USER SUGGESTION FORM

From:

To: Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2042 Broadway Street, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5067 (C 400P)

Subj: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING MCRP 6-11A, A BOOK ON BOOKS

1. In accordance with the Foreword to MCRP 6-11A, which invites individuals to submit suggestions concerning this MCRP directly to the above addressee, the following unclassified recommendation is forwarded:

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Nature of Change: □ Add □ Delete □ Change □ Correct

2. Proposed new verbatim text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary.)

3. Justification/source: (Need not be double-spaced.)

Note: Only one recommendation per page.
FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 6-11A, *A Book on Books*, has been prepared to provide a guide for the United States Marine Corps Professional Reading Program.

2. SCOPE

**Read to Lead in Today’s Corps.** This publication is directed to all Marines, as we are all bound by a common pursuit of professional knowledge. Our profession is warfighting, and, therefore, the emphasis of the professional reading program is on books that will make the individual Marine a better warfighter. This is not homework; this is not drudgery. The selected books have been chosen for their intrinsic excitement as well as their content. Many of the books will be hard to put down. This publication is your roadmap to the professional reading program and serves as a handy reference on how the program works and what the books are about. Let it guide your efforts in developing your own reading program.

3. SUPERSESSION


4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited from commands as well as directly from individuals. Forward suggestions using the User Suggestion Form format to—

 COMMANDING GENERAL (C 40 OP)
 MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
 2042 BROADWAY STREET
 QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5067

5. CERTIFICATION
Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

PAUL K. VAN RIPER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 144 000014 00
# A Book on Books

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Our goal as Marines is to support and defend our nation. Some of the ways we achieve that goal include combat training, the maintenance of weapons and equipment, and physical fitness. These steps alone, however, do not prepare us adequately for combat as we would find ourselves physically ready, but mentally unprepared to fight. Mental readiness is attained partially through training, but primarily it is acquired as a result of professionally oriented education.

The ability to make clear and swift judgments amid chaos is what sets warriors apart. Training in the field and in wargames is important to improving our military judgment, but its development remains anchored primarily to a sound understanding of war. Through education we can equip ourselves to make sound military judgments even in chaotic and uncertain situations; it is here that professional reading plays a vital role.

Professional reading enriches our knowledge and understanding of war and enhances our ability to make timely and sound military judgments. How do we translate written words into sound military decisions? Obviously, the first step is to read. Then, we must relate what we have read to what we actually do in training. The means of accomplishing this are many and varied, but some proven methods are discussed below.

### Reading in Depth About a Single Battle

The professional reading program is designed to enhance every Marine’s understanding of the art and science of war. The thorough study of a single battle goes a long way towards attaining that military literacy.

Take the battle of Tarawa, for instance. You might begin with Robert Sherrod’s *Tarawa*, and Colonel Joseph H. Alexander’s *Utmost Savagery*, and then supplement your reading by looking up “Tarawa” in the indexes of Isely and Crowl’s *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*, Moskin’s *The U.S. Marine Corps Story*, and Spector’s *Eagle Against the Sun*. By the time you have studied one battle in this way, you will have learned much about your profession on multiple levels. You will—

- Learn how the Japanese defended the island; how they integrated artillery and armor into their defense and how they made extensive use of bunkers and other field fortifications (including coconut logs at the beach to make it difficult for men and machines to traverse).
- Learn what Marines did to penetrate these defenses; how they employed reconnaissance, task-organized rifle squads, and combined arms in the form of artillery, naval gunfire, and aviation.
• Learn how the Japanese Naval Infantry on Tarawa was motivated to fight virtually to the last man—and reflect on why.

• See that a static defense, isolated on something such as an island, can be defeated, no matter how strong—and come to grips with the number of casualties it costs to reduce such a defense. Contemplate why no senior American officer came close to predicting the difficulty of, or friendly casualties associated with, this operation.

In seeing how this irresistible force clashed and grappled with what seemed an immovable object, you will make discoveries about offensive and defensive tactics, reconnaissance, and combined arms. Lessons of intelligence are inescapable as you view the two sides groping to come to terms with one another.

But there will be much more. Study of this one battle will also take you to the higher levels of war, the operational and strategic. Contemplate, for example—

• Opposing strategies and supporting campaigns in the broad strategic context of the Pacific War.

• Lessons about command and control related to communications on both sides (they seldom work as planned).

• How reserves were employed and how they might have been better employed

• Why and how technological foresight equipped us with the right type of amphibious vehicles, but in woefully insufficient quantities.

• The moral dimensions of war and the challenges of leadership, especially in Sherrod’s book:
  ■ What kind of men did it take?
  ■ How frightened were they?
  ■ How did they overcome their fears?
  ■ Where did they get their courage?
  ■ What does it mean to be a Marine?

So now, studying this single battle has revealed lessons about the operational art, strategy, communications, technology, the friction of war, leadership, and morale. Marines who know one battle well know more about their profession than those who have read a hundred manuals. They may not be able to define what they know, or divide the battle into phases, or tell you where the line of departure was, or who manufactured the aircraft or what kind of alloys were in the metal of the machines. They may still need to read some manuals, but they will have gained a sensing of the character and dynamics of battle.

Much—in fact most—of what the reader can learn about Tarawa, can be applied to other battles. Such things as courage, leadership, strategy, dispersion, and focus have applied in every past battle and will apply to future battles. They can be learned equally well from thorough studies of Khe Sanh, Chosin, Iwo Jima, Belleau Wood, Antietam, and other battles.
Reading About Many Battles

We have discussed how reading in-depth about a single battle can improve your professional knowledge and insights. Further rewards come from reading about many battles. You will discover that some aspects of battle are timeless, never changing from antiquity through the present, in cold climates or hot, in jungle or desert. Other aspects of battle do change and one of the best ways you can gain professional insights into which things stay the same and which things change is to read about different battles.

Reading About Subjects Other Than Battles

History gives you an appreciation for the realities of your profession which is essential. But you should read more than history. Read military theory as well. Just be careful. The works of theorists often get condensed and simplified. For example, on the assumption that the reader does not wish to tackle something as lengthy and profound as Clausewitz, his ideas are condensed into simplified principles or even procedures. That is how much of our previous doctrine was written. The reader of such condensed works unwittingly becomes the prisoner of someone else’s theories. The only way for us to gain our freedom from this kind of imprisonment is to read about the human experience in war ourselves, and then draw our own conclusions. Remember, all those authors developed their theories and conclusions by studying battles. You have the opportunity to study the same historical events, and you may arrive at different conclusions.

Do not restrict yourself to battles alone. Campaigns and wars need to be studied too. They can be studied with or without focusing on the battles.

Read good fiction. For instance, The Red Badge of Courage is on the list. It is well known that its author was never in combat. Yet he had a real-life understanding of fear and what fear does to people. Anyone who has been in combat and read The Red Badge of Courage recognizes that Stephen Crane did an excellent job of describing fear. Because Marine leaders must work with their Marines to discourage them from taking counsel of their fears, it is important for us to be literate in the subject. Read about subjects such as this through the best commentators our culture has to offer.

Do not restrict yourself to reading only those books that are on the Marine Corps reading list! The requirement is small—two to four books a year—for a reason. It allows you to read the classics, other books not directly related to warfighting, and the kinds of books you enjoy the most.

It is also just as important for you to know what you are fighting for, and what you stand for, as it is to know how to fight. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are works we need to be familiar with if we are to be well-rounded professionals tasked with guarding our nation.

How to Read

When people “are in love and are reading a love letter, they read for all they are worth.” And that is how to read a book, says Dr. Mortimer Adler, our nation’s best known authority on reading. Marines can relate to this. Tough as Marines may be, anyone who
thinks Marines don’t receive, read, and write love letters has never been in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and never been at mail call in a deployed unit.

Some Marines are hesitant about this program because they do not read well. Fear not! The best way to learn to read is to read. Read slowly. Speed will come in time. Besides, speed is not the important thing. Comprehension of the material is the most important aspect. It is not the number of books you read that will help you in combat. It is what you have learned from the books. The main thing to remember is that the professional reading program is not a check-in-the-box exercise. It is an exercise in learning!

Because the Corps is depending on leaders in the chain of command to make the professional reading program work, many Marine leaders will want to read Adler’s book, How to Read a Book: The Art of Getting a Liberal Education (New York, N.Y. Simon and Schuster. 1940). It is a great help in explaining to others why it is important to read, what one gains from reading, and how best to get the most out of it.

What To Read

We have individual goals and common goals for our professional reading program. Marines should pick their books according to their needs, filling in areas where they are weak and reinforcing where they are strong. A commander may also make choices for the unit, especially when he or she identifies a need for the unit to read a single work or to read on a specific topic. We do not want reading contests—attempts to see which unit can read more. This would conflict with the spirit of the program.

The listed books are seed corn to stimulate interest in reading about our profession. Marines should be encouraged to read works that are not on the list, too. Both the individual and the Corps benefit each time a Marine discovers a new work that is relevant and useful. New material is always coming out, more than any centralized official body can ever discover. To that end, chapter 2 provides both general battle references and recommended periodicals that can help Marines remain current in our changing world. Chapter 3 gives the reader concise reviews of the various books in the professional reading program and is invaluable in making selections on what next to read. Lastly, appendix A contains the complete reading list by title and grade and is useful as a quick reference tool for the professional reading program.

What Not To Read

There is nothing that Marines are discouraged from reading. We are not in the business of book banning or censorship. Marines can and should read whatever they want.

About the Book List

Why are books listed? The list consists of those books that are especially helpful in learning the art of war. The list was compiled by Marines and scholars who have worked closely with Marines. Therefore, each book helped some Marine or a friend of the Marine Corps to learn about the art of war. The same book might help you too.

Why aren’t books listed? There are any number of reasons for not listing certain books. Some of the best books in the world are not on the list. But no two people are likely to
agree on what the best books in the world really are. The list serves as a guide to give all Marines a common basis, a foundation for understanding and communication.

**Implementation and Impact of the Program**

Implementing the program is not complicated. All the information you need is contained in this book. The manner in which the program is implemented is left up to the discretion and initiative of commanders and individuals.

The Marine Corps will not implement a reporting process or a centralized requirement for written exams or papers to ensure that Marines are reading. The Commandant does indeed desire assurance that Marines are reading, but he depends entirely upon his chain of command to see that this is done.

How do leaders know if their Marines are reading? By talking to them, holding group discussions, observing them in the field, and, most importantly, by reading themselves.

We should not rule out the possibility of a Marine knowing a great deal about the profession of warfare without reading. However, the probability of a Marine being an expert on war without reading is slim. Our reading program purposely covers a vast spectrum of wars including ancient and modern, cold weather and tropical, guerrilla and conventional. Few, if any, Marines can be as widely knowledgeable as we want them to be without doing their required reading.

This leads to a question frequently asked: “Will professional reading affect promotion opportunities, fitness reports, assignments, etc.?”

In evaluating a Marine as a professional warrior, we do not count the number of books read in a year. Instead, we gauge the capacity for sound military judgment. The Marine Corps certainly expects—in fact, it requires—the reading of two to four books annually from the list. But the output we desire is the daily display of military judgment that will serve our Marines and the American people in time of war. As a Marine’s career progresses, so too should the level of judgment, encompassing higher levels of war and an appreciation for larger and larger units, more equipment, and issues such as sustainability, public opinion, and operational tempo. This progression must come from many ingredients: practice, exercises, and maturity, to name a few. Professional reading speeds that progression and lends a depth of understanding that would otherwise be missing.

**Acquiring the Books**

The requirement to read breeds an atmosphere that is well known to anyone who has been on a university campus. It has already begun on Marine bases. Marines will decide which books to buy and which books to borrow based on what they want in their libraries at home for immediate reading and future reference.

Base libraries have stocked the books on the list. Commands may also establish book exchanges similar to those that exist on university campuses. Marines bring to the exchange listed books they have read and receive in return, at no cost, a used book to read. The Marine may then keep the book or return it for another. Other variants are for the command to buy books on the list, or for unit members to donate books from their own personal library, or a combination of the two. Then the unit can conduct business just like a
regular library. Many people enjoy owning new books rather than used books, especially editions that are personally meaningful or attractive. Books make wonderful gifts. Some commands have already begun to give a book as a going-away gift where formerly just a plaque might have been given.

Of course, Marine Corps Exchanges will have the books in stock or can order books for you. Marine professional associations may also have books available or can order them.

**In Summary**

Aristotle recognized education as a necessity for survival in trying conditions, one of which is certainly in war. He called education a “refuge in adversity,” while a mere “ornament in prosperity.” Napoleon and Alexander the Great were both students and adherents of the idea of self-education.

Often, in times of adversity, and when the majority of a nation’s people are least prepared, there is a call for warriors who know what they are doing. The adage that “the only thing that we learn from history is that we don’t learn from history” remains unchallenged. A review of American history reveals several periods of complacency which ended with a “crisis management” call to arms. American people trust, somewhat blindly, that there will always be warriors prepared to respond and “report for duty with a full seabag” when they need them, for they have always done so in the past. What is not considered, and one of the hardest concepts to instill into a (traditionally) skeptical American public, is the cost (in training time, money, and experience) to produce a warfighter with the requisite capabilities to succeed on the modern, high-technology battlefield.

Whether the warriors will be real or hollow depends on the seriousness with which they prepare. Do they have a sense of destiny and commitment which will keep them motivated to pursue a study of the profession of arms? The professional reading program is more than a reading list. It is the cornerstone of a pursuit of the knowledge won by warriors who have gone before us. Sharing and learning from their experience is a great gift that is yours for the taking. It is important for you to draw upon them. The more you read, the more you will understand, and the richer will be your experience. Most importantly, you will be worthy of the trust that is placed in you as a guardian of our nation.
Chapter 2

General References and Periodicals

Many references can assist a Marine’s professional military reading program. Several varied sources used in conjunction with the books contained on the Commandant’s reading list greatly enhance the learning experience. The following list contains titles of several references Marines may find valuable in their personal and professional reading efforts. These books and periodicals are available in many base libraries.

**Dictionaries and Encyclopedias**


The intent of the compiler of this book of quotes was to create an understanding of the whole art of war from its incidents, its personalities, its participants, their weapons and equipment, their traditions and customs, as well as their ways, techniques, and modes of war. Organized by subject areas from action to zeal, the *Dictionary of Military & Naval Quotations* can lead the student of the military sciences to a greater understanding of the maxims and views of war.


This encyclopedia traces the development of the military arts and sciences in English North America from its early beginnings to the present. Using an essay format, scholars, historians, and military professionals describe the factors and processes that make up and define the American military. Volume 3 contains a subject index to the complete set.


This six-volume set provides excellent general coverage in all aspects of military and naval science. The subject index in the sixth volume gives comprehensive access to the whole set. This is one of the best starting points to be found for overviews and bibliographies.


This multivolume set is very useful when researching general topics of interest in the science and technologies. Explanations are detailed without being too complex. It is an absolute must when delving into “New Sciences” reading.

**Atlases**


This is one of the great modern atlases of the world. Its text, maps, charts, and diagrams set the standard for such publications. It is an outstanding research tool for those studying current events worldwide, and an excellent...
reference for developing scenarios for war-games and exercises.


This volume provides comprehensive coverage of the theaters of operations; the chronology and progress of major battles and campaigns; technical and tactical innovations; and the equipment, forces, and nations involved. It is profusely illustrated with maps, photographs, diagrams, and charts. This volume is exceptionally useful in understanding narrative accounts of the war.


This world atlas is exceptionally useful for Marines keeping abreast of current world events. Its maps, charts, text, and diagrams provide a thorough picture of the topography, agriculture, industry, and cultural groups in the nations of the world.

**Guides**


A well-organized and informative companion to analyzing major battlefield sites in the European theater of war in World War II, this book is very useful in analyzing historical narratives and placing the described units’ actions and movements in theater context.


This is an excellent source for the student of military history. It places individual works (autobiographies, historical fiction, diaries, etc.) in proper context in the overall course of studying military history.


These definitive guides to several important Civil War battlefields are an absolute must for conducting insightful battlefield tours and analyses.

**Indexes**


Begun in 1949 and published quarterly, the *Air University Index* is a subject index to significant articles, news items, and editorials appearing in 78 English language military and aeronautical periodicals. Although slanted more towards concerns of the Air Force, this is the best and only index available to the military science field.
Yearbooks


Covering all major aspects of defense issues during a year, the *R.U.S.I. & Brassey’s Defence Yearbook* presents essays written by some of the major experts in the defense field. Following the essays is a chronology of main events of defense interest and also a bibliography of defense literature published during the year.

Bibliographies


Originally published in 1975 and supplemented in 1981 and 1986, the *Guide to the Sources of United States Military History* presents a chapter on each of the services. Each chapter contains an essay that discusses recent works on each service during the specific time period or subject area, i.e., Revolutionary War, World War I, between wars, uniforms, traditions, and lore. Following the essay is an annotated bibliography of journal articles, books, pamphlets, and documents.

Government Documents


This is a yearly presentation of the United States’ security concerns and plans written for general consumption. It tends to be very general in both scope and nature, but this is one place where you can see the mapping out of future policy.


Primarily a supplement to testimony presented to congressional hearings in support of Fiscal Year Defense Budget(s) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this publication presents a readable “high level” view of American armed forces strengths and weakness vis-a-vis external threats to the United States.

Series


This first-class series is devoted to various chapters in American military history from Revolutionary War to the present.

Volume/Book Titles:

*Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art*

*Ancient and Medieval Warfare*

*The Wars of Napoleon* (with accompanying atlas)

*The Dawn of Modern Warfare*

*The Early American Wars and Military Institutions*
The American Civil War (with accompanying atlas)

The Great War (with accompanying atlas)

The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (with accompanying atlas)

The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific (with accompanying atlas)

The Arab-Israeli Years; The Chinese Civil War; and The Korean War (with accompanying atlas)


This superb series is dedicated to various phases of the USMC effort in World War II. A masterful blend of photos and narrative, the series is easy to read and thoroughly enjoyable.

Periodicals

Selected military periodicals should be part of every Marine’s professional reading program. The variety and scope of such periodicals is extensive. Base libraries carry many of these periodicals, and most commands can receive copies of commercial publications in accordance with MCO P5600.31F (par. 3109.1, Commercial Publications). Though somewhat dated, “The Defense Communication Study” published by Corporate Communication Studies, Inc., in 1984 has been paraphrased here to provide some of the paragraph-length descriptions of selected military periodicals in this section. The following periodicals are ones Marines are likely to have an interest in and are generally available at base libraries.

Air Defense Artillery Magazine

Air Defense Artillery Magazine, formerly Air Defense Magazine, is published by the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas. It informs Army air defense personnel on the latest tactical, doctrinal, and technical developments in air defense. Published quarterly, it provides a conduit for communications between units in the field and the school, thus improving efficiency in all aspects of air defense. The readers are officers and enlisted soldiers of air defense, including active duty, Reserve component, and National Guard.

Subscription information:

Address: Superintendent of Documents
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954
Telephone: (202) 512-1800

Air Power Journal

Air Power Journal appears quarterly. The professional journal of the U.S. Air Force, it serves as a platform for discussion on issues that pertain to Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related defense matters of interest to Air Force leaders. Essays in a regular department titled ‘Books, Images, and Ideas” identify and debate issues of topical interest. Articles inform on and explain specialized aspects of the Air Force.

Subscription information:

Address: Air Power Journal
401 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB, AL
36112-6428
Telephone: (334) 953-5322
DSN: 493-5322

Amphibious Warfare Review
Amphibious Warfare Review is published by the Capitol Hill Marines, a detachment of the Marine Corps League. In the words of the publishers, “It is designed to reach the highest levels of decision-makers within the Executive and Legislative branches of government, both civilian and military.” Articles are on tactics and equipment as well as the latest concepts of amphibious warfare. This annual publication is issued to coincide with the Modern Day Marine Exposition.

Subscription information:
Address: Amphibious Warfare Publishing Corp.
9351 Birchwood Ct. St 201
Manassas, VA 22110
Telephone: (703) 330-0599
Fax: (703) 335-6181

Armed Forces Journal International
Senior military officers, top-level members of the DOD, and congressional leaders concerned with the military and defense budgets are the readers of AFJI. It reports monthly on events taking place along the defense front, DOD plans, procurement policies, budgets, new weapon systems development, and military movements. “To assure military preparedness for the U.S.” is the stated purpose of this periodical.

Subscription information:
Address: Armed Forces Journal International, Inc.
2000 L Street, NW, Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: (202) 296-0450
Fax: (202) 296-5727

Armed Forces & Society
Armed Forces & Society is an interdisciplinary journal with an international perspective. Its interests are military institutions, civil-military relations, arms control, strategy, peacemaking, and conflict management. Published quarterly, it offers scholarly writing derived from historical, comparative, and empirical research. The editors and contributors include political scientists, sociologists, historians, psychologists, legal scholars, and economists, as well as military specialists.

Subscription information:
Address: Armed Forces & Society
Dept 4010
Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ 08903

Armor
Armor’s aim is: “To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences, with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote professional improvement of the Armor Community, and to preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions and the solidarity of armor in the Army of the United States.” Published bimonthly by the U.S. Army, the magazine is distributed free to Army combat arms units. Individuals may subscribe through the U.S. Armor Association. Tactics, logistics, maintenance, research and development, and historical analysis that pertains to mobile warfare are the topics found in Armor.


**Subscription information:**

Address: U.S. Army Armor Center  
4401 Vine Grove Rd  
Fort Knox, KY  40121  
Telephone: (502) 942-8642  
Fax: (502) 942-6219

**Aviation Week & Space Technology**

*AW&ST* can be credited for timely reporting on the latest and most important events and technologies. *AW&ST* serves all aerospace interests including those of the military service, government, commercial air transportation, and corporate aviation. The editorial aim is: “To provide complete coverage of scientific, technical, operational, financial, political and legislative development, both domestic and international, in all the major segments of the aerospace industry . . . .” Each December, the magazine publishes its annual “International Aerospace Marketing Directory” as a special issue.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Aviation Week & Space Technology  
1221 Avenue of the Americas  
New York, NY 10020  
Telephone: (212) 512-2000  
or 1-800-525-5003  
Fax (212) 512-6068

**Defense & Security Electronics**

*Defense & Security Electronics* is a leading electronics magazine in the defense field. Its content includes technical articles, program management and system design features, technical and market commentary both by the magazine’s staff and invited military and industrial authorities, and details of new products and technology. The fields of information covered are software design and development; command, control, communications, and intelligence; missile guidance; electronic warfare; avionics; shipboard electronics; and satellite communications.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Intertec Publishing Corp  
6151 Powers Ferry Rd N.W.  
Atlanta GA  30339-2941  
Telephone: (770) 955-2500

**Field Artillery Journal**

*Field Artillery* is a bimonthly publication directed to active and reserve artillerymen, sister services, and the Defense Department. The emphasis is on subjects of interest to battalion-level officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Articles dealing with historical development, modern field artillery concepts, force structure, doctrine, matériel, training, and current events are factual and readable. This publication offers a question and answer column, technical subjects, training and operational news briefs, and reader correspondence, along with items of general interest.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Field Artillery  
P.O. Box 33311  
Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311  
Telephone: DSN 639-5121  
Comm. (405) 355-5121  
Fax:  DSN 639-5127  
Comm. (405) 355-5127

**Fortitudine**

*Fortitudine* is a quarterly bulletin for the Marine Corps historical program. Articles are contributed by active duty Marines, retired
Marines, and noted civilian authors. This widely read bulletin is produced at the rate of one copy for every nine active duty Marines.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Marine Corps Historical Center  
Building 58, Washington Navy Yard  
901 M Street, Southeast  
Washington, DC 20374-0580  
Telephone: (202) 433-2945

**Infantry**

Original articles concerning infantry organization, weapons, equipment, tactics and techniques are featured. *Infantry* contains book reviews, career notes of interest to officers and NCOs, and general items of interest to any military professional. The primary audience of *Infantry* is Army officers and NCOs at the infantry, company, and battalion level.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Infantry  
P.O. Box 52005  
Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005  
Telephone: DSN 835-2350  
Comm. (706) 545-2350

**International Defense Review**

*IDR*, a periodical published in four languages, originated in the mid-sixties and is now a monthly periodical. It is considered a reliable and informative source of news and in-depth reporting on defense developments.

**Subscription information:**

Address: International Centre Cointrin  
Building H, 20  
Route de Pre-Bois

**Joint Forces Quarterly**

The *Joint Forces Quarterly* seeks to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development.

**Subscription Information:**

Address: Editor  
Joint Forces Quarterly  
Attn: NDV-NSS-JFQ  
Building 62 Room 171  
300 5th Avenue  
Fort McNair  
Washington, D.C.  
20319-5068  
Telephone: (202) 685-420  
Fax: (202) 685-4219  
Internet: JFQ1@ndv.edu

**Journal of Military History**

The *Journal of Military History* is a diversified and varied quarterly journal of military history. Many articles are written by active and retired military officers; however, the majority of the contents is written by civilian historians.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Society for Military History  
The Journal of Military History  
George C Marshall Library  
Virginia Military Institute  
Lexington, VA 24450  
Telephone: (540)464-7468
Leatherneck

*Leatherneck* has the honor of being the longest-running “all ranks” military magazine in the United States. Information on Marine Corps activities throughout the world, descriptions of various posts and installations, news on the Marine Corps Reserve, history and traditions of the Corps, and features on successful active and former Marines are all included in this monthly publication.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Leatherneck Magazine/Marine Corps Assoc.
Box 1775
Quantico, VA 22134
Telephone: Toll Free 1-800-336-0291

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Marine Corps Gazette

The *Marine Corps Gazette*, principally for officers and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) of the Marine Corps, is published monthly. It provides a forum for the expression of matters that will advance knowledge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Articles are contributed primarily by active duty or retired Marine Corps officers and address all aspects of Marine Corps life, field operations, exercises, tactics and weapons systems.

**Subscription information:**

Address: Marine Corps Gazette
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Military Intelligence

*Military Intelligence*, published quarterly by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is directed at both military and civilian intelligence professionals. Military intelligence training methodologies and evaluations are periodical themes featured in the magazine, as is joint service activity and information exchange. Articles regularly include opposing force portrayals in which U.S. Army units simulate adversary armed force units. Other features address the technological aspects of military intelligence such as command, control, and communications (C3) countermeasures, research and development updates, unit histories, and future scenarios.

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*Military Review*, published monthly, features articles on military history, abstracts of recently completed defense studies, articles on international affairs, and current events with impact on current national security. The publication provides a forum for an open exchange of ideas on military affairs and contains researched information on ground warfare as it pertains to Army doctrine.

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Naval War College Review

The *Naval War College Review* addresses issues affecting students who are interested in defense and foreign policy matters. When the periodical first appeared in 1948, its purpose was to provide Navy and Marine Corps officers some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the War College. Articles are contributed by both military and civilian writers.

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Parameters

The Army War College publishes the quarterly journal, *Parameters*. It serves as an instrument for continuing the education of War College graduates and senior officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. This journal provides a vehicle for expression of professional thought on the art and science of warfare, national and international security affairs, military history, military strategy, leadership and management, and other topics of current interest to members of the U.S. Army and DOD.

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*Proceedings* is the official publication of the U.S. Naval Institute. This widely read, monthly magazine is directed toward Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps officers. Wide-ranging and readable articles encompass topics from new technology reviews to authoritative comments on naval strategy and operations, international relations, and naval history.

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R.U.S.I. Journal

*R.U.S.I. Journal* is the quarterly publication of the Whitehall-based British Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (R.U.S.I.). Its commentary, and evaluation of international relations, British defense and overseas policy, strategic studies, weapons technology, and battlefield tactics are excellent. The *R.U.S.I. Journal* reports on its own activities, reprints lectures and papers from various conferences and symposia, and publishes informative articles by leading military and strategic analysts. Readers are encouraged to participate by expressing their views in a conventional “Letters to the Editor” department and in “Talking Point,” a department that features reader comment on current topics of interest. The magazine is also notable for its book reviews.
**Subscription information:**

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**Signal**

The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association publishes *Signal* magazine for a selected audience in the military, industry, and government defense communications field. Articles address salient points of military, industrial and government communications, electronics, computers, audio-visual and command and control (C²). Editorials are relative to management, research, design, procurement, and operational phases of communications-electronics equipment and systems.

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**Strategic Review**

*Strategic Review* is published by the United States Strategic Institute in association with the Center for International Relations at Boston University. This quarterly journal provides a vehicle for discussion of important matters in the politico-military field with an aim to contribute to informed understanding and debate necessary in a democracy and to the wise conduct of foreign policy and national defense. The publication is not affiliated with the military or any government agency.

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P.O. Box 15618 Kenmoore Station  
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Chapter 3

Book Reviews

The book reviews in this section are snapshots of all reading list selections. The Marine Corps University invites the submission of new and old reviews of professional books both on or off the Marine Corps’ reading list. Send your reviews to—

Commanding General (C 40OP)
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
2042 Broadway Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5067

Ambrose, Stephen  
*Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne: From Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest*  
(New York, NY. Simon and Schuster. 1993)

SSgt/WO/CW02/CW03/2Lt/1Lt; Leadership.

This story of an airborne company fighting its way across Europe in the wake of the Normandy invasion recounts numerous meaningful lessons on leadership and the functioning of an organization engaged in combat.

Stephen Ambrose looks not only at the individuals who help shape the company, both positively and negatively, but also traces the evolution of the unit itself over several reconstitutions—from Normandy and the Battle of the Bulge to the war’s end at Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest and follow-on occupation duty. Finally, the reader glimpses some of the company’s members in their post-War lives, noting the mark that the company experience has left with them.

*Band of Brothers* offers valuable insights on leadership and what makes a fighting organization tick. Its lessons are timeless for those who choose warfighting as a profession.

Ambrose, Stephen  
*Pegasus Bridge: June 6, 1944*  
(New York, NY. Simon and Schuster. 1988)

SSgt/WO/CW02/CW03/2Lt/1Lt; Leadership.

This is a story as exciting and fast-paced as any fictional adventure—a detailed description of a special operation which worked. It is a book you will find difficult to put down once you begin reading.

For two years, Major John Howard trained Company D, 2d Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 6th British Airborne Division, for the planned invasion of Europe. On 18 April 1944, he was informed that soldiers of his company would spearhead the invasion. Their mission would be to conduct a night gliderborne assault to seize two key bridges on the left flank of the British landing beaches at Normandy. These bridges were to be used to establish the land link between the troops conducting the amphibious assault and paratroopers of the 6th Airborne Division.

Final preparations for Company D’s mission were made with great urgency and that most secrecy. Suspense was high as soldiers climbed aboard their gliders in the last hours...
of D-Day minus one. A master storyteller, Stephen Ambrose recreates the suspense for the reader as he details the crossing of the English Channel, the near heart-stopping landing, and the tense moments of close combat in the darkness surrounding the Pegasus bridges. The reader will have a very real sense of being at the scene throughout the action.

This book is a must-read for those Marines charged with planning and conducting small-unit operations calling for unique or special skills.

Ambrose, Stephen  The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower  (Garden City, NY. Doubleday. 1970)

Col; Memoir.

Selected to assist in the editing of General Eisenhower’s papers, Stephen Ambrose grew to understand his subject in a more profound way than many of the General’s other biographers. Thus, as he tells the story of Eisenhower’s rise from Pentagon war planner in 1942 to Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe in 1944, events and personalities take on new interest and life. Often the reader feels he is on the scene as momentous decisions are discussed and made; the character of key leaders and the manner in which they operated become clear. This is not a book which provides details of strategy and operations; it is one to help understand how a talented officer grew into a giant among commanders of coalition warfare.


SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Small Wars.

This work still stands as one of the most honest and scholarly efforts to come to grips with what went wrong in Vietnam, militarily and politically. Also, it is one of the best studies of guerrilla warfare, tracing this subject from Darius and the Scythians in 512 B.C., through Hannibal and Fabian, the American Revolution, England’s colonial wars, and into the 20th century and Mao Tse Tung. Thus,
Asprey’s book becomes a superb source for preparing for future war, incorporating the oft neglected lessons of Vietnam with an in-depth perspective on the problem of a people’s war. Wounded as a company commander on Iwo Jima, Asprey is a combat Marine as well as an Oxford scholar. He is well respected in academic circles as an author and a historian and was a protégé of Samuel Griffith. Although in two volumes, the length is well justified considering the unusual effort to tie together war, society, morality, politics, the Pentagon, and U.S. industry. Psychological, moral, and physical dimensions of war are all richly covered.


MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Sea Power.

George Baer takes the U.S. Navy from the era when the new steel-hulled, steam-powered fleet was a modern phenomenon and carries the story through to the advent of the Post-Cold War era. He provides a firm basis for understanding the fundamental philosophy upon which the modern Navy functions. As the capabilities of the new steam-powered ships forced the Navy to reexamine its roles, missions, and doctrine, they also provided the impetus for the evolution of the modern Marine Corps. The steam-powered fleet’s need for coaling stations in wartime provided the initial avenue for the Marine Corps to expand beyond ships and guard detachments. Someone had to take and defend those coaling stations for the Navy, and the Marines responded by forming an Advance Base Force, the precursor to the Fleet Marine Force. Though the relationship between the two was not always a smooth one, the evolution of naval doctrine shaped the way both Services have fought the several major wars since 1890 and points to the future. This book, though it focuses on the Navy, provides excellent insights on why the United States must maintain the robust capabilities in its Naval Services.


Cpl/Sgt; Small Wars.

On June 16, 1948, the fierce jungles of Malaya gave birth to a systematic campaign of terror by a few thousand ruthless communist insurgents (soon branded communist terrorists—CTs—by the British). While the CTs marked British owners and operatives of isolated rubber plantations and tin mines for assassination, they reserved special treatment for “Running Dogs,” a name they gave to native Malayans loyal to the British and holding positions in labor, business, and especially the police.

The British response was crafted and led by men of vision who grasped the fundamental truth that communism could only be beaten by winning the hearts and minds of the people. They realized that wars of this nature are not won by massive counterviolence, counterterror, and military power, but by adherence to three simple practices: patience, presence, and persistence. They also realized that the “authority for running the war must rest squarely on the shoulders of the civil government and the police. The troops were [only] there to help.” These were men like MacDonald, Gurney, Templer, Bob Thomson, and Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, who orchestrated the greatest social experiment in Asia—the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese, transforming them
from squatters into legitimate landowners with a personal stake in the fighting and outcome of the war. These “new villages” created under the “Briggs Plan” produced a more secure population, increasing the flow of information about CTs to the police, which in turn led to the breakup of CT organizations in the populated areas and the isolation of the CTs from both food and information supplies. Ultimately they forced frustrated and desperate CTs to fight in the open on poor ground.

The Malayan “Emergency” was a police war fought and won by the Running Dogs. Expanded to a peak of 67,000 (from 9,000), the police suffered 70 percent of the total casualties and served as a vital political symbol of civilian authority and the rule of law. Assisting them were cloak and dagger men (and women) of the “Special Branch,” working in secret for top government officials. One Special Branch operative “opened a thousand blank files and told his men to fill them with ‘people not numbers’. He wanted every item of information about the past lives of CT sympathizers: photographs, teacher’s names, nicknames, spending, eating, lovemaking habits, until he had a list of people with fears, hates, and loyalties he could understand.”

The Malayan “Emergency” was a war of individuals following, stalking, listening, and waiting—and paying seemingly obscene sums of money for critical information or directly to high-ranking “surrendered” CTs. These rewards led many CT leaders to fear death at the hands of their own bodyguards. In the final analysis, the strategy which triumphed in the twelve-year Malayan “Emergency” was one part military and nine parts political, social, and economic.

Bartlett, Merrill  
*Lejeune: A Marine’s Life, 1867-1942*  
(Columbia, SC. University of South Carolina Press.1991)

Gen; Heritage.

John A. Lejeune’s professional reputation is monumental among Marines. He remains one of the most respected figures in Marine Corps history. Graduating from the Naval Academy just as naval forces completed the transition from sail to steam, Lejeune served in the era that took the Marine Corps from the primary mission of guard duty ashore and afloat to the cusp of forming the modern Fleet Marine Force and codifying a preliminary doctrine for opposed landings. Throughout his career, the amphibious mission—the seizure and defense of advance naval bases—increasingly served to justify the existence and, more importantly, the organization and doctrine of the Marine Corps. Lejeune provides the classic case of the right man at the right time.

His Naval Academy credentials—and personal connections within the Navy—were important as all the Services set out to enhance their professionalism. General Pershing gave Lejeune, a graduate of the Army War College, the opportunity to prove himself as a brigade and then division commander in France in World War I. After the Armistice, and later as commanding general of the Marine base at Quantico, Virginia, he started schools to educate his men for both military and civilian life. Under his leadership, the Marine Corps regularized its present system of professional schools.

The reader can enjoy this book on two levels. The first is as a description of the life and ca-
career of a remarkable Marine. The second, the one with perhaps the most professional value, is the story of the development of the modern, expeditionary Marine Corps.


**CWOS/Maj; Leadership.**

This book is a modern classic of military history that clearly demonstrates that a serving officer, a professional who knows the right questions to ask of the data, can write superb history. Baynes, an officer in the Cameronians (the Scottish Rifles), chose to analyze current professional leadership issues by studying morale and the factors which create and sustain morale in combat. He studied the issues by examining the experience of one battalion of his regiment in World War I. As an example, in the six days of its first combat in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the battalion’s strength dropped from 900 officers and men to only 150 under the command of the sole surviving officer, a second lieutenant. In spite of such casualties, the survivors remained a cohesive unit which demonstrated its regimental pride by marching, not walking, back from the front. In the end, Baynes cites five major factors necessary for high combat morale: regimental loyalty, strong discipline, good relationships between officers and enlisted, a strong, universal sense of duty, and sound logistical support.


**MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Intelligence.**

*Ultra in the West* represents a groundbreaking effort to tie the intelligence acquired by Allied decryption of high-level German message traffic, code-named “Ultra,” into the actual conduct of military operations in Normandy and in the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the West. By tying Ultra messages to actual military events, Bennett is able to pinpoint when and to what extent intelligence was able to aid Allied commanders on the battlefield. Ultra played a crucial role in destroying the headquarters of Panzer Group West early in the Normandy battle, in alerting Eisenhower and Bradley to the German counterattack against Mortain, and in keeping the focus of U.S. strategic bombing on its very successful efforts to destroy German petroleum production. But there were some notable failures to use Ultra as well: both MARKETGARDEN and the Battle of the Bulge suggest inexcusable breakdowns between intelligence and operational commanders. Bennett’s work is enhanced by the fact that he served at Bletchley Park during the war as an intelligence analyst.


**Col; Leadership.**

This volume is a synthesis of lectures on moral philosophy which Brennan gave in a course at the Naval War College from 1978 until his retirement in 1992. The impetus for the course—as well as its informal name, “The Stockdale Course”—came from Admiral James Stockdale, then president of the institution. Both men taught parts of the course during the remainder of Admiral Stockdale’s tenure. Thereafter, Brennan taught it alone. Admiral Stockdale remained an integral part of the course, however, since much of its con-
tent drew upon his experiences as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam during much of the Vietnam War. Despite torture and solitary confinement, Admiral Stockdale survived by drawing strength from his previous studies of stoic philosophy. The issues covered in this book remain vigorously relevant. This volume has great value as a source book for those who will implement the Marine Corps Values Program.

Buell, Thomas  
*The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance*  
(Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1987)

MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Biography.

Anyone aspiring to high-level combat command needs to read this book. Spruance’s World War II leadership is especially valuable as a study in combat decisionmaking. The Battle of Midway shows him at his best as he achieves decisive results worthy of comparison with Napoleon and Nelson. Luck is often offered as an explanation for his amazing victory at Midway. Luck does not explain it. Spruance had to set the stage first in order for the luck to happen. Luck is always a factor. However, understanding of combat and understanding of one’s enemy are among the things that enable a commander to let luck work for him. Spruance was one who had learned to do that through years of serious study.

The book spans this admiral’s entire life and career. As he is one of our own country’s proven successful warriors, we would be neglectful not to study and even emulate him.

Campbell, Tom  
*The Old Man’s Trail*  
(Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1995)

Cpl/Sgt; Small Wars.

Retired Colonel Tom Campbell (USMC), was a battalion adviser with the Marine Advisory Group (1965-67) and later operations officer (1970-71) with the 1st Marines. His writing reflects his knowledge of the Vietnam terrain and tactics of both the NVA and VC.

Campbell’s book is unique in that it centers on an enemy platoon of 15-year-olds navigating the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They suffered, too: B-52’s, artillery harassing fire, swollen river crossings, leeches, snakes, and the weight of carrying ammunition from the north to combat units in the south.

The book centers on Duan, a combat veteran of fighting against the French. He holds the title of Sergeant Major, North Vietnamese Army. His mission was to lead 60 teen-age boys through 650 miles of trail, carrying 2,500 pounds of weapons and ammo on their backs.

Campbell has drafted a superb battle analysis of America’s longest war. It is a well-written study, accompanied by exciting and believable situations. Many Americans and Vietnamese die for a variety of reasons, fighting for a number of causes, none of which matter to grief-stricken friends or family members both in Vietnam and in the United States.

Card, Scott  
*Ender’s Game*  

Cpl/Sgt; Tactics.

This is the story of the development of a military genius in the guise of clever, brash, exhilarating, and extremely enjoyable science fiction. Even if you do not like science fiction, you will love this book—and you will learn a lot in the process. Alien “buggers” have al-
ready unsuccessfully attacked the earth and are coming back for another try. Outnumbered and ill-equipped, the earth leaders know the only hope of survival rests in finding a military genius who can outfight the buggers. They choose young Ender Wiggin, and his intense training comes in the form of space-age war games. Ender thinks he is but one student among many, but the administrators of the battle school have a particular curriculum in mind for the young soldier, who will be put to the severest test. The tactics Ender develops in his training are based on fluidity, adaptability, tempo, deception, ambiguity, and a keen appreciation for the enemy. If this sounds remarkably similar to maneuver warfare, it is.

Catton, Bruce  
*Grant Takes Command*  
(Boston, MA. Little, Brown, and Co. 1990)  

CWO5/Maj; Leadership.

This is a fascinating and descriptive account of General Ulysses S. Grant from the summer of 1863, his victory at Chattanooga, his promotion to General-in-Chief, and his subsequent direction of the Union Army against the Confederates, until Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. It is a highly analytical examination of those qualities of a great man and reveals the unemotional thoroughness of General Grant as he painstakingly considered the operational challenges before him. Additionally, the author vividly describes the battles and the men who fought them, reveals remarkable insights into the issues at hand, the individuals involved, and the outcome. This is a superb biography of perhaps the greatest General of the Civil War era. His development as a general is carefully and accurately presented. As his development went, so did the Union’s war effort. Grant succeeded as a soldier and had a significant influence on the success of the Union. His new path toward the presidency, however, was not destined with the same good fortune. Anyone with an interest in either the Civil War or leadership (specifically the making of a general in combat) is sure to enjoy and glean substantive insights from this worthwhile volume. Additionally, the student of warfare can gain tremendously from the invaluable analysis the author provides. The author guides his readers through this volume with care and ease.

Chaliand, Gerard  
*Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*  
(Berkeley, CA. University of California Press. 1982)  

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Small Wars.

Guerrilla warfare came to the American armed forces in 1965 as a new kind of threat. Its existence as a form of warfare can be traced from antiquity through the present. Americans by 1965 had already served in Vietnam as advisors, and though Marine Corps and Army education and training had increasingly included the subject since 1961, we were not ready. When our forces began deploying to Vietnam in 1965, as an institution, we did not understand the motive of guerrilla war. It can be argued that we still do not.

Chaliand’s *Guerrilla Strategies* is one of the best books for gaining this understanding. Through studying it, one places oneself in the mind of the enemy. Without putting oneself through such an exercise, it is too easy to believe that the guerrilla’s objectives and means of obtaining them—his “strategies”—are like our own.

*Guerrilla Strategies* is an anthology written predominantly by guerrillas and guerrilla sympathizers. The authors have traveled with and written about guerrillas, as the full title suggests, “. . . from the Long March to Af-
ghanistan.” Their names are not well known to the general public; however, they include some of the most prominent names in the annals of 20th century guerrilla warfare. Among them are Vladimir Dedijer, Tito’s companion, 1941-44; William Pomeroy, an American participant on the Communist side of the Huk war in the Philippines, 1950-52; Si Azzedine, a noted commander on the Algerian side against the French, 1955-57; Kararí Njama, who participated in the Mau insurrection, 1952-56; Che Guevara, who needs no introduction; and the editor himself, Ger
dard Chaliand, who in 1966 accompanied guerrillas who fought the Por
tuguese in the struggle of Guinea-Bissau.

The book is best approached after achieving a background in the history of guerrilla warfare. The author presumes a basic knowledge of what the issues of the conflicts were and who eventually won. Meaningful objectives can also be obtained by Marines without previous knowledge of guerrilla warfare. The most important benefit that Marines can gain from Guerrilla Strategies is to learn how guerrillas think. For the reader who finds fascination in the mind game of pretending to be in an adversary’s head, the book is extremely stimulating. For those who don’t or won’t do this sort of mind game, avoid the book, and stay away from battlefields.

Chandler, David *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York, NY. Macmillan. 1966)

Col; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

Chandler has created an exhaustive and colorful recounting of Bonaparte’s victories and failures. He has created much more as well by thorough analyses of the policies, strategy, operations, tactics, logistics, administration, and organization of the man who revolution-ized war. Napoleon’s strategy and operations provide a classical yardstick in these areas of warfare. It is essential to study him, and this book is a good way to do it. *Campaigns* is a little long for most readers (1,100 pages), but its organization and a detailed index make it an excellent reference tool and it includes color maps.

Chapin, John *Uncommon Men: The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps* (Shippensburg, PA. White Mane Publishing Co. 1993)

Cpl/Sgt; Leadership.

Few Marines have so great an influence on other Marines as the unit sergeant major. *Uncommon Men* focuses on the sergeant major, that one staff non commissioned officer who achieves the distinction of being selected to serve as the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps.

John Chapin traces the lineage of those who have served in this billet at the pinnacle of their profession. He finds men who are unique in their personalities and talents, but who share a remarkable likeness in their personal skills and their concern for their fellow Marines.


CWO5/Maj; Theory.

This massive, murky, and often misunderstood work contributes some fundamentally important ideas on war. The most enduring idea is that friction is a pervasive attribute of war and
war is merely the extension rather than the cessation of policy. Most readers will have difficulty finding their way through Clausewitz’ dark, labyrinthine passages, but most do not need to. There are whole parts that can be skimmed or bypassed altogether. Bernard Brodie’s *Guide to Reading On War* in the Princeton University edition is an essential tool. The Princeton edition is the best translation available. A warning: do not view *On War* as a polished masterwork but rather as an unfinished draft studded with uncut gems. Read this book critically. While some of its ideas are fundamentally important, others are undeveloped or even flat wrong (such as his notions of the inherent supremacy of defense over offense or the battle being an end in itself). To the discriminating reader, these mistakes in no way detract from the book; rather, they provide fuel for thought.


Col; Theory.

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch examine that phenomenon which finds apparent good fortune in battle transformed into misfortune. Backed up by historical examples, the authors cite three specific kinds of military misfortunes: failure to anticipate (Israeli Defense Forces in Yom Kippur War); failure to learn (U.S. antisubmarine warfare early in World War II); and failure to adapt (the British at Gallipoli in World War I). When any or all of these misfortunes occur simultaneously, the effect can be catastrophic.

**Collins, Arthur** *Common Sense Training* (San Raphael, CA. Presidio Press. 1978)

SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Training.

Should Marines ever joke that we have nothing to learn from the Army about training and leadership, Collins’ forceful book puts that idea to rest. In 22 short, practical chapters, Collins covers virtually every aspect of training from philosophy to the importance of stopwatches in MOS training, to the role of general officers in training. No leader of Marines should begin any training program without reading this book. While we do not need to use every prescription Collins orders up, we are foolish if we do not read and understand his approach. Collins is a man dedicated to building combat effectiveness in every warfighter. He has worked, experimented, and thought long and hard on the task. We have in his book a tremendous mine of practical information that we can and should put to use immediately. It is up to leaders of Marines to read and heed.


Cpl/Sgt; Tactics.

No Marine who seeks to prepare himself for combat or, more particularly, to lead others in combat can afford an ignorance of fear. Fear and how it affects young men under fire is the principal topic of *The Red Badge of Courage*. It visits the Civil War in a way that has never been approached before or since. Stripped of heroics, devoid of human control, the war becomes to Crane’s young protagonist the red monster of his deepest nightmares. The book allows the reader to experience the conflicting thoughts, impulses, emotions, and fears as they tumble through the youth when he confronts this red reality of war, a war so different from his hopes. Grasp *Red Badge* by the front and back covers and immerse yourself in
a tale told for combat leaders, a brief, vivid dissection of war. Any Marine who accepts Crane’s invitation to war will emerge with new understanding and new leadership skills.


Ed Cray tells the story of an extraordinary man and soldier, with extraordinary contemporary relevance.

Marshall’s role as the “Organizer of Victory” in World War II is legendary. “By dint of cool authority,” he was the acknowledged leader of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. “He alone had the global vision to balance competing European and Pacific theaters,” he alone had the “personal reputation to keep such headstrong men as Douglas MacArthur and Joseph Stilwell in line.” Yet Marshall also had an unparalleled reputation for objectivity and fairness regarding inter-Service issues.

On December 6, 1943, Roosevelt decided to offer command of Operation OVERLORD to Eisenhower rather than to Marshall. Explaining to the unflinching Marshall, the President stated simply, “I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country.”

That decision would transform Dwight David Eisenhower into a national hero and ultimately lead him, not Marshall, to the White House. Denied battlefield command and his rightful place in history, Marshall was nonetheless admired by those who fought the battles. Matthew Ridgway, celebrated commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II, wrote: “The combat soldier never had a better or more understanding friend than George C. Marshall. With the burdens of a global war upon his shoulders, he never forgot the man with the rifle, the man whose task it was to kill and be killed.”

As the Army Chief of Staff, he possessed great influence, but refused to grasp for power. Marshall’s integrity and his sheer physical presence convinced Congress and the public that the war was in good hands. To Marshall, a foundation of trust and respect vis-a-vis Congress was a priceless national asset, far more valuable over the long run than any short-term gain derived from expediency. It was with considerable admiration and justification, that Winston Churchill called George C. Marshall “the greatest Roman of them all.”

Today, perhaps more than ever before, we need to recall the qualities and accomplishments of George C. Marshall.

**Davis, Burke**  *MARINE! The Life of LtGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, USMC (ret.)*  (New York, NY. Bantam Books. 1964)

This exciting story of legendary “Chesty” Puller’s combat experiences begins in the Banana Wars of Central America, continues through the world wars, and finally ends at the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir, Korea. Chesty rose from the rank of private to three-star general while earning the Navy Cross on five separate occasions. Renowned for his love of the Corps and his Marines, he was especially revered by enlisted men. When finally retired, the General had spent more than twenty years deployed on foreign soil and had been decorated 53 times for valor, making him the most decorated Marine in history. This is a timeless story of a Marine
whose life was characterized by courage, self-sacrifice, and devotion to the Corps.


General Patton is perhaps one of the most colorful military personalities to emerge during the first half of this century. His many moods are legendary and his genius for war indisputable. Carlo D’Este captures both the character and the talent of this larger-than-life military leader in a thoroughly readable and well-researched volume.


At the beginning of May 1940, the world was convinced that France was an impregnable fortress strong enough to prevent the upstart Germans from seriously disturbing the peace of Europe. Seven short weeks later, the world was a very different place. France’s fortifications had been outflanked, her army dispersed, her air force destroyed, and her navy sent flying to the all too temporary haven of North Africa.

Many books have been written in an attempt to explain this upset. The one with the most immediate value to Marines is Robert Doughty’s *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940*. While other books deal with issues such as national morale and grand strategy, Doughty looks at the key battle of the campaign from the point of view of the regiments, battalions, and companies that did the actual fighting.

Using records only recently made available to researchers, Doughty gives the reader the opportunity to compare the tactics, training, and leadership of the French and German units that fought at Sedan. In doing so, he provides not only an excellent series of case studies in infantry operations, but reminds us that excellence at the small-unit level can sometimes decide the fate of nations.


Eccles stresses the command point of view on logistics in this superb book. His most important theme is contained in a discussion of how logistical activities tend to grow out of all proportion to the tactical forces which they support—a theme of significant relevance to
the Marine Corps today. Like Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War, Logistics in the National Defense* is timeless because it is based on fundamental principles. A must-read for all commanders and senior staff officers.

**English, John, and Gudmundsson, Bruce**

*On Infantry* (Westport, CT. Praeger. 1994)

**SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; History.**

This important book is on one level a comprehensive discussion of things infantry but on another level, English goes beyond merely infantry matters, discussing the development of ground tactics in general through the ages, the evolution of infantry tactics, the effects of technology, and the infantryman’s utility role on the battlefield. The book includes exhaustive analyses of infantry structure and tactics throughout history and the importance of unit cohesion and integrity. It also relates the comments of other military theorists such as Liddell Hart and S.L.A. Marshall. It underscores the general theme that small infantry forces have been more important to the outcome of conflict in the 20th century than has been acknowledged.

**Fall, Bernard**


**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Small Wars.**

This is a superb book that deals exclusively with the history of the early years in Vietnam (and briefly in Laos). While the focus of *Street Without Joy* is on a French campaign between Hue and Quang Tri, it covers other significant activities of the First Indo-China War. Dr. Fall, one of the few correspondents with access to records of both sides, opens with the War’s beginning, offers an extremely factual account of the early set-piece battles such as Vinh Yen, Lorraine, Hoa Binh, the decimation of G.M. 100, and continues with an excellent analysis of the epic struggle at Dien Bien Phu. His description of the planning and execution of the campaign along Highway 1 addresses intelligence, logistics, weather, terrain, employment of amphibious and airborne forces, close air support, and commander’s intent. Readers will have no difficulty in following the flow of the battle, and those lessons learned by the French commanders would be well worth filing away in one’s personal notebook. Unquestionably, one of the book’s strengths is Fall’s final chapter on the future of revolutionary war, a chapter that may have been overlooked by those that planned and directed the Second Indo-China War. This is definitely a book worth reading, and rereading, by all military personnel.

**Fehrenbach, T.**

*This Kind of War* (New York, NY. Macmillan. 1963)

**CWO5/Maj; Tactics.**
Of the many books written about the Korean War over the past 35 years, this is one of only a handful which have proven to be of enduring value. The author, who experienced the fighting firsthand as a company grade officer in the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry Division, covers nearly every aspect of the war: politics, strategy, tactics, discipline, training, and truce talks to name a few. Relying on his own experiences and official records and journals, but most importantly on the personal stories of those who carried the brunt of the fighting, Fehrenbach provides us with an intense and dramatic story. Always, however, he writes from the perspective of the man in the foxhole. The significant lesson he draws is the need in future wars for a professional soldier; “The man who will go where his colors go, without asking, who will fight a phantom foe in jungle and mountain range, without counting, and who will suffer and die in the midst of incredible hardship, without complaint.” This is the book to read if you want to learn how bureaucracy and public indifference nearly ruined much of the American military between World War II and the Korean War and to discover how the values of the Corps prevailed and led to successful performance on the battlefield.

Flickel, Wilhelm  
*War Secrets in the Ether: The Use of Signals Intelligence by the German Military in WWII* (Fort Monroe, VA. TRADOC. 1977)

Col; Intelligence.

Sun Tzu said, “All warfare is based on deception.” *War Secrets* exemplifies this theme. However, Flickel’s work is more than a history of the intercept and counter-intercept services in Germany and Europe during the 30-year period between the First and Second World Wars. His work also reveals the motives behind political and military decisions of this era.

Flickel draws on his experiences as a member of German information intercept organizations—the “Arendt service” in the First World War, the OKW cipher office between the wars, and the Funkabwehr (radio counterintelligence) during the Second World War. He explains very clearly how the “war in the ether” influenced such battles as the Marne, the Vistula, and Tannenburg.

Flickel argues that the ether is a battlefield just as terrain is. He who is able to “maneuver” in the ether gains the advantage of economy and surprise. Victory is his spoil.

*War Secrets* offers an excellent perspective of the way imagination may shape political and military events. This is a must-read book, with revealing descriptions of the political and military implications that the intercept and counter-intercept organizations had on world affairs.


Col; Leadership.

This novel is about a conventional British officer unable to come to grips with the unexpected conundrum of trench warfare on an industrial scale. It is as much about today’s Marine Corps as it is about the British Army of the First World War. Many Marines will reluctantly see themselves in the genial conformist who manages to make a career without any serious study of his profession. Those who might take comfort in the fact that this is a work of fiction should read Timothy Travers, *The Killing Fields*, for a thorough look...
at Douglas Haig, the officer who is generally seen to have been the model for Forester’s protagonist.


Pvt/PFC/LCpl; Courage and Commitment.

A short, relatively simple story about the contributions of a light infantryman, Rifleman Matthew Dodd, toward Wellington’s defeat of the French during the Peninsular Wars. This is the tale of how Dodd, cut off from his unit during combat, finds and fights his way through enemy territory to return to his unit. Dodd’s primary interest is survival, but we can learn from the considerable technical and tactical skill he puts to use. Due to its emphasis on honor, courage, and commitment, *Rifleman Dodd* was selected as the “Commandant’s Choice” during June 1995. This book is a “must read” for all Marines, regardless of rank. Although fiction, Forester’s work is an inspiring characterization of the personal character, determination, innovation, and physical toughness that light infantry must possess to succeed on the battlefields of yesterday, and, we believe, tomorrow.

Also valuable are Forester’s *The Gun*, another novel about the Peninsular War, and his Horatio Hornblower series about the exploits of a brilliant if unconventional British naval officer in the Napoleonic wars.


CWOS/Maj; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

The armed forces of the United States now focus on joint and/or combined operations. When two or more are committed, it is imperative that Marines know the capabilities and limitations of their sister Services, and those of allies and friends—as well as the foe. This 800-page book on Guadalcanal, fought in the Solomon Islands in 1942 and 1943, contains much of relevance to today’s joint operations. Frank blends into one volume the ground, naval, and air aspects of the campaign from both the American and Japanese perspectives. He also portrays the campaign through the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. In so doing, Frank has used sources previously not available, including intelligence records and Japanese materials.

The major strengths of this book are its treatment of the uncertainty and chaos of command in battle; the assumptions of various commanders, some valid and others not, upon which actions were based; the lack of information in operations when decisions had to be made; and the uncertainty and horror of combat. Frank vividly depicts the trauma of air and naval combat in graphic and compelling terms. He also presents a realistic and human portrayal of the Japanese and American troops operating ashore. He gives a balanced three-dimensional picture of the strengths, weaknesses, abilities, and physical deterioration of the Japanese soldier.

A basic subtheme focuses on how this small operation on an obscure island in the Southwest Pacific assumed, for both the Japanese and Americans, a life of its own and with the devotion of increasing assets, a growing strategic and psychological importance. The 1945 image of the Pacific in which large American combatant fleets roamed at will, supported by
a vast logistical base, certainly was not true in 1942.

**Fraser, David**  *Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel*  (New York, NY. Harper Collins 1993)

CWO5/Maj; History.

Instead of describing Erwin Rommel as a “brilliant general,” it would be better to use the more inclusive phrase “brilliant soldier.” Rommel was enormously successful as a junior German infantry officer in World War I, and earned his country’s highest decoration for courage in combat, the *Pour le Merite*. In the interwar years, he digested his own tactical combat experience into the enduringly-popular volume, *Infantry Attacks*. This book brought Rommel the attention and sponsorship of the head of the new German National Socialist government, Adolph Hitler.

After gaining highly-merited laurels in the 1940 campaign in France, Rommel was chosen to command the Afrika Korps formed to assist the Italian forces fighting the British in North Africa. This was theater of war that brought Rommel to the attention of the world and admiration of even his British opponents. But though he won a string of tactical victories, eventually his courage and skill proved insufficient in the face of growing British strength, expertise, and superior logistical support.

Rommel was home recovering from wounds when he was implicated in the plot to kill Hitler in 1944. His suicide protected his wife and son from also suffering from Hitler’s revenge.

The world remembers him as a great combat leader; his contemporaries in the German army described him as an excellent corps commander, but a mediocre army commander. A greater blot on his reputation was his close relationship with Hitler, which Rommel only partly erased through his involvement in the foiled assassination plot. In the end, Rommel provides as much a lesson in ethics as he does in battlefield genius.

**Friedman, Thomas**  *From Beirut to Jerusalem*  (New York, NY. Farrar, Straus, Giroux. 1989)

Col; Small Wars.

This award-winning volume brilliantly chronicles the Arab-Israeli conflicts of recent years. The author split most of his time evenly for most of the 1980s between the two named cities as a reporter for the *New York Times*. For this work, he received two Pulitzer prizes. The book unravels the mystery of the region and explores its intractable problems. The book also includes a poignant chapter on the Marine presence in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Overall, his analysis is exceptional, his insights revealing, his judgments—and he makes many—balanced. One reviewer called it “one of the best accounts yet of the Middle East psychodrama.” Another said, “If you’re going to read only one book on the Middle East, this is it.” This selection will broaden your horizons and deepen your understanding of a part of the world to which Marines may one day be called upon to return.

**Fuller, J.F.C.**  *Generalship, Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command*  (Leavenworth, KS. Command and General Staff College. 1984)

Gen; Theory.
General Fuller was one of the greatest military thinkers and writers of the 20th century. Had World War I lasted into 1919, his “Plan 1919,” which melded the capabilities of the tank, airplane, and artillery into a combined armed force similar to those so familiar today, might have ended the war. Instead, this combination did not appear on the battlefield until World War II, and, ironically, it was the Germans who used it first and to great success.

Had Fuller not irreparably damaged his credibility by becoming embroiled with British fascist politicians between the wars, he might have played a central role when war came again in 1939. This should not obscure the reality of the contributions he made in the interwar period as a writer on military theory. This book, though a short and easy read, is one of those contributions. In it, Fuller drives home the point that modern weapons have not erased the need for personal leadership. Instead, he emphasized that such leadership becomes even more important as weapons become more sophisticated. Fuller blamed the stalemate on the Western Front in World War I on the lack of such personal leadership by Allied generals. Fuller, however, did not provide the answer on how to maintain long-distance control on the modern extended battlefield. The technology of the era perhaps did not permit it. The modern senior officer may again exercise personal leadership in battle to an extent not seen since the 19th century. Fuller would be envious.

Fuller, J.F.C. Grant & Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship (Bloomington, IN. Indiana University Press 1982)

SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

Fuller questions the conventional historical opinion that U.S. Grant was a butcher while Robert E. Lee was the consummate military artist. He offers a penetrating comparison of the generals’ strategic, operational, and tactical methods, and the compatibility of these methods with the policy aims of the respective political leaderships. Grant was a commander whose strategy and campaigns were directly supportive of the needs of policy, while Lee’s ambitious offensive strategy proved too much for the South to sustain. In this way, Fuller provides an extremely useful analysis of interaction among the levels of war. Grant & Lee is enjoyable reading and its argument is powerfully convincing: a first-rate book.

Giap (Nguyen Giap Vo) How We Won the War (Philadelphia, PA. Recon Publications. 1976)

SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Small Wars.

This book gives us the enemy’s view of the Vietnam War, and no war can be understood or viewed through the eyes of only one side. One major weakness in the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was our failure to understand the enemy. Here is a chance to learn some things about him in retrospect.

What insights do we gain from reading Giap? We learn a great deal about what he thought of us, and therefore how he predicted and anticipated our actions, correctly in some instances, incorrectly in others. We also witness the enemy view of the war, his moral values, and how he communicated with his people.

Giap’s military thinking is not profound, and his writings clearly demonstrate that our enemy did not stand ten feet tall. If this is the case, did the North Vietnamese defeat the
United States in Vietnam or did we defeat ourselves?

Gordon, Michael, and Trainor, Bernard

MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

Using interviews with generals, senior politicians, and other officials from the Coalition, General Trainor and Michael Gordon of the *New York Times* provide a portrait of the major players in the Gulf War. *The Generals’ War* does away with much of the high-tech glamour that is seen in earlier books written on the war. Trainor and Gordon give the reader an inside look at the personalities, ambitions, and motivations that made up the top military leaders—a view that is often unflattering.

Given access to many previously classified documents, the authors reveal greater disharmony within the American military than the frequently advertised spirit of jointness. The Air Force believed that it could win the war through strategic bombing. The Army saw the conflict as an opportunity to use its version of maneuver warfare. The Navy preferred to remain aloof from the Central Command and acted on its own. The Marine Corps, with its history of amphibious assault and expeditionary warfare, approached the war with its own unique viewpoint. From this jumble of attitudes, doctrines, and outlooks, Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf were to develop a unified plan of action. Instead, the Gulf war plans were never combined into a fully integrated plan. One result of this failure to combine and coordinate planning was the escape of half of Iraq’s Republican Guard.

For the Marine reading this book, the major lesson to be learned is that jointness is not yet a reality.

Griffith, Paddy
*Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam* (Chichester, West Sussex England. A. Bird. 1981)

CWO5/Maj; Tactics.

Following the techniques originated by John Keegan in *The Face of Battle*, Paddy Griffith analyzes a series of battles from Waterloo to Vietnam to determine what really happened as opposed to what was reported to have happened. Seldom do the two agree. He concludes that despite 150 years of technological development, it is the willingness of the individual soldier to close with the enemy that determines the final outcome of most engagements. The tool for this risky business in the past was the bayonet; in recent times, it has become the grenade. Mr. Griffith has much to say to Marines and those who lead Marines. Unfortunately, the book is not well known and seldom read.

Guevara, Ernesto (Che)
*Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York, NY. Praeger. 1961)

CWO5/Maj; Small Wars.

This small volume is an enduring classic which should be read in conjunction with Mao’s book on the same subject. While the introductory remarks are dated Cold War rhetoric, Guevara’s ideas and prescriptions are as relevant as ever for anyone who may participate in guerrilla warfare. Guevara provides a clear, simple primer to anyone who may lead or take
part in operations by friendly guerrilla forces. For the professional who must combat such forces, this book provides insights necessary for developing an effective counterguerrilla campaign.

Hackett, Sir John  *The Profession of Arms*  
(New York, NY. Macmillan. 1983) 

**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Memoir.**

General Sir John Hackett had a small but growing audience of Marines well before publication of *Profession of Arms* or his two popular books on an imagined third world war. That audience developed from among those who were fortunate to discover copies of his 1942 Cambridge lectures on the role of the soldier in Western society. This book captures those lectures in a revised, expanded, and permanent form. It provides a rich and graceful description of the evolution of military ethics from ancient Sparta to late 20th century America. A valued addition to the original lectures is the final chapter on leadership; many consider it a classic. Only in his discussion of the post-World War II military professional does Sir John Hackett miss the mark. The selection of paintings and photographs is first rate. Essential reading early in any Marine’s career; don’t pass it up!

Hagan, Kenneth  *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*  
(Westport, CT. Greenwood Press. 1973) 

**SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Sea Power.**

This book establishes the background of American imperialism during the period 1877-1889. Hagan describes events affecting economics of the period, and those events continue to impact U.S. trade and military presence today. Beginning at the low period of post-Civil War naval decay, Hagan traces some of the fundamental political, naval, and commercial developments leading to the beginnings of our modern Navy and current commercial sea links. The first concepts of American sea power were being formed during this period. The need for a Navy and Marine military presence to ensure free passage for U.S. foreign trade was born then as well.

This book is a straightforward primer on American naval history. The reader will find interesting historic accounts of how our naval service came to be what it is today.

Halberstam, David  *The Best and the Brightest*  

**Gen; Policy.**

Taking a journalist’s perspective, David Halberstam explores the U.S. decision-making process vis-a-vis growing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in the 1960’s.

Key players from the highest levels of government take the stage in what proves to be a play increasingly divorced from reality. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Secretaries McNamara and Rush, and Generals Taylor and Westmoreland are but a few whose actions and beliefs are analyzed in this context.

These “best and brightest” are presented as part of a national deception involving a war that has receded into history for most active duty Marines today. Military leaders at the time earned Halberstam’s criticism for their role in manipulating the nation’s commitment to the war through misrepresented progress
reports (e.g., the “infamous” body counts reported daily by the media).

Halberstam’s depiction of policy-making as a function of key personalities—the “best and the brightest” of an era—is a valuable perspective for all concerned with implementing national policy.

**Hammel, Eric** *Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War* (Novato, CA. Presidio Press. 1990)

**CWO5/Maj; Heritage.**

Hammel is a prolific writer and an astute military historian. *Chosin* is a historical and personalized account of the 1st Marine Division’s epic battle in Korea during November and December 1950. Rich in anecdotal testimony, *Chosin* tells the story from the individual Marine’s view of the action. The senseless death, the paralyzing cold, the battlefield confusion, and the improbable survival are related with flair. The historical details are not as emphasized as the personal stories in this eminently readable book; yet *Chosin* remains one of the best histories available of this proud and neglected battle.


**Cpl/Sgt; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.**

Hammel focuses on the Tet offensive in this volume, specifically the fall and capture of the ancient Vietnamese capital of Hue. The North Vietnamese held the city for nearly a month after the surprise invasion in 1968 that began the Tet offensive. This particular battle involved house-to-house fighting, massive casualties on both sides, and utter devastation of the city. In his usual style, Hammel has assembled this book from hundreds of pieces of eyewitness testimony. Based largely on interviews with Marines, this book is a daily journal of the fighting. It is a dramatic and skillfully presented story that serves as an important historical record.


**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Sea Power.**

Since it is the only major amphibious operation in recent history, the reasons for studying the Falklands campaign should be obvious to any Marine. This volume, which covers the historical background as well as the political and military events from a British perspective, provides an outstanding jumping-off point for such a study.

Simon Jenkins, political editor for the *Economist*, provides the background information and describes events occurring in London, Washington, and Argentina. Max Hastings, the military correspondent for the London *Standard* who traveled with the task force, delivers the description of the conflict. U.S. Marine readers will make repeated comparisons between the American way of war and the British approach. Certainly our carrier force, aircraft, troop lift, supporting arms, and logistics train all stack up as superior. One suspects that if the United States had to accomplish the same mission, it would have been done in a larger, swifter, more violent, and infinitely bloodier manner. There is a nagging suspicion, however, that without our hardware advantages the issue may have been in doubt. The individual soldiering skills, mental and physical toughness, small-unit leadership, tactical innovation, and military judgment displayed by the Royal Marines and
paratroopers were impressive and make it clear why our own Commandant has put such a heavy emphasis on these areas.

The book also provides handy reference material for detailed study. A chronology of military and political events, a glossary, order of battle information, complete with major equipment drawings and statistics, and an honors list are all provided for reference. Strongly recommend The Battle for the Falklands as an overview before exploring more narrow areas.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

Inchon stands as man’s landmark achievement in amphibious warfare. *Victory at High Tide* is a Marine’s professional account, written for professional readers. Through *Victory at High Tide*, the student of the art of war can quickly appreciate what a rare success Inchon really was. One would be hard pressed to find so decisive a tactical victory since Waterloo. Even Waterloo was not more dramatic. For at Inchon, it was the side that had all but been driven off the continent at Pusan, the side that was clearly losing, that turned the tide in a single battle.

High tide is the key to the Inchon operation for the whole thing had to be done at high tide. Thus the title. For three or four successive days each month, there would be a brief period in the morning and again in the evening when all the ships and boats could get to shore and withdraw. The rest of the time, the water would be too shallow. This meant the landing had to go on 15 September—only twenty-three days from the start of planning. There would be no time for rehearsal. This also meant that once the landing started, it had to succeed in three days. LSTs that landed at evening tide would be stranded on the beach until morning. If everything was not accomplished in the three-day window, there would be no opportunity ever again. The surprise would be lost forever.
If a Marine by definition is a professional amphibious warrior, then a Marine who has not read *Victory at High Tide* is a contradiction of terms.

**Heinlein, Robert**  *Starship Troopers*  (New York, NY. Berkely Books. 1982)

**Pvt/PFC/LCpl; Training.**

Heinlein tells a futuristic story of battle with the Terrain Mobile Infantry against mankind’s most alarming enemy. The narrative follows a recruit of the future through the toughest boot camp in the universe and eventually intergalactic battle. Idealistic and long on honor and discipline, this is a superb story of small-unit leadership and combat.

**Higginbotham, Don**  *George Washington and The American Military Tradition*  (Athens, GA. University of Georgia Press. 1985)

**CWOS/Maj; Strategy.**

A noted contemporary historian of the Revolutionary War, Higginbotham traces the development of General Washington’s thoughts on the military from his early years in Virginia to his command of the Continental Army. He tells how a young, quick-tempered colonel of the Virginia Regiment developed into the very model of what an officer should be in a free society. As one reviewer notes, “his understanding and support of civil control of the military and all that it meant became his most admirable soldierly quality . . . and his foremost contribution to the American military tradition. To us who have grown used to huge standing armies and immense expenditures for the national defense, Washington speaks to this generation of civilian and military leaders as much as he did to those of two centuries ago.” The final chapter comparing the military legacies of General Washington with General George C. Marshall provides a welcome bonus to this exceptional book.


**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.**

The popular conception of military history is that it focuses narrowly on narratives of battles and campaigns. Higginbotham goes beyond that stereotype to examine the effects of the long Revolutionary War on American society. In the process, he integrates military history into the larger corpus of American history. This book reflects the state of scholarship on the Revolutionary War just prior to the national celebration of its bicentennial. The author correctly presents it as, in part, a civil war of American against American, instead of simply a rebellion against British rule. For military professionals, one lesson from this book is to see war as a complex undertaking which must consider the attitudes on the home front as well as tactics on the battlefield.
Hoffman, Jon  

**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Heritage.**

The title of this book is misleading since this is a biography of Edson’s entire life and Marine Corps career, not just an account of the relatively brief time he led the 1st Raider Battalion. While the Raider period brought Edson his greatest fame, his earlier and later career provided major contributions to the development of the Marine Corps. For instance, his exploits as the leader of a series of river patrols in Nicaragua against Sandino’s guerrillas in the 1930’s provided him with the experience to write the Marine Corps’s famed Small Wars Manual. He was a natural choice as a battalion commander when the Marine Corps decided to emulate the British Commandos and form special units (the Raider Battalions) to conduct raids behind Japanese lines. He proved innovative, and essentially created the modern fire team that is so central to Marine small-unit tactics.

In the immediate post-war years, during the “Unification” hearings in Congress, Edson was a leading figure in the Marine Corps’ efforts to remain a viable military force. He ultimately retired from the Marine Corps so that he could be free to speak his mind on the proper role of the Marine Corps in the post-war Defense establishment. This book is a “must read” for those who wish to understand the development of the modern Marine Corps.

Holmes, Richard  

**SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Memoir.**

This book’s subtitle, *The Behavior of Men in Battle*, is a misnomer, for it is really a wide-ranging and lengthy description of what happens to men from the time they are recruited until they are discharged as combat veterans. Holmes draws from interviews, written accounts, memoirs, psychological studies, and other varied sources to examine the experiences of the individual soldier. He discusses items as central to his subject as training, motivation, and casualties to those as remote as rituals, use of alcohol, and “Dear John” letters. The book is perhaps too focused on the Anglo-American experience, and ideas are often presented uncritically. Yet the scarcity of works covering war and military life from the individual perspective will make this one worthwhile for some time.

Hooker, Richard  

**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Theory.**

Today, America’s armed forces face massive change, a dramatically reduced force structure, and severe budget cuts. The concept of “maneuver warfare” has been put forth as one promising solution to this dilemma. Can a small, maneuver-oriented military establishment actually serve us better, as its proponents claim? This vexing question provides the basis for this important book.

The answers to this question will serve as the foundation for American military doctrine in the 21st century. Here, some of America’s finest minds explore the idea of maneuver-based warfare, getting to the heart of the issues and engaging in an energetic and lively debate, with each essay making an independent contribution to the evolving thought. Whether a cure-all or an empty bag of tricks, maneuver
warfare theory presents a formidable challenge to the American defense establishment. The synthesis of ideas presented in this volume will be critically important in shaping the post-Cold War world. Everyone in the military or interested in national defense should read these thoughtful and controversial essays.


Col; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

*To Lose a Battle* is one of the first works to dispel a multitude of myths about how the Germans so decisively defeated the French in 1940. Horne’s scholarly research reveals that the French did not give up easily, but that they had the will to fight until they were outfought tactically. The Germans did not overwhelm the French with tanks and airplanes. Rather, the Anglo-French Allies had on the battlefield more of each, and they were of superior quality. The Allies just did not know how to employ them tactically, and the Germans did. German casualties were much lighter than their enemy’s, but their officer casualties were proportionately higher because German officers led from the front. This is one of the first revelations in the English language that the German Army was a thinking army, dependent on a tolerance for independent decisionmaking.

Young officers in the French and British armies after World War I speak out against the rigidity and resistance to change of their seniors. “We won” they are told, “so why change?” New ideas of the young are suppressed by the French and British but welcomed by the Germans who have to admit “We lost. It is time to change.” In six short weeks, the French Army, recognized as the world’s strongest, is destroyed. Thorough treatment of the sociological and cultural background of the French and British Armies between the World Wars helps to show why the Allies were unready when the war broke out.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

No other single campaign study better captures the tactical and operational realities of the First World War than this thoroughly researched and superbly written volume. Drawing upon French and German-language sources, Horne crafted a succinct and evocative study that is both filled with the drama of the unparalleled heroism born of desperate fighting and crackling with insights on the war as a whole. The campaign illustrates the manner in which expectations that generals raise of easy success deprive them of control.

Field-Marshal Erich Falkenhayn thought he had discovered the formula to avoid a prolonged campaign against Russia and to knock Britain out of the war by “bleeding” the army of its great ally, France, through a lethal concentration of artillery on the exposed, obsolescent fortress city of Verdun. In conception the plan was to raise the stakes for the French, so that they would funnel troops into this killing zone. In practice, the German government and people demanded that the city be taken, and Falkenhayn altered his plan. The result was an 11-month blood bath that cost 700,000 casualties, French and German. To those who fought it and to us, Verdun was a byword for the senseless carnage of industrial-age warfare. For France, it made the reputation of Philippe Petain and convinced later French governments that fixed fortifications were the best
means of avoiding future blood-lettings on the scale of Verdun.

**Horne, Alistair**  
*A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*  

**Col; Small Wars.**

A combat veteran of World War II, a world-class journalist, and a lifelong student of French history, Alistair Horne is well equipped to tell the tale of the Algerian war of independence. Marines should read this book because it portrays the same forces that were at work in Vietnam in a completely different environment. It’s all here—a tightly organized group willing to stop at nothing to gain power, tradition-bound villagers enlisted in the cause of a left-wing revolution, a hopelessly divided Western nation trying to live up to its commitments, Western-educated intellectuals attacking the West, Westernized elites caught in the middle of a civil war, and ethnic minorities left out in the cold when power is handed over to the “natives,” not to mention pacification, “hearts and minds” terrorism, and “search and destroy.”

**Hubbard, Elbert**  
*A Message to Garcia*  
(New York, NY. Peter Pauper Press Inc. 1982)

**Pvt/PFC/LCpl; Memoir.**

*A Message to Garcia* is a concise lesson in what to look for in people—seniors and subordinates. The focal point of this story is the ability to effectively accomplish whatever task is assigned with a minimum of supervision and to have the intelligence and initiative to do what is necessary to “get things done.”

Although decades old, these lessons have particular significance today in the context of maneuver warfare. An easy, understandable book, it requires the reader, no matter at what level, to ask some very hard, self-searching questions concerning loyalties and motivation, not just of themselves but also of the persons under their charge. As a Marine, if you are not familiar with this story, you are culturally illiterate.

**Hynes, Samuel**  
*Flights of Passage: Reflections of a World War II Aviator*  
(Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1988)

**SSgt/ WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Heritage.**

This is an exceptionally well-written and enjoyable memoir of World War II by a distinguished scholar and professor of English at Princeton. It details Hynes’ service as a Marine pilot from his initial entry through flight school, combat in the Pacific, and the end of the war. In addition to being enjoyable in its own right, this volume is exceptionally useful for illuminating the experiences shared by most Marine aviation veterans of World War II.

**Infantry School (U.S.)**  
*Infantry in Battle*  
(Washington DC. HQMC. 1989)

**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Tactics.**

A collection of practical, tactical lessons learned from the First World War in the form of numerous, concise historical examples edited by then-Colonel George C. Marshall. Written in simple, straightforward language
and supported abundantly by sketch maps, the examples illustrate the intended lessons very clearly and powerfully. Interestingly, the lessons reflect an unexpected bias toward third-generation tactics; i.e., maneuver tactics, without saying so, of course, and are thus very relevant today. It is an interesting companion to Lupfer’s Dynamics of Doctrine and Rommel’s Attacks.

Isely, Jeter, and Crowl, Philip  The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific  (Quantico, VA. Marine Corps Association. 1979)

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Sea Power.

Widely known simply as “Isely and Crowl,” this is the single most authoritative source available on amphibious warfare and the Marine Corps; it describes better than any other work the development of our amphibious heritage. While the book focuses on the conduct of amphibious operations in war, it includes an important section on the development and institutionalization of amphibious warfare in the pre-World War II days. It was an era that demonstrates many parallels to the present and one we can learn from. For a more detailed discussion of that period, see Kenneth Clifford’s Progress and Purpose (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1973). Isely and Crowl is not necessarily a book to be read from cover to cover, but for the reader who wants to get the definitive word on Tarawa or Tinian, for example, this is the place to go. This is an important book.

James, D. Clayton  The Years of MacArthur  (Boston, MA. Houghton Mifflin. 1980)

MGySgt, SgtMaj, LtCol; Leadership.

There have been many books written about General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Why, then, should a Marine choose to read this work of over 2,400 pages? First, because James’ three volumes are the most comprehensive biography of MacArthur. They are likely to stand for decades as the definitive study of this colorful and controversial American general. All three volumes have been praised for their balanced and unbiased approach, careful research, and enormous detail. Second, but more important, General MacArthur needs to be studied for the immense impact he had on the course of World War II in the Pacific, his vital role in the reconstruction of Japan as a democratic nation, and his leadership during the early months of the Korean War.

Volume I covers the first 61 years of MacArthur’s life to include his early career, service in World War I, years as Chief of Staff of the Army, and as field marshal of the Philippine Army. Volume II details his leadership during World War II to include each of the major operations from early defeat in the Philippines to the Japanese surrender, conflict with Navy leadership in the Pacific, and disagreements with officials in Washington. Volume III chronicles his role during the occupation of Japan and command in the first 10 months of the Korean War. James’ prose is ordinary (thus your reading may at times be tedious), but no other book or books will so reward your efforts as The Years of MacArthur.


Gen; Strategy.
Sun Tzu wrote that the “art of war is of vital importance to the state.” Kagan admonishes us that “no less important is the art of avoiding war.” A persistent and repeated error through the ages has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does. “No peace keeps itself.”

Kagan uses the study of the origins of four great wars and one near atomic disaster—the Peloponnesian War, the Second Punic War, World Wars I and II, and the Cuban missile crisis—to craft a forceful argument that “peace is best preserved by the active and responsible exercise of power.”

Kagan makes a strong argument that threats to peace similar to those in the past persist to this very day and will continue in the future. This is a must-read book for leaders involved in strategic-level policy-making positions.


SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; History.

This remarkable book was written to answer the question, “What is it like to be in a battle?” Even more remarkable is the fact that the author in large part accomplishes the task, though he himself has never experienced combat or served in the military. Opening with a review of military history as traditionally practiced, Keegan finds shortcomings in past descriptions of how men behave in combat. He sets about to correct this deficiency in an examination of three battles—Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815), and the Somme (1916)—each of which was larger, more complex, and deadlier than its predecessor. Keegan is only excelled by the master of this genre, S.L.A. Marshall. However, his conclusion that battle as known in the past has abolished itself is suspect, no matter how welcome such an eventuality. An important work, it is not to be missed by young leaders.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Sea Power.

In two of his earlier works, *The Face of Battle* and *The Mask of Command*, John Keegan displayed a unique ability to meld the human elements of combat into the wider context of tactical and technological developments. He employs that talent superbly again in his first study of war at sea. Using the battles of Trafalgar (1805), Jutland (1916), Midway (1942), and two Atlantic convoys (1943), he traces the evolution of naval warfare from the era of the classic sailing ships through the 20th century’s armored dreadnoughts, aircraft carriers, and submarines. When Keegan describes the sounds, the smells, the sights, and the suffering, he gives one a sense of actually being at the scene of the action. Yet, as with Keegan’s other books, there are two disappointments. First is his failure to share with us the emotions of those who fought. Second is his rather strained conclusions, in this case, that “command of the sea in the future unquestionably lies beneath rather than upon the surface.” Nonetheless, no serious student of war should miss this or any other book by Keegan.

MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Heritage.

A thorough examination of the Marine Corps’ efforts to remain a viable military organization as the nation transitions from wartime to a period of peace, this book demonstrates that Congress “saved” the Marine Corps because it believed the nation needed Marines. A small, hand-picked group of bright, talented, sophisticated Marine officers shaped this congressional opinion, in part, by proving trustworthy and nonpartisan. As the United States continues to adapt to the post-Cold War “peace,” this model for relations with Congress remains viable. This book is a “must read” for those who fight budget and structure battles in our nation’s capital as well as for those who want to know how fragile our continued existence is.

Kennedy, Paul  *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*  (Atlantic Highlands, NJ. Ashfield Press. 1986)

Col; Sea Power.

This is not a book about famous (Royal Navy) admirals and battles, nor is it one of tactics, ship design, gunnery, navigation, or social life in the navy. It is a masterful examination of the sinews of British sea power, with the Royal Navy set within the broad framework of national, international, economic, political, and strategic considerations, i.e., the geopolitical context, “without which the terms ‘sea power’ and ‘naval mastery’ cannot properly be understood.” The term “naval mastery” explicitly implies “something stronger, more exclusive and wider-ranging” than does the narrower term “sea power.” Kennedy eschews taking A. T. Mahan’s exposition of the workings of sea power as gospel and takes issue many times with *The Influence of Sea Power on History* published in 1890.

Among Kennedy’s arguments and conclusions are two of special contemporary significance: First, “Britain’s naval rise and fall has been so closely bound up with her economic rise and fall that it is impossible to understand the former without a close examination of the latter.”

Secondly, even during the “so-called ‘Columbian era’ the influence of sea power had some very natural limitations which British governments needed to take account of in peacetime and wartime. It was not by maritime methods alone, but by a judicious blending of both sea power and land power, that Britain rose to become the leading world power.” Thus, historically the Royal Navy’s many ships-of-the-line played only one role (admittedly a large one) in a multi-actor play which also required British expeditionary armies of various sizes and large financial subsidies to enemies of Britain’s enemies to pay for and sustain the large national armies which Britain lacked.

National resources, however, are no substitute for effective vision and doctrine. Fixated on the German High Seas Fleet in World War I, Britain’s naval leaders tempted fate first by scoffing at the emerging U-boat threat and then by combating it with an ineffective doctrine. Only belatedly, and reluctantly, did they accept the convoy system.

Readers will find chapter 10 “The Years of Decay (1919-1939)” especially interesting and relevant. Aptly named, this chapter explains the (drastic) demise of the Royal Navy in the aftermath of the “war to end all wars.” Balanced budgets were the order of the day. Before the war the Royal Navy had been allo-
cated 25 per cent of the total government expenditure. By the time of the 1929 slump, it would get only 6 per cent.

How does Britain’s interwar experience compare and apply to our own situation in the 1990s? Seeing no credible threats on the horizon, Britain adopted a “Ten-Year Rule” in the 1920s (there would be ten years’ warning of an emerging threat and therefore plenty of time to prepare). Fearing the consequences of national debt, British politicians balanced the budget, decimating their armed forces in the process. Is the United States about to take this same path? With the same consequences?


*Gen; Sinews.*

*Rise and Fall* is a national bestseller for good reason. It explains how various “Great Powers” have attained and then lost that status over a five-century period. The interaction between economic and military concerns in war and peace are described in clear, unambiguous terms. This book is a foundation of education on the effect of economics on the choice to go to war and the effect of waging war on the ultimate success or failure of the economy. It is particularly important that an officer in today’s military understand the broader relationship of military strategy to the economic element of national power. *Rise and Fall* is a well-researched and easy-to-read examination of one of the “big pictures” that military officers must be able to envision. This book is definitely a “keeper.” It should be in every professional’s library.


*Gen; Strategy.*

Henry Kissinger is an eminent feature of our intellectual landscape. In a sense, he is beyond controversy. Love him or loathe him—and almost everybody does one or the other—he is inescapably there. Now in a powerful and erudite new book, *Diplomacy*, Kissinger has created something almost as monumental as his own brooding presence. At 835 pages plus notes and bibliographies, *Diplomacy* conducts its readers on a Kissinger’s eye tour of European and American diplomacy from the Peace of Westphalia to the New World Order.

Not everyone will want the full tour. At his best, Kissinger is a brilliant diplomatic historian, but 350 years is a lot of territory and Kissinger is a busy man. His interpretations of German history are always interesting and sometimes gripping, but although his analysis of American grand strategy during the Cold War is often both original and convincing, Kissinger grows generally less satisfactory as a guide the farther his focus shifts from Vienna and Berlin.

But let’s cut to the chase. This book isn’t really about diplomacy in general. It is about diplomacy in particular: American diplomacy at the end of the Cold War. Kissinger believes that the United States needs a more sophisticated intellectual framework for its foreign policy process, and this book is his most determined and comprehensive effort to date to provide it. Kissinger believes that American diplomats and public opinion need to absorb European ideas about realism and balance of power politics and *Diplomacy* is intended as a
primer for the new breed of American real-politik politicians that Kissinger would like to encourage.


MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Policy.

This is one of best books available for examining the period just after the Revolution when the United States government discovered it needed national military forces in addition to the militia. The initial intent, based on a strong suspicion of a professional military, was to rely upon the States to provide militia units and naval forces to protect the new nation. The disastrous campaigns in 1789-92 against the Indians on the frontier forced a painful, heated reexamination of the new nation’s military policy. By the turn of the century, the nation had reluctantly created a small, standing army.

There are lessons in this book that make it well worth reading by military professionals, especially those who lead and advise at the tactical and operational levels of war. The early campaigns provide the negative lessons of what not to do. The subsequent ones under the leadership of “Mad Anthony” Wayne provide excellent insights on how to organize and use the forces available to achieve victory.

Serving professionals may find some of the early arguments relevant to understanding the current post-Cold War era. Of particular value are Kohn’s accounts of the debates over the size of the Services and whether the Federal military could or should be used in riots or other domestic crises.

Kohn is an excellent writer, and this is a very enjoyable book. It has a highly-deserved reputation among those who study military policy in the United States.

**Krepinevich, Andrew**  *The Army and Vietnam*  (Baltimore MD. Johns Hopkins University Press. 1988)

MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Small Wars.

There are few examples more vivid of an army’s failure to come to grips with its enemy because of its preconceived notion of how the war should be fought than *The Army and Vietnam*. The author is a U.S. Army major, too young to have fought in the war, but an ardent student of it, able to look unemotionally at what went wrong. Of particular interest to Marine readers will be his treatment of the Marine Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program. Infantry Marines in this program operated from within Vietnamese villages and fought alongside popular forces, giving tremendous confidence to the people we were there to help. According to Krepinevich, the U.S. command in Saigon was not enamored with the CAP program because it did not seem to be making a significant contribution to the body count. Had the relevance of the Marine Corps’ CAPs and other psychological warfare programs been appreciated and had the U.S. forces not been so focused on a European-style war in their preparations, the author believes results might have been different. This book is extremely well researched and an invaluable study for anyone willing to be introspective about how we fought the war.

**Krulak, Victor**  *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*  (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1984)
The author’s life and career give him and his reader a rare perspective on the Marine Corps. Krulak’s active duty spans the bulk of our post-World War I history, and his active “retired” life has kept him writing and commenting throughout and into the present. Therefore, Krulak’s perspective encompasses the entire amphibious era and the transition that followed through Vietnam and into the modern expeditionary era.

During his active duty years, Krulak developed qualifications that support this important perspective. As a lieutenant, he was intrigued watching Japanese amphibious landings against the Chinese, and as a captain, he saw to it that the U.S. Navy adopted a landing craft with a retractable bow ramp. As a major in the 1930’s, he helped to form the Marines’ amphibious doctrine, commanded a battalion in World War II, was General Shepherd’s operations officer in Korea, and went on to be a leading thinker on counterinsurgency as we moved into the Vietnam era, where he commanded FMFPAC.

It would be interesting to name all the books in which Victor Krulak plays prominently. Most significant would be the eras they span. They would include Clifford’s Progress and Purpose, Isely and Crowl’s U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Heinl’s Victory at High Tide, Asprey’s War in the Shadows, Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam, and Sheehan’s Bright Shining Lie. Sheehan, incidentally, names him the man in the hierarchy of the U.S. armed forces in 1963 who had the imagination to grasp the importance of the moment and who, during his twenty-eight and a half years of service, had displayed a capacity for innovative military thinking that could be described without exaggeration as genius.

Krulak examines the foundations on which our Corps has been built. The work is not a history, but a philosophical teaching that helps to fill in the answers that no Marine history provides: what really makes the Marine Corps different. Anyone whose experience fails to span all that Krulak’s does would be arrogant to assert his views on the Marine Corps, past, present, or future, without reading this book. This is such a fundamental book for Marines that, although it is assigned to higher grades, all Marines ought to consider reading First to Fight.

Laqueur, Walter, and Alexander, Yonah

Terrorism Reader is the best work for getting a good insight into the minds of some of the world’s more notable terrorists—an important exercise for anyone who intends to make his living fighting them. This excellent anthology includes primary source writings by terrorists and authorities on terrorism. The book’s primary editor, Walter Laqueur, has devoted a lifetime to studying conflict, especially guerrilla warfare and terrorism. He used much of the material that appears in Terrorism Reader as source material for his book, Terrorism, which is more expensive and harder to read. Terrorism Reader begins with some classic essays (all of them short): Aristotle’s “The Origin of Tyranny” and Cicero’s “No Fellowship with Tyrants.” We then see through the eyes of some devoted Russian terrorists of the 19th century how terrorism successfully discredited the old Russian empire. Mikhail Bakunin’s “Revolution, Terrorism, Banditry” and Sergey Nechaev’s “Catechism of the Revolutionist” are especially enlightening.
The ideas and theories of 20th century terrorists are well represented. There is Emil Julius Gumbel’s “Organized Murder” and several essays on the IRA. There is the “Platform of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.” Menachem Begin tells the story of the tactics used against the British in the 1940’s in “The Revolt.” Bhagwat Charen provides lucid insight into the expectations of modern revolutionaries in his “Philosophy of the Bomb.” An essay by Josef Horchem gives a German perspective on European terrorism, including treatment of current revolutionary organizations in Germany, Italy, and Spain, while Michael S. Radu writes on “Terror, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Latin America.” Terrorism remains a mystery to too many military men today. A first step in knowing one’s enemy in this area is understanding that there is a philosophy and a logic to what seems on the surface a flagrant, cruel, and arbitrary use of violence. When we discover how terrorism succeeded as a major factor in bringing down the Russian empire and how it was then exported to the Middle East, where the British were forced to leave, we begin to realize its power. On studying the essays in this book, we can learn much about what may lie ahead—perhaps for the next hundred years.

Leckie, Robert Strong Men Armed: The United States Marines Against Japan
(New York, NY. Random House Inc. 1962)

Cpl/Sgt; Heritage.

The author served as a scout and a machine-gunner with the 1st Marine Division during World War II. With the exception of Okinawa, he was in all that outfit’s campaigns. While serving at Peleliu, he was severely wounded in a blast and subsequently awarded a Purple Heart and Navy Commendation Medal for valor.

Leckie, William The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West
(Norman, OK. University of Oklahoma Press. 1967)

Cpl/Sgt; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

This book is subtitled A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West, and it deals with the 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments of the U.S. Army following the Civil War. The book’s title comes from what the Indian adversaries called the cavalry. The Indians likened them to sacred buffaloes. The author has successfully reconstructed the lives of these soldiers by drawing upon military reports found in the National Archives.

This book is scrupulously researched and scholarly written and has style and wit. The narrative finds the appropriate anecdote, and it is also good history. Leckie very ably describes the complicated racial situations that developed in Oklahoma and other parts of the frontier at the turn of the last century and provides a helpful critique of specific cavalry operations.

Lejeune, John Reminiscences of a Marine
(Quantico, VA. Marine Corps Association. 1979)

CWO5/Maj; Heritage.

The unadorned and humble memoir of the Marine Corps’ 13th Commandant and one of its greatest legends, this superb book is also a treatise on leadership. Reminiscences is simply one of the most inspiring and insightful books
available, a “must read” for anyone who professes to be a leader of Marines.


*SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Strategy.*

Despite being slanted to support the author’s preconceptions, this is a colorful and valuable look at military history. Liddell Hart’s jaunt through time is intended to support one basic thesis: in war, the indirect approach prevails over the direct every time. The indirect approach clearly owes its origins to Sun Tzu and is essentially a theory of maneuver, which makes *Strategy* valuable reading for Marines. Like all of Liddell Hart’s work, *Strategy* is as eminently enjoyable as it is unquestionably biased.


*SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Tactics.*

Like the dentist you love to hate, Lind has been drilling into painful cavities in Marine doctrine and habit for some time. *Handbook* is the best introduction to maneuver warfare available, particularly as it applies to the Marine Corps today at the small-unit level. As recent as this book is, it represents maneuver warfare in its Marine Corps infancy—a testament to the dynamism of tactical and operational thought in the Corps today. In some areas, the Marine Corps has since surpassed the ideas contained in this book, but in other areas Lind’s thoughts are still on the cutting edge—and still fueling controversy. In either case, the *Handbook* provides an excellent starting point. The second half of the book, Col Wyly’s transcribed lectures and the practical exercises which accompany them, are equally valuable, as is the annotated reading list.


*MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Memoir.*

Grant’s own account of his war and his life was written in a desperate race with throat cancer. It is a story of a man who considered himself a failure until destiny rescued him from obscurity. This scruffy-looking man pointed his well-chewed stub of a cigar forward and followed it down a long road to victory in a monumental civil war which determined the fate of our nation. Somewhere along the way he became a general who could wage war better than any man of his era.

Grant has been castigated for being a butcher, for beating the mythologized Robert E. Lee, not in a single great decisive battle, but in a nonheroic campaign of attrition marred by successive defeats from The Wilderness to Cold Harbor—defeats which nonetheless still served the gruesome purpose of battering Lee’s army, forcing it to ground in the Richmond defenses, and pinning it there. Purposeful attrition in a strategic design ending in victory is at least preferable to unintended greater attrition in a strategic vacuum ending in failure. Over the period of two years, the Army of the Potomac had suffered nearly 120,000 casualties to achieve nothing more than a draw. Then came Grant. In 45 days he advanced more than 75 miles and took Lee out of the war for good—at the cost of (only) 55,000 casualties. Grant complained little and worked with what he had. He possessed self-confidence, without conceit, had confidence in his principal subordinates, and let them receive credit and acclaim even at his own expense. Grant freely admits to mistakes,
misjudgments, and regrets. His simple, clear, and concise orders and instructions remain models for future commanders at all levels of war. Written in that same unpretentious and straightforward manner, with no plea or excuses, this volume ranks among the greatest of all war memoirs.

Lupfer, Timothy *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in the German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS. Command and General Staff College. 1981)

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Doctrine.

*Dynamics of Doctrine* describes how the German Army of World War I changed from a force of battalions, whose doctrine was based on a profound mistrust of the common soldier, to an army of fireteams where tactical judgment was expected of the most junior rifleman. Unfortunately for Germany, her army did not change fast enough. The damage wrought by the shoulder-to-shoulder assaults of 1914 and the inflexible defensive tactics of 1914, 1915, and 1916 could not be undone by the stormtroop tactics and mobile defense of 1917 and 1918. The result was catastrophic defeat. The lessons are clear: encourage innovation; learn from the battlefield; don’t wait for a new manual to change the way you fight. G.C. Wynne’s mistitled *If Germany Attacks* is a good alternate to *Dynamics of Doctrine*, and Bruce Gudmundsson’s *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918* is an excellent and concise complement.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Memoir.

MacArthur easily is one of the most controversial figures in American military history; he is hailed and condemned with vehement passion. At the same time, he will be found near the top of any list of America’s greatest generals. And like him or hate him, there is much to be learned from his *Reminiscences*. After all, any officer who spends over 30 years as a general officer—leading combat forces in three major wars and being a household name throughout America in two of them—has a lot to teach us.

This is no collection of “been there, done that” sea stories. This book gives the opportunity to get inside the mind of a military leader who excelled at leadership, tactics, and the operational and strategic levels of war. But read it objectively, for memoirs can be self-serving. MacArthur provides a benchmark for evaluating and raising the reader’s own professional competence and striving to reach his/her full potential as a leader.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Memoir.

This personal account is essential for study by any Marine leader anticipating combat for the first time. An Army company commander in Europe in World War II, the author tells how he dealt with his fears and struggled and succeeded in asserting himself as leader of a company that included soldiers with the combat experience he himself lacked. That his predecessor had been superb and loved by his men made the challenge to the new company commander even greater. Though the narrative is in many ways comparable to Erwin Rommel’s
account of his company-level experience in World War I, MacDonald’s account falls short in terms of tactical profundity. A search for why this is so, however, makes the book especially worth reading in comparison and contrast to Rommel’s *Attacks*. In Rommel, we have the young professional soldier, seeing war for the first time, having studied and trained for it all his life. In MacDonald, we have a young civilian entering the service and being rapidly commissioned in an Army almost frantically building from a small constabulary to a massive continental force. What is the difference between the professional and the amateur? How necessary are the years of training and education now given to today’s Marines? Answers to these questions can be deduced from reading MacDonald along with Rommel.


*Gen; Small Wars.*

MacDonald’s book, while designed as a full-scale biography, is in reality a lengthy interview with Vo Nguyen Giap and a number of his (trusted) subordinates. It does offer a fairly reliable account of Giap’s military career, beginning with his organizing a fledgling military force, through the Viet Minh War and Dien Bien Phu, and his role during the Second Vietnam War. MacDonald gives Giap full credit for several masterful innovations, and there is a considerable focus on his “logistical genius” and ability to move men and material around the battlefield which astounded . . . and confounded his adversaries. As a strategist, Giap’s role is somewhat downplayed during the Second Vietnam War, while as a tactician and guerrilla warfighter, he receives extremely high marks during both wars.

If there is a weakness in this book, it is that the author served neither in combat nor in any capacity in Southeast Asia. Thus at times, his perceptions may be based totally on a one-on-one interview with Giap. The result is a sometimes one-sided approach. MacDonald concludes that while Giap had all of the qualities needed for generalship, what made the difference in his lengthy tenure at the top was fortuity. This book, unfortunately, does not address specific roles during the 30 years of conflict, such as his failures, his sporadic removal from the top military position, and the role of other military leaders such as Van Tien Dung, Troung Chin, Chi Than.

The strength of MacDonald’s book unquestionably is his account of how the national strategy and the national military strategy were developed. This alone makes the book a worthwhile read.


*SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2LT/1LT; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.*

This book, first published anonymously and in abbreviated form, later became a worldwide phenomenon. Detailing the experiences of an infantryman on the Western Front in the First World War, it is about camaraderie and the bonds within combat units. Reading this book is a moving and powerful experience. Ernest Hemingway described this piece as “the finest and noblest book of men in war that I have ever read.”

**Mao Tse-tung.**  Trans. by S.B. Griffith  *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*
Godfather to uncountable guerrilla leaders and their wars of national liberation, Mao put his thoughts on war in this one book. Although the book is thin, like Sun Tzu’s small book, Mao’s book is thick with insight. Beginning with a discussion of what guerrilla warfare is and its relationship to regular operations, Mao proceeds to discuss the history of guerrilla warfare as well as its organization, politics, strategy and prospects for victory. Mao’s brief chapter 6 dealing with the political problems of guerrilla warfare may by itself have altered the Vietnam war if we had read, understood, and applied it. Its lessons are still applicable and yet remain largely unlearned. We, as Marines, cannot be truly prepared to fight in any clime or place unless we fully grasp the principles in this book. Mao used these principles to conquer all of China, while the United States backed his opponent. Victories like those, wherever we find them, demand our respect and study. Mao’s victory in China is recent history, but his insights are timeless and cross all geographic boundaries. It is past time we studied this book and reaped the knowledge Mao has left behind.

Marshall, S.L.A. Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation (Quantico, VA. Marine Corps Association. 1980)

Cpl/Sgt; Tactics.

We carry too much gear. Everyone knows it. Everyone says it. To the point, Marshall does not overload his superb book with an excess of pages. He proposes that troops going into combat carry no more than about 40 pounds, including weapon, ammunition, food, water, and clothes. Fighting forces in contact with the enemy must not expend their energy lugging needless gear. Those in rear areas should emulate the living conditions of those forward. Marshall cites example after example of ways supply should be properly used; for example, Patton began his attack into Brittany with only three days’ worth of fuel, ammunition, and food. He demanded that his supply people keep up with him. Marines must do no less. We have the transportation and communication assets, if we will but use them, to get gear where and when it is needed. We do not have the capability, however, to transport everything any warfighter might desire—and we never will. Self-discipline in matters of supply is what Marshall really writes about. Each Marine who reads and puts into action the wisdom in this small book will improve our Corps.


Cpl/Sgt; Heritage.

John McCormick wrote the book, The Right Kind of War, from his own World War II service with the U.S. Marine Corps. He served with the elite group of Raiders. These extraordinary men of the island-hopping campaign wrestled control of the Pacific from the Japanese. It is the story of a gallant band of young Marines coming of age in a crucible of fire, lead, and steel.

There have been many novels of World War II, but none have portrayed the kind of war where there are no rules and there is no surrender. This was McCormick’s war.

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Training.

McDonough, an Army lieutenant colonel, writes a modern version of *The Defense of Duffer’s Drift*. The book follows a battalion rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. After his “death,” the battalion commander must watch as his battalion successfully negotiates the course at NTC. After each chapter, the object lesson is presented. The book is easy and captivating reading that will augment the professional knowledge of all those who read it.


Gen; Strategy.

The longtime Secretary of Defense (1961-1968), who presided over the early years of the Vietnam War, writes to justify his present-day view that the war was a terrible error. Listing eleven reasons for our failure, McNamara is most interesting in his portrayal of the hesitations and confusion surrounding high-level decisionmaking under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He documents the inability of the two successive administrations to make clear-cut decisions and their fatal tendency to straddle two horns of a dilemma. For example, both Presidents agreed that only the South Vietnamese could defend their country, yet both saw South Vietnam as a vital American and regional security interest that required American support to whatever extent necessary. These propositions were incompatible. The portrayal of high-level decision-making that emerges shows the two administrations confused and irresolute, reacting to events they barely understood.

The Vietnam War marked a low point in our civil-military relations. Military readers will find much in this book to help them understand why.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Strategy.

This is a brilliant narrative of the Civil War, finely crafted in novel style. This book has been widely hailed as the best Civil War book in a generation; the *Los Angeles Times* calls it the “best of 50,000 books written on the Civil War.” Packed with detail and exhaustively researched, this is a book of stellar historical writing and good storytelling. Historical figures come to life and all perspectives are examined. The important issues are addressed, and with appropriate depth.

McPherson’s primary focus is, correctly, on the campaigns and battles. Yet McPherson never loses sight of “those weary men in blue and gray who fought it out during four years of ferocity unmatched in the western world between the Napoleonic Wars and WWI.” The author skillfully probes why the North won and the South lost, seeing the outcome as a military issue. On many levels, this book will greatly add to even the most astute reader’s knowledge.

This book is more than the title implies. Though written as a study of the employment of armor, it is a study of maneuver. What Von Mellenthin and his contemporaries applied to tank warfare, we can apply to infantry, helicopterborne forces, and light armored vehicles. The author is a product of Germany’s much vaunted Kriegsakademie and general staff system. His superb professional military education is reflected in his writing, observations, and criticisms, and even his maps. The maps reprinted in *Panzer Battles* provide more clarity, tactically and operationally, than nearly any other military work.

The book is a virtual bible on armored warfare, to be read thoroughly cover to cover. It loses meaning if quotations are taken out of context. For example, the reader in search of an answer to whether tanks or infantry ought to lead in the attack will find the author answering the question both ways in different parts of the book. What the reader must appreciate is the situation. The book does an excellent job of relating tactical lessons so that the reader sees the lessons in terms of situational awareness and not as rules.

One chapter that stands alone is that on fighting the Russians. Von Mellenthin characterizes the Russian soldier, how he fights, and his strengths and weaknesses, all from the extensive personal experiences of his years on the Eastern Front.

An additional reason to read the book is that Von Mellenthin served personally on the staffs of two of the 20th century’s greatest field commanders: as an intelligence officer for Erwin Rommel in North Africa and then as chief of staff for Hermann Balck on the Eastern Front. The lessons of leadership and tactical and operational finesse were not lost on the author.


**CWO5/Maj; Air Power.**

This book is a chronology of Marine Corps aviation from the first Marine aviator, Alfred A. Cunningham, through the post-Vietnam era. The author focuses primarily on pilots, aircraft, and historical squadron activity with limited coverage of the roles, missions, and doctrine employed. Although the book covers a long period of time, Merskey gives the reader an understanding of the tangible and revolutionary achievements of Marine aviation. The reader should take this book for what it is, a historical account, not an analysis of air doctrine as it developed. For those looking for a short and usable historical overview of Marine aviation, Merskey’s book is the best place to start.


**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Training.**

This book comes from an experienced officer who brought together the recommendations and insights of many others who have led at the company level. In a sense, it provides a panel of experts who can be consulted as the situation dictates. This book “works” for both those with the title of commander and those who advise and assist the commander in making it all happen. It’s an easy book to use be-
cause of its format and thorough index. Important tips appear in bold type, and the author uses boxes throughout the book to highlight successful leaders’ quotes and actual experiences. Much of what appears will not be new to experienced leaders, but it is outstanding for bringing a lot of useful material and good common sense into a single package.

Miller, John  *The Bridge at Dong Ha*  (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1989)

Pvt/PFC/LCpl; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

This is a story of individual action. One U.S. Marine, Captain John Ripley, decides on his own and acts. In so doing, he saves the entire command; in fact, the entire nation. A one-man tactical action strikes directly at the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. As a result, the North Vietnamese offensive of Easter 1972 is stalled when their tank columns cannot cross the Cua Viet River because one very courageous Marine blew up the bridge at Dong Ha.

*The Bridge*, in minute and accurate detail, tells the real-life story of one of the most astounding acts of heroism during the Vietnam War. Today’s generation of Marines will receive from this story the inspiration for tomorrow’s victories. This is the kind of individual initiative that FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, demands. One Marine, deciding and acting before the enemy can react, stops a column of tanks and a strategic offensive. This is risk-taking, boldness, and action without orders. It is leadership from the front and quick thinking. It is seizure of an opportunity. Many morals could be drawn from this story. Prominent among them would have to be the value of training. Captain Ripley was ready when the challenge came. His years of professional preparation came together in a single day. That kind of dedication makes this book extremely valuable reading for all warriors.


MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Heritage.

Every young Marine, private or lieutenant, quickly becomes aware that the Corps has a history full of legendary heroes. Dr. Allan R. Millet, a retired Marine Reserve colonel and an eminent military historian, has added a fresh title to that short list with his biography of Gen Gerald C. Thomas,*In Many a Strife.*

He was neither a fiery battlefield commander like “Chesty” Puller nor a renowned Commandant like John A. Lejeune. Nonetheless he is an important figure in the history of the Corps, enlisting as a private in May 1917 when the United States entered World War I and retiring as a four-star general in 1955. He was a successful combat leader as a noncommissioned officer in the 6th Marines at Belleau Wood and as commanding general of the 1st Marine Division in the Korean War.

Thomas’ greatest contributions to the Corps came during his work as a staff officer, where he did far more than merely carry out orders from his commanders. As the operations officer of the 1st Marine Division, he played a major role in planning and executing the landing on Guadalcanal. Vandegrift, the division’s commanding general, leaned heavily on the operational expertise of his protégé, and Thomas soon rose to the position of chief of staff of the division. From that vital spot he helped direct the subsequent campaign to hold Gua-
At the conclusion of World War II, Thomas faced a new struggle against a different type of foe. Under the leadership of Gens George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Army sought to unify the armed forces in a way that would have brought about the end of the Marine Corps as a combat entity. In conjunction with a handful of other officers, Thomas carried on the campaign to defeat the Army plan in the halls of Congress.

Anyone interested in the history of the Corps will find this book enjoyable, but everyone concerned about the future of our service in the difficult times ahead should read *In Many a Strife*. Modern Marines may find themselves in a similar struggle to protect the Corps today. We will certainly have to adapt our equipment, organization, and