proceeded overseas.418,052
Enlisted for Royal Air Force, etc.21,169
On the strength of C.E.F. in Canada and St. Lucia, including those under training as overseas reinforcements, Siberian Expeditionary Force, Canadian Garrison Regiment, Military Police Corps, Medical and Administrative Services, etc.36,533
On harvest leave without pay.15,405
Granted leave of absence without pay as compassionate and hardship cases.7,216
Number discharged in Canada who had not proceeded overseas for the following among other reasons, as below medical standard, absentees, aliens, to accept commissions, deaths, on transfer to British Army and Royal Air Force.95,306
Included in enlistment returns, for whom discharge documents have not been received, or in some cases duplicate enlistments. This number is being adjusted as further records are received.1,760
 595,441

In addition to the above, 14,590 British and Allied reservists went from Canada to rejoin the colours in their own countries.

Movement Overseas

The number of men of the Canadian Expeditionary Force who had gone overseas on November 16, 1918, was 418,052.

The movement overseas by years was as follows:—

Before Decenber 31, 191430,999
Calendar year 191584,334
Calendar year 1916165,553
Calendar year 191763,536
January 1 to November 15, 191873,630

On September 30, 1918, about 160,000 men were in France and about 116,000 in England.

Researching Canadian Soldiers of the First World War


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Updated: Saturday, 23 April 2016 8:36 PM EDT
Sunday, 22 May 2016

The Bayonet; US Army, Korea (1951)
Topic: Cold Steel

The Bayonet; US Army, Korea (1951)

Commentarty of Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter of 1950-51, S.L.A. Marshall, October 1951

… there is a tendency to credit the bayonet with almost miraculous powers as a catalyst of the fighting spirit.

More for Morale

In most of what has been reported in the American press, and in part of what has been circulated officially within the Army, the role of the bayonet in Korean operations has been stressed far beyond its intrinsic importance, when the latter is estimated in the very real terms of the battlefield and the thinking of troops about the weapon.

It is no doubt true, and subject to competent proof, that there has been more legitimate bayonet fighting by our troops in Korea than by our armies of World War I and II.

Largely because of this comparison, and partly because the upsurge of interest in the bayonet and the exaggerated wave of publicity concerning bayonet action coincided roughly with the beginning of American recovery, there is a tendency to credit the bayonet with almost miraculous powers as a catalyst of the fighting spirit.

There is nothing particularly new about this supposed connection. Indeed, it is because this view of things is so very old and traditional that it always reasserts itself upon the slightest provocation. In Korea the bayonet advocates have a considerable case based upon an impressive body of evidence—even when rumors and provedly false reports are thrown out. The main question is whether the case as it stands is being argued to a rational set of conclusions, or will serve once again to place undue training emphasis upon the weapon and what it contributes to the building of an aggressive spirit.

At least four-fifths of the reports of "fierce bayonet charges" by our troops emanating from the Korean theater are false either in whole or in part. In some instances, the troops which were described as engaging in this manner did not even possess bayonets. In others, they had bayonets and fixed them, but, during the attack, did not close with that weapon upon the enemy. One of our allies was credited in the operations of the early winter with a bloody repulse of the enemy at bayonet point in which scores were It helped inspire the new interest skewered; this story drew attention the world over. No doubt, the killing took place. But all of the attendant circumstances in the weapon. indicate that its main victims were friendly ROKs, trying to fall back into protective lines after their own position had gone; it was a case of mistaken identity.

The need for a sharp killing instrument at the end of a rifle is well indicated by the course of Korean operations; the need of a discipline which will compel troops to retain such a weapon and will enable them to use it with some efficiency when an emergency requires it is equally well indicated. Recurrently through the winter in the defense of hilltop perimeters, infantry companies were engaged with the enemy at such But killings close range that the rifle used as a spear would have taken many a victim. by Eighth Army infantry under these circumstances were so few that they could be When the rifles began to run empty and the enemy counted on one man's fingers. at last closed, with very few exceptions the men had no blade with which to stand off the rush. For lack of bayonets, they fought with clubbed rifles, stones, and sometimes with their bare fists. All of these things are in the record: the companies and individuals who so participated can be named. Oddly enough, however, the repetition of situations in which the bayonet might have proved useful did not of itself stimulate the interest of troops in the return of the weapon. The companies which had been They caught short for having thrown the bayonet away did not demand its re-issue. were not "bayonet-minded," and they seemed perfectly willing to fight again under the same odds in the next round.

1st Marine Division retained the bayonet. The Corps has continued to hold with the idea that the bayonet makes men aggressive. The entire Chosen Reservoir operation was fought at close range, with the Chinese repeatedly charging the defensive works in the night attacks and occasionally breaking the circle. Even so, the bayonet was used with killing effect in only two instances. Three Chinese were bayoneted at Hagaru-ri—all by the same man. Three, possibly four others, were either wounded or killed by the bayonet in the one assault that, managed to break into the lines at Koto-ri. The Marines make a strong display of the weapon when in defensive position. It is within They argue with some cogency that this may be one of its chief values. reason that the Chinese attacks upon Marine perimeters north of Chinghung-ni might have been pressed with even greater determination had the attackers not anticipated that they would be met with cold steel. But to attempt to justify Marine retention of the weapon, and the attendant burden, upon what the bayonet has done as a killing weapon in Marine hands during Korean operations is impossible in view of the cold figures.

The same would have to be said of results through the Eighth Army as a whole, including those non-American elements which have received especial acclaim because of their ferocity in the bayonet charge. In February, outside of Suwon, the writer visited a hill where a battalion belonging to one of our Allies was said to have killed 154 of the enemy with bayonet thrusts; these figures were publicized in the theater. Examination of the bodies made it conclusively clear that the preponderant number of the enemy dead had been killed and badly mangled by artillery fire prior to the direct assault upon the hill. In some of these bodies, there were superficial bayonet wounds. Judging by the condition of the bodies, there may have been a dozen or fewer who were eliminated by the bayonet.

Not since the rifle bullet began to dominate the battlefield has there been any sound tact'ical ground for contending that the bayonet was per se an efficient way to kill and an agency toward keeping one's own casualties low. Argument for its retention and use has been built largely around these points: (1) it creates aggressiveness in troops, (2) it instills additional fear in the heart of the enemy, and (3) troops need a last-resort weapon when other means fail.

None of these points is to be despised. If all are true as stated, they compose a valid case for retention of the weapon and a discipline serving that end. When gradual restoration of the bayonet to infantry forces was undertaken in the mid-winter of 1950-51 by the Eighth Army and lower commands, the impulse developed partly around consideration of these ideas.

But there was one other thing—the bayonet in this instance served a conspicuous need of the moment. The Eighth Army at that time was a greatly demoralized body, and lack of confidence was manifest in the ranks. The command greatly needed Restoration of the bayonet, and a something to symbolize the birth of a new spirit. Dramatizing of that action, was at, one with the simple message given to troops: "The job is to kill Chinese." Once men could be persuaded that those in other units were deliberately seeking the hand-to-hand contest with the enemy, they would begin to feel themselves equal to the over-all task.

There can be no question about the efficacy of this magic in the particular situation: it worked! But rekindling of the spirit of the Eighth Army was due even more to loud talk about the bayonet, and the power of suggestion, than to the effectiveness of such bayonet action as took place against the enemy. The benefits came from the rallying of the intangibles rather than from direct use of material means. The rapid moral recovery of Eighth Army in January is one of the true phenomena of our military history. Here there is time for reflection only on certain of its tangential aspects.

The Army had spent five weeks in retreat; the salient fact in its operations had Ranks were discouraged; having been the avoiding of close contact with the enemy. no idea what the main purpose of the nation might be, they could find none in themselves. It was an interlude of negative leadership and moral vacuum. Where a spate of words about the need for personal decision and maximum individual aggressiveness might have been received by troops as just so much bombast, emphasis on bayonet fighting served pointed notice that the period of uncertainty was over, and henceforward all ground would be contested. In combination with other techniques employed by the command and staff, it shook Eighth Army out of a state of extreme depression and gave it fresh confidence in its own power and in leadership's hold upon the general situation.

This was the significant contribution of the bayonet to the restoration of Eighth Army. It was a device toward the restoring of morale in a particular situation. But it does not follow by any means that the bayonet and bayonet doctrine make the difference between half-hearted troops and stalwart strong-going fighters in any situation.

Some of the ablest and hardest-fighting infantry companies in Korea have not taken up the bayonet and say outright that they see no good in it. They resent the effort by higher authority to persuade them to use it because they say that it is an invitation to be killed uselessly.

There are also other companies which have used the bayonet with great intrepidity during the recent months. It may be remarked of them, according to the record, that they were already combat-worthy, aggressive, and efficient in the use of their other arms before they became bayonet fighters. There is no proof whatever that the bayonet transformed them as fighters or added materially to their fighting power as a group.

Case Study

The bayonet charge by Easy Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, against Hill 180 is the one modern operation of this character which may be studied in its full detail, in the light of knowledge of the individuals concerned, their prior service in combat, their reactions, physical and emotional, during the fight, and the operational results. It therefore throws a revealing light on the general subject and particularly on the degree of emotional intensity which is required before average Americans can go all-out in bayonet fighting.

The results were truly phenomenal. One cannot help but marvel at the impetuosity of these men, once they got started forward with their rifles ready for a cutting action. But this was not an "average" infantry company nor an average man who led it. Both had already made a reputation for unusual bravery and sangfroid before ever they got together. The company included a high percentage of individuals with Spanish or Mexican-American blood; they were represented in great disproportion in the actual employment of the blade against enemy soldiers.

The mortality figures show this breakdown: Of the 18 enemy soldiers killed by the bayonet after Easy Company had closed on their foxholes, 6 met death that way because something untoward had happened to the attacker's rifle—either a misfire In four instances, the bayonet was or a failure to load consequent to the excitement. the "weapon of last resort" because one group had used up its ammunition. In most of the other killings, the men were in so close that if a bullet missed, the consequence might have been fatal.

There is no need in this writing to dilate upon the emotional stress undergone by the bayonet fighters of Easy Company or to attempt an answer to the question of whether troops could for long be sustained at such a pitch without risking total nervous breakdown. The record is the best evidence of the varying reactions of the individuals; the question is one which could be answered competently only by medical authority. But it is germane to any study of how far bayonet training and use of the bayonet in the attack should be pushed in the interests of increasing the combat quality of the Army.

The tactical omissions, which accompany and seem to be the emotional consequence of the verve and high excitement of the bayonet charge, stand out as prominently as the extreme valor of the individuals.

  • The young Captain Millett, so intent on getting his attack going that he "didn't have time" to call for artillery fires to the rearward of the hill, though that was the natural way to close the escape route and protect his own force from snipers who were thus allowed a free hand on that ground.
  • His subsequent forgetting that the tank fire should be adjusted upward along the hill.
  • The failure to use mortars toward the same object.
  • The starving of the grenade supply, though this was a situation calling for grenades, and the resupply route was not wholly closed by fire.
  • The fractionalization of the company in the attack to the degree where only high individual action can save the situation, and individual ammunition failures may well lose it.

These are not entries on the debit side, or words uttered in criticism. One cannot study this fight without being reminded of the words of Justice Holmes that "heroism alone promotes belief in the supreme worth of heroism." But it is precisely because of the extreme determination of the action that its negative lessons should be held at as great value by the Army as the inspirational effects of the example.

In Summation

The main issue in regard to the bayonet is not whether troops in combat should have a knife ready for use at the end of a rifle, but how much time should be devoted to bayonet in the training schedule, and what type of blade would best suit the general purpose.

There is every advantage in equipping troops with a "last-resort weapon" provided that it is a model which they will prize for its manifest usefulness, and which, at the same time, will give them extra protection in an extreme emergency.

Of the value of the bayonet charge as a nerve tonic to troops or as an expedient in tactics, this report cannot attest. The data from Korean operations proves nothing except that given an unusual company of men, an unusually effective use of the weapon may occasionally be made. There is nothing to show that it induces phenomenal moral results when employed in the attack, either upon the using individuals or the targets; proof is lacking that in any particular situation it achieved a greater economy in operations than increased fire power might have done.

But a line of sharpened steel along the defensive line is additional insurance for the individual and may well have a profoundly deterring effect upon the enemy's resolve. If troops can be conditioned to having the blade ready for defense, they will soon form the habit of carrying it in the attack, ready for use if needed. The best results will ensue if use of the bayonet is emphasized in this order. There is no steadying value in any tactical teaching which runs counter to the common sense and instinct of the average soldier.

The Knife Bayonet

The issue bayonet is heavy, unwieldy, hard to sharpen, and harder yet to achieve a penetration with. The blade is not liked even by those units which have retained it and used it.

All infantry companies interviewed in Korea were in agreement that a knife-type bayonet for the M1 would be vastly preferable, and if a knife with a slotted handle were issued, which at the same time would serve a utilitarian purpose, troops would retain it and would fight with it. Such a knife is needed in any case for the cutting of brush, loosening of dirt, first aid, the opening of cans, and a variety of uses. The carbine knife is well thought of by troops, but they believe that an even better model could be designed.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Saturday, 21 May 2016

Feeding an Army (1914)
Topic: Army Rations

A very simple but exceptionally practical part of these rations is the erbswurst, or pea bologna, …

Feeding an Army (1914)

The Milwaukee Sentinel, 28 November 1914

Among the unnamed heroes in the European war whose deeds receive little or no attention are the men who take care of the hungry soldiers and horses during and after battle. In an up to date army these men form a little army by themselves, and from the very commencement of war a great strain falls upon their shoulders.

The responsibilities of the department for food supply are simply stupendous, and to fulfill successfully its task the provision department must be equipped and organized to perfection.

The feeding of a modern army is a problem of the utmost significance, as upon the efficiency of regular and quick supply of nourishing food depends its success to a very large extent.

A German army of 1,000,000 men consumes daily not less than 500 tons of food, while the feeding of the horses require daily quantities of over twice that weight.

The German military supply department is divided into two divisions, the first of which is responsible for the quick and timely distribution of food, forage and clothing, while the second division is the medical department, and attends to medical supplies only.

The main difficulties which confront the food supply department in war are the obstacles which may block the way of the supply columns. Aside from bad roads, wagons will break down, horses will be lost, and if these things are avoided the roads will be blocked by ambulances, marching troops, etc.

Also, as soon as the army begins to operate out of its own territory, there are the possibilities of the destruction of food magazines and the owners of obtainable food will often hide or destroy available victuals rather than let the enemy have them.

The war equipment of each German soldier includes the so-called "iron rations," consisting of the erbswurst, preserved meat and vegetables, biscuits, coffee and salt sufficient to furnish satisfactory meals for three days.

A very simple but exceptionally practical part of these rations is the erbswurst, or pea bologna, which is made out of mashed peas, to which minced bacon, salt and spices are added, and which, through extraction of the moisture, is preserved in containers of parchment about 10 inches long and 2 inches wide.

The simple addition of hot water to this preparation creates a wholesome, nourishing and decidedly tasty meal. In case of dire necessity the preparation can also be used cold.

But the "iron ration" of the soldier is not to be used under any circumstances unless he is cut off entirely from food supply of any kind.

Each army corps, 40,000 men, is accompanied twelve or thirteen supply columns, or one wagon to about 500 men, carrying a full ration for two days for each men.

The organization provides for food magazines on a large scale, which sends to the different army corps at regular intervals supply columns with rations per man for four days, and which is supplemented in proportion.

Thus we see that the German soldier in the field is practically continuously in reach of provisions for nine full days, and the possibility of starving soldiers, provided sufficient time is found for meals, is very remote.

What is done for the man is also done for the beast, with the exception that the cavalryman carries only one day's provisions and one day's supply of oats, in order not to hinder quick and efficient movement, and in consideration of the fact that the riding troops can be more easily brought back to the supply columns, says the Boston Globe.

The main load of these columns consist invariably of flour, to provide the fighting men daily with fresh bread. For this purpose each army corps is followed by two field bakery columns, which represent the result of many years of study and practical tests.

Whether stationary or en route these field bakeries are turning out daily from 25,000 to 40,000 portions of fresh rye bread, each portion weighing six pounds. It is far easier to move flour than baked bread, and this system eliminates also the chance of stale or moldy bread.

An innovation in the provisioning of the German army is the water columns, which are devised to prevent the use of unclean or even poisoned water as far as possible.

Previous war have taught terrible lessons to what extent the use of unclean water can decimate the strength of an army by typhoid and cholera, which, under war conditions, inevitably become epidemic.

Scientific research has revealed the disinfecting influence of free oxygen, and the military authorities were not slow in using this knowledge. The working of these water wagons is a rather complicated process, but it may suffice to say that water of any kind and from any place has been proven pure after having been pumped through the apparatus and charged with oxygen.

An equipment of this kind is of enormous value and will keep men and animals of a far greater basis of efficiency than has been possible heretofore.

While part of the supply columns are marching with the corps, another part follows at a distance of about ten miles, and a third groups keeps a day's march to the rear. These precautions are taken with a possible defeat in view and also to eliminate the capture of too great a part of the supply division.

Field bakeries as a rule follow at a distance which permits the ’army corps the use of the bread within twenty-four hours after it leaves the ovens.

To provide for three meals, the German soldier received daily: 1 pound 10 ounces bread, 1 pound 1 ½ ounce meat (fresh when possible), 1 pound 8 ounces bacon, 3/4 ounce coffee, salt.

Vegetables are provided as procurable. Wherever possible, 1 ½ ounces of tobacco is added daily. While in communication with the food magazine fresh meat is supplied when possible, and in foraging in the enemy's land the hunt for fresh meat is conducted very thoroughly.

But is conditions do not permit a sufficient supply of the fresh, the preserved meats are of such an excellent quality and so carefully prepared that they must be considered nourishing meals.

The German government has seen to it that grafting and substituting of inferior products in the supply department is an impossibility, for the value of the man in the field is keenly appreciated, and consequently most explicit care it taken to sustain the fighter and his spirit by caring for his inner machinery.

Researching Canadian Soldiers of the First World War


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Friday, 20 May 2016

Canada's Permanent Corps (1896)
Topic: Canadian Militia

Canada's Permanent Corps (1896)

A Safe Target for Distorted and Misleading Criticism
The Cost of the Force and Its Good Work for the Dominion

Canada cannot afford a large standing army, nor from her isolation from the great military nations of the world does she require one.

The Quebec Saturday Budget, 14 November 1896

The officers and men of the permanent corps are so restricted by regulations as to be practically prohibited writing to the press: they form, therefore, a safe target for the criticisms of the amateur "who knows it all." Honest criticisms the corps should not object to; they are the servants of the public and the public has a right to have, as the Hom. Minister of Militia expressed it, "a hundred cents worth for every dollar expended." But as a rule the written attacks upon them either lack the 'essential element" or are so distorted as to be quite as annoying.

As an example, somewhere about a year ago the Military Gazette, published in Montreal, presented in an attack upon the permanent corps, an array of figures, evidently with the intention of persuading its readers that these corps absorb the greater portion of the militia funds, and it was boldly asserted that they were not worth their cost. Figures it is said, will not lie, but they may be presented as to lead to very erroneous conclusions.

In the article referred to it is made to appear that the permanent corps cost the country the previous year in round numbers $476,000, while the remainder of the militia cost only $211,000; as the whole militia vote for that year was $1,360,000, it might have spoiled the writer's argument, but it would have been more satisfactory to some at least of his readers, if he had told what became of the remaining $672,000.

The writer truthfully observes that "even this statement does not give the whole case." A careful examination of the Auditor-General's report and the official papers leads me to believe that the cost was much nearer $383,000 for the permanent corps and $477,000 for the "other militia," the balance being expended on fortifications, etc. For these sums we had on the one hand about one thousand officers and men well drilled, equipped and clothed ready to take the field at a moment's notice for the stern duties of war, who performed 329,960 days duty; on the other hand, 17,686 officers and men, many of the officers without sufficient military knowledge to make good non-commissioned officers, the majority of the men in the rural districts raw recruits, with scarce any equipment, who performed 212,232 days of elementary drill.

We have been told that the permanent corps have been a failure as schools of instruction. If it is meant that they have failed to grant certificates to men who did not deserve them, it is probably true. Experience has taught us that a small available force is a necessity in aid of the civil power, and all arguments to the contrary, notwithstanding, will be a necessity until the arrival of the millenium. The presence of a permanent corps in Quebec in times past has saved the authorities thousands of dollars, and even Montreal has not objected to them on several occasions. During the North-West unpleasantness the permanent corps were first in the field and last to leave, were always kept to the front, sustained the heaviest losses, did the hardest work, and got the least kudos. In other words, they have done their duty and their reward has been the approval of a good conscience and slanderous attacks which they are practically forbidden to reply to. That they are not perfect in every respect as their critics are, I will admit; there is room for reform and economy in the administration as there is in every department and profession, but in suggesting the better way do not drive truth from the field in order to score a point. Personally I object to the title of permanent corps, they should have retained their original titles as schools of instruction.

Canada cannot afford a large standing army, nor from her isolation from the great military nations of the world does she require one, but she does require "that degree of protection for self-defence that would compel other nations to hesitate before making war upon her" and this degree of preparation can be best secured by maintaining in the highest degree of efficiency schools of instruction for the militia, from which politics are entirely eliminated.

We read periodically, laudatory reports of the ability, knowledge and zeal of some 25,000 men, of the large quantities of military material and of the 600,000 men we have in reserve; but have these 25,000 men, beyond elementary drill, any real and valuable military knowledge? In no other calling in life would a similar amount of knowledge be considered worth a thought. Fancy even a college graduate, reading for the first time, theology, medicine or law for twelve days in a year, and their claiming to be an expert.

Of what use are 100,000 knapsacks if the material of which they are composed is rotten from age of insufficient care? Of what use are fuzes that will not act? Of ammunition of various makes and ages and unknown power or of obsolete patterns? What particular value are crumbling walls in the heart of a city armed with smooth bore guns on rotten carriages? Are 600,000 men invincible, without military training, modern arms and equipment, and without trained officers and non-commissioned officers to promptly organize, instruct and care for them and direct them in the field? It seems to me there is a very large field here for those military critics who are affected with cacoethes scribendi.

Militaire.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Thursday, 19 May 2016

Military District No. 1 (Second World War)
Topic: Wolseley Barracks

History of Military District No. 1 in the Late War

Off Parade; newsletter of No. 1 District Depot, Wolseley Barracks, July 1946
By: Capt E. Kelleher, P.R.O., M.D. 1

Military District No. 1, which is rightfully proud of its ranking number on the national map of Canada, more than lived up to its fine military traditions in the Second World War.

At the outbreak of the war in 1939, there were only 400 permanent force troops in this District, while the non-permanent active militia were counted at some 3,500 men.

But the call to the Colours was answered in a swelling stream of combat manpower. It is a matter of record today that 80,000 Western Ontario men enlisted in the three services, and of that total 50,000 joined the Army. And one must pay tribute also to the large numbers of girls and women from the western counties who joined the C.W.A.C. and took over vital Army jobs.

M.D. No. 1 maintained a fast pace in the all-out war effort, first under Brig. (later Maj.-Gen.) D.J. MacDonald, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., who was District Officer Commanding at the outbreak of war; and then under his successor, Brig. P. Earnshaw, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., who still handles the reins of this key District.

No time was lost in setting up the machinery to school recruits for this stark business of war. Basic training centres were established at Chatham, Woodstock, Kitchener, Listowel, and Stratford. Chatham alone handled a total of 18,000 recruits in its career. Later came A-29 Canadian Infantry Corps Training centre at Camp Ipperwash, which graduated thousands of fully-trained soldiers to front-line units.

Woodstock developed into S-5 Canadian Driving and Maintenance School, which drew candidates from around the country for special training. It is estimated that 17,000 officers and men completed courses at that Centre.

And from men's basic training, Kitchener grew into No. 3 C.W.A.C. Basic Training Centre. One authority has said that more than two-thirds of the nation's C.W.A.C.'s took their "basic" at Kitchener. One of the most cosmopolitan of army camps, Kitchener was the alma mater of girls from Newfoundland, the United States, British West Indies, Bahamas, Bermuda, and even some who had escaped from Nazi-occupied countries of France, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

Eventually, Kitchener was the only C.W.A.C centre left on the war establishment, and it handled basic as well as officer training.

M.D. No. 1 also gained Central Mechanization Depot, located in London, and popularly known as Canada's "largest Army garage." With its branches in Hagersville and New Sarum, it still functions as the most extensive Army depot of its kind.

The Royal Canadian Regiment, the District's only permanent force unit, was the first to be mobilized.

The following N.P.A.M. regiments were also mobilized during the war:

  • 6th Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) of London,
  • Essex Scottish Regiment of Windsor,
  • Canadian Fusiliers (City of London Regiment),
  • Kent Regiment of Chatham,
  • Elgin Regiment of St. Thomas,
  • Perth Regiment of Stratford,
  • Highland Light Infantry of Canada, of Galt,
  • Scots Fusiliers of Canada, of Kitchener,
  • 30th Reconnaissance Regiment of Windsor, and the
  • Oxford Rifles of Woodstock.

Other units mobilized in M.D. No. 1 included:

  • Royal Canadian Artillery (R.C.A.)
    • 100th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, Listowel.
    • 98th (Bruce) Anti-Tank Battery, Pert Elgin.
    • 16th Field Battery, Guelph.
    • 26th (Lambton) Field Battery, Sarnia.
    • 29th Field Battery, Guelph.
    • 43rd Field Battery, Guelph.
    • 55th Field Battery, London.
    • 63rd Field Battery, Guelph.
    • 99th Field Battery, Wingham.
    • 12th Medium Battery, London.
    • 97th Field Battery, Walkerton.
    • No. 1 Artillery Holding Unit, London.
    • No. 4 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, R.C.A., London.
    • 48th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., Watford.
    • 9th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., Walkerton.
  • Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.)
    • 7th Field Company, London.
    • 11th (Lambton) Field Company, Sarnia.
    • 1st Field Park Company (Lambton), Sarnia.
    • No. 1 Road Construction Company, R.C.E.
    • 9th Field Company, London.
    • H.Q. 2nd Infantry Division, Sarnia.
  • Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (R.C.C.S.)
    • 1st Canadian Division Signals, London.
    • 1st A.A. Brigade H.Q., London.
  • Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (R.C.A.S.C.)
    • No. 3 Company, London.
    • No. 11 Company, London.
    • 4th Division Petrol Company, R.C.A.S.C., London.
  • Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (R.C.A.M.C.)
    • No. 2 Base Depot of Medical Stores, Kitchener.
    • No. 11 Field Ambulance, Guelph.
    • No. 15 Field Ambulance, London.
    • No. 24 Field Ambulance, Kitchener.
    • No. 3 General Hospital, Windsor.
    • No. 10 General Hospital, London.
    • 28th Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., London.
    • 1st Field Hygiene Section, R.C.A.M.C., London.
  • Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (R.C.O.C.) .
    • No. 1 Armoured Brigade Ordnance Field Park.
    • No. 1 Army Field Workshop, R.C.O.C.
    • No. 2 Mobile Laundry and Decontamination Unit.
    • No. 4 General Labour Section, R.C.O.C.
    • No. 4 Mobile Laundry and Decontamination Unit, Windsor.
  • Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (R.C.E.M.E)
    • 16th L.A.D.
    • 17th L.A.D.
    • 18th L.A.D.
    • 19th L.A.D.
    • 20th L.A.D.
    • 21st L.A.D.
    • 22nd L.A.D.
    • 23rd L.A.D.
    • 24th L.A.D. (all of London)
  • Canadian Provost Corps (C. Pro. C.)
    • 3rd Provost Company.
    • 4th Provost Company.
    • 8th Provost Company.
    • 11th Provost Company.
  • Veterans' Guard of Canada.
    • No. 2 Company.
    • No. 40 Company

       

Canadian Army Battle Honours


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Updated: Saturday, 16 April 2016 3:12 PM EDT
Wednesday, 18 May 2016

To Test New Equipment (US Army, 1911)
Topic: Soldiers' Load

To Test New Equipment (US Army, 1911)

The Milwaukee Sentinel, 27 March 1911

The maneuvres of the United States army along the Mexican border will afford an opportunity to try out the more modern and lighter personal equipment for the individual soldier. Ever since military experts began a real study of conditions with the intention, if possible, of lightening the infantryman's burden, the one foremost idea has been in lessening the number of pounds of accoutrements necessarily carried when under full field equipment. Full field equipment is the new and official term used in place of the old heavy marching order.

Under the present army regulations the full field equipment for active service, including rifle and ninety rounds of ammunition, weighs fifty-four pounds. Although some reports of the mobilization have said that each man received 200 rounds, it was pointed out by an expert that while the particular organization of troops carried such a supply with them, only the prescribed ninety rounds were doled out to each soldier. Only in extreme cases—that is, when a body of men are to be immediately engaged in actual battle—are the extra cartridges supplied.

With fifty-four pounds as the present weight of the individual equipment for an infantryman, it is the hope of the military experts to reduce that from fifteen to seventeen pounds; but the ever present idea remains in their mind, namely, that an equal efficiency must be obtained from the lighter articles. The use of aluminum plates, knives, forks and spoons, together with haversacks, tent halves, ponchos, tent poles, etc., of lesser weight, it is thought will bring down the total number of pounds per man.

Under the present ruling a soldier carries besides hi piece, a Springfield magazine rifle which weighs nine and a half pounds, and ninety rounds of cartridges which weigh four and a half pounds, a bayonet, bayonet scabbard, a rifle sling, cartridge belt, a pair of cartridge belt suspenders which tend to lessen the weight by help from the shoulders, a first aid packet, a canteen and strap, a set of blanket roll straps, a haversack, a meat can, once cup, one plate, one knife, one fork, one spoon, half a shelter tent, one tent pole and five tent pegs. Then in addition to that comes his field kit, the weight of which is included in the total fifty-four pounds; consisting of a blanket, a poncho and personal effects, such as a comb, toothbrush, towel, extra underclothing, soap, etc.

But besides the soldier's individual load there are intrenching tools which are given out and carried by company and squad. A full company is made up of 108 men and officers in time of war and sixty men and officers in time of peace. A squad, the second unit of a company, consists of eight men. The intrenching tools are four hand picks, to be carried by company, a pick mattock per squad, three shovels per squad, three wire cutters per company and a two foot folding rule per company. These tools are an addition to the fifty-four pounds and the soldiers take turns in carrying them.

Most of the troops in the Mexican border war game are equipped with the fifty-four pound outfit; but enough are using the lighter articles to insure a thorough tryout.. Tin plates, meat cans, etc., instead of aluminum ones are the staple mess equipment carried by the majority of these soldiers.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Tuesday, 17 May 2016

The Canadian Force at the Front (1918)
Topic: CEF

The Canadian Force at the Front (1918)

Each Division contained 19,000 to 20,000 troops, and there were about 10,000 Corps troops, making about 90,000 men in the Corps.

Canada's Part in the Great War, 3rd Edition, Issued by the Information Branch, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, May 1921

The distribution of the Canadian troops in France and Belgium on September 30, 1918, was as follows:—

The Canadian Army Corps, forming part of the British Army, consisted of four Divisions and Corps Troops.

Each Division consisted of three Infantry Brigades, each of which was made up of four Battalions of Infantry and one Trench Mortar Battery, and the following Divisional Troops:

  • Artillery—Two brigades, two medium and one heavy Trench Mortar Batteries, and a Divisional Ammunition Column;
  • One battalion of the Machine Gun Corps;
  • Engineers—three Engineer Battalions, one Pontoon Bridging Transport Unit, and one Divisional Employment Company;
  • Divisional Train of four Companies;
  • Medical Services—three field Ambulances, one Sanitary Section and one Mobile Veterinary Section;
  • Divisional Signals of four Sections, one at Divisional headquarters and one with each Brigade.

Canadian Army Battle Honours

The Corps Troops were as follows:—

Corps Artillery: Three Brigades of Garrison Artillery containing twelve Siege Batteries and two Heavy Batteries, one Anti-Aircraft Battery of five sections, three Brigades of Field Artillery, two medium and one heavy Trench Mortar Batteries, one Divisional Artillery Ammunition Column, and two Motor Machine Gun Brigades.

Corps Engineers: Pontoon Bridging Unit, five Army Troop Companies, two Tramway Companies, and Anti-Aircraft Searchlight Company and Corps Survey Section.

Corps Medical Services: One Field Ambulance, one Sanitary Section, the Dental Laboratory and the Veterinary Evacuating Station.

Corps Signalling Services: The Corps Signal Company, two Motor Aid Line Sections, four Cable Sections, four Brigade Signal Subsections and one C.D.A. Brigade Detachment.

Army Service Corps: Headquarters Mechanical Transport Column, seven Mechanical Transport Companies, one Divisional Artillery Mechanical Transport Detachment, one Artillery Brigade Park Section and one Divisional Train Detachment.

Ordnance Services: Three Ordnance Mobile Workshops.

Miscellaneous: Infantry School, Machine Gun School, Lewis Gun School, Signal School, Gas Services School, Instructors' Pool, Gymnastic Staff, Canadian Records List, Y.M.C.A. Services, Corps Military Police and two Railhead Army Post Offices. Labour Services—Labour Group Headquarters, four Labour Companies, a Pontoon Bridging Officers' Establishment and five Canadian Area Employment Companies.

Each Division contained 19,000 to 20,000 troops, and there were about 10,000 Corps troops, making about 90,000 men in the Corps.

The Canadian Cavalry Brigade formed part of the Third British Cavalry Division belonging to the Third Army and consisted of three Cavalry Regiments, a machine Gun Squadron, the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, a Signal Troop, a Field Ambulance and a Mobile Veterinary Section. There were about 3,000 men in the Brigade which was part of the Third Army.

The following Canadian Units, separate from the Canadian Corps, were attached to the five British Armies:—

First Army: Two Casualty Clearing Stations, one Sanitary Section, one Railhead Supply Detachment and two Battalions of Railway Troops.

Second Army: One Casualty Clearing Station, one Advanced Depot Medical Stores, two Battalions of Railway Troops, two Auxiliary Horse Transport Companies, one Field Butchery, two Depot Units of Supply, a Railhead Supply Detachment, and a Tunnelling Company.

Third Army: One Casualty Clearing Station, one Railhead Supply Detachment, three Battalions of Railway Troops and the Overseas Railway Construction Corps.

Fourth Army: One Medical Corps Mobile Laboratory, four Battalions of Railway Troops, one Light Railway Operating Company, and one Broad Gauge Operating Company.

Fifth Army: One Battalion of Railway Troops.

On the Line of Communications and attached to British General Headquarters were the following: Thirteen Depot Units of Supply, four Field bakeries, and two Field Butcheries, which were distributed at Boulogne, Calais, and Dieppe; six General Hospitals and six Stationary Hospitals, which were at eight different places; the General Base Depot, the Infantry Base Depot, the Machine Gun Base Depot, the Labour Pool, the Report Centre, the Command Pay Office, the Dental Store, two Field Auxiliary Post Offices, the base Post Office, one Veterinary Hospital, one Battalion of Railway Troops, one Wagon Erecting Company, and one Engine Crrew Company. The following troops of the Canadian Forestry Corps were distributed at eleven places in France: Sixty-three Forestry Companies, five District Workshops, one Construction Company, one Technical Warehouse, one Forestry Hospital, and two Detention Hospitals.

There were altogether about 160,000 Canadians serving in France on September 30, 1918.

The Canadian Army Corps was commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Currie, with the following divisional commanders: 1st Division, Maj.-Gen. A.C. MacDonell, 2nd Division, Maj.-Gen. Sir H.E. Burstall; 3rd Division Maj.-Gen. F.O.W. Loomis; 4th Division, Maj.-Gen. Sir D. Watson

Researching Canadian Soldiers of the First World War


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Monday, 16 May 2016

Adjustment of the soldier to an Oversea Environment
Topic: Leadership

Adjustment of the soldier to an Oversea Environment

Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-14; Training Guide for Commanders of Company Sized Units; 31 July 1967

The astute commander must not only be a leader and trainer of men, but a student of psychology and human nature as well.

a.     The soldier who steps off the ship or plane upon his arrival overseas is faced with the problem of adjusting to two types of new environment, geographical and situational. In most instances, this will be his first trip outside the United States; specifically his first experience in a foreign country. But even if he has been overseas before, he will find many changes and feel the necessity of adjusting to these changes. As with all other problems in a command, it's the commander who is responsible to see that the soldiers become adjusted.

b.     The new arrival should be indoctrinated in the customs of the country in which he is stationed. He should be encouraged to meet his new neighbors, learn their ways, study their language, and become familiar with their history. Commanders exercising the proper guidance and indoctrination can reap unending benefits from an effective orientation, not only through better community relations, but in higher morale of their troops. Once he has adjusted to his new surroundings, the strangeness of being in a foreign country will gradually wear off and he will become more productive as a soldier.

c.     Being away from home may tend to lower the morale of the new arrival, but if his energies are directed into the right channels, all will benefit. Facilities for off-duty education are available and their use should be encouraged. For those who shy from "book-learning" but would like some practical acquaintance with geography, history, and local customs, the recreation and travel opportunities are unlimited, and as such as probably available to many for the first and last time. Each commander should guide and encourage his men to take maximum advantage of these unique opportunities.

d.     Simultaneously with adjustment to his new geographical environment must come adjustment to his new situational environment. This transformation is one of attitude, in which the new arrival must be made to realize that he is no longer in a basic training or garrison situation. He must now apply the training principles and garrison experience he has gained. He must be made aware of the seriousness of his situation—that he is in the front line of defense against aggression. While there are many educational and recreational diversions overseas, the commander must keep the new arrival constantly alert to the necessity of keeping himself combat ready. The astute commander must not only be a leader and trainer of men, but a student of psychology and human nature as well. He must be able to instill in his men the feeling that they can enjoy their tours of duty overseas, benefit by the experience, and at the same time be prepared to assume more serious endeavors when called upon.

e.     Each individual should be thoroughly indoctrinated concern­ing the importance of his job and how it fits into the "big picture," An individual who feels he occupies an important place in the organization will generally be more effective. He will have a better understanding of the heavy training requirements, of the need for field exercises, and of his small but important part in the free world's fighting forces.

f.     You as a commander now have a new replacement. His future value in your unit depends on you. Proper orientation and a continuing program of profitable training, guidance, and information will help him and you. Without these, and left to his own devices in a local gasthaus or bar, he can become a disciplinary problem.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Sunday, 15 May 2016

Year's Work of Canada's Militia (1913)
Topic: Canadian Militia

Year's Work of Canada's Militia (1913)

Annual Report of Militia Council is Presented by Col. Sam. Hughes
No Important Changes
Permanent Force Now Comprises 3,118 men, Including Officers—Increased Expenditure was $791,947

The Montreal Gazette, 15 January 1913

Ottawa, January 14.—The year's work in the Canadian Militia is reviewed in the annual report of the Militia Council presented by Colonel the Hon. Samuel Hughes. The one object sought, says the report in part, was preparedness for war, the power to mobilize at short notice a force of adequate strength, well-trained and fully equipped. In the scheme of defence a few adjustments have been made, but no important changes introduced.

Respecting mobilization, the general scheme is assuming definite shape. It depends for its success on decentralization, Division commanders will be given as free a hand as possible and not required to adopt a uniform system. The peace strength of the militia compared to war establishments is relatively low.

An inter-departmental committee, composed of the director of the naval service, chief of the general staff, and general staff officer for mobilization has been formed. Seventeen officers took instructional courses in England during the year. The report deals at length with the instructional schools of the militia in Canada, which in the last fiscal year granted certificates to 1,724 officers. In the year forty officers were appointed to the permanent staff.

The permanent force now comprises 3,118 men, of which 202 are officers. The largest number, 1,201, are at Halifax, Quebec coming second with 404, Toronto with 346, and Kingston with 345. The year's expenditure under votes was $7,558,284, and by statute $21,600. This was an increase of $791,947. A total of 38,994 men received efficiency pay aggregating $174,053.

"The main obstacles to our efficiency," remarks General Otter, "present themselves in two forms—lack of money on the one hand and the profusion of it in the form of successful enterprises on the other. The former, militating against the provision of armories and equipment, rifle ranges and training grounds, and so placing obstacles in the prosecution of effective training in its full significance; the latter prevents individuals from sparing the time necessary to fit themselves for the military duties they have assumed."

General Otter goes on to say that not enough serious thought is given to neglect of preparation for defence. Is it not imperative, he asks, that we possess a military force adequate to bear the first brunt of conflict or in any event cause the invader to stop and think on the threshold. He expresses the belief that the plaudits for church or ceremonial parades may have lulled us into the belief that we are fit and capable for any invasion and that we are encouraging a rude awakening and irreparable loss some day.

Canadian Army Battle Honours


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Saturday, 14 May 2016

British Army; Personnel Statistics, 1882
Topic: British Army

British Army; Personnel Statistics, 1882

"Military Matters," The Toronto Daily Mail, 28 January 1882

Thus the average British soldier is about 23 years of age, about 5 ft. 7 in. in height, and about 37 in. round the chest.

The last general annual return of the British Army has been issued, and contains a great deal of interesting information on many points affecting the military efficiency of the Empire. It shows that the average strength of the regular forces, officers and men, during the year was 188,986, of whom 7,817 were officers, 12,431 sergeants and farriers, 3,472 trumpeters, drummers, and buglers, and 165,266 rank and file.

On the 1st of January, 1880, the number of the rank and files was 167,909, or 3,794 over the establishment; while on the corresponding day of the present year it was 165,320, or 397 over the establishment. The numbers voted (rank and file) of each arm of the service on the latter day were: —

  • Household Cavalry, 1,029
  • Cavalry of the Line, 13,592
  • Royal Horse Artillery, 4,827
  • Royal Artillery, 25,473
  • Royal Engineers, 4,053
  • Foot Guards, 5,250
  • Infantry of the Line, 104,460
  • Colonial Corps, 2,146

– the remainder being the Departmental Army Service and Army Hospital Corps.

Regarding the question of the age of men joining the army, it appears that 1,021 were under 17 and 156 between 17 and 18 years of age. In both cases they were probably for the bands. Those joining: —

  • from 18 to 19 years numbered 6,611;
  • from 19 to 20, 5,510;
  • from 20 to 21, 3,667;
  • from 21 to 22, 2,525;
  • from 22 to 23, 2,081;
  • from 23 to 24, 1,785;
  • from 24 to 25, 1,968;

– while a few — 289 — were enlisted over 25.

Regarding the height of the men, the numbers are: —

  • Under 5 ft. 5 in., 9,360;
  • 5 ft., 6 in., 24,756;
  • 5 ft., 7 in., 37,033;
  • 5 ft., 8 in., 37,389;
  • 5 ft., 9 in., 29,806;

Then the numbers fall off considerably, until only 3,502 are left at 6 ft. and upwards.

In the point of chest measurement in inches there are: —

  • 3,192 under 33 in.;
  • 5,819 from that to 34 in.;
  • 20,082 from that to 35 in.;
  • 32,599 from that to 36 in.;
  • 40,348 from that to 37 in.;

– after which a progressive fall takes place and only 7,373 are described as over 40 in.

Thus the average British soldier is about 23 years of age, about 5 ft. 7 in. in height, and about 37 in. round the chest.

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT
Friday, 13 May 2016

Public Service Advisory - Artillery Firing at Camp Petawawa
Topic: Drill and Training

Public Service Advisory – Artillery Firing at Camp Petawawa

Canada Gazette, 15 June 1907

Published in the Canada Gazette, the following public service advisory cautioned civilians about artillery firing at Camp Petawawa. Of note is the information that the public was not restricted from accessing the range area when the artillery was not in action. Even more surprising is the reward offered for shells found by members of the public.

"Notice. The public are hereby cautioned that Artillery Practice will take place at Petawawa, between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. daily, except Sundays, from the 17th July to about the 1st September, 1907.

"The danger zone will be an area bounded on the west by the Canadian Pacific railway, on the south by a line drawn north-east from the railway bridge over the Petawawa River, north of Petawawa Station, to the Ottawa River, on the north by the right bank of the Chalk River from the Canadian pacific Railway Bridge to Sturgeon lake, thence to Allumette Bay, on the Ottawa River.

"The public are also cautioned not to touch any whole shells found on the range as they are dangerous, but to report their whereabouts to the Camp Commandant, Artillery Camp. Petawawa. The sum of 60 cents will be paid for each shell so reported."

Camp Commandant,
Artillery Practice Camp, Petawawa

The Senior Subaltern


Posted by regimentalrogue at 12:01 AM EDT

Newer | Latest | Older

The Regimental Rogue.

Follow The Regimental Rogue on facebook.

« May 2016 »
S M T W T F S
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30 31
Entries by Topic
All topics  «
Armouries
Army Rations
Battle Honours
British Army
Canadian Army
Canadian Militia
CEF
Cold Steel
Cold War
Commentary
CWGC
Discipline
DND
DND - DHH
Drill and Training
Events
Forays in Fiction
Halifax
Humour
LAC
Leadership
Martial Music
Medals
Militaria
Military Medical
Military Theory
Mortars
Officers
OPSEC
Paardeberg
Pay; the Queen's shilling
Perpetuation
RCAF
RCN
Remembrance
Resistance
Soldiers' Load
Staff Duties
Taking Advantage
The Field of Battle
The RCR
The RCR Museum
Tradition
US Armed Forces
Vimy Pilgrimage
Wolseley Barracks

You are not logged in. Log in
Blog Tools
Edit your Blog
Build a Blog
RSS Feed
View Profile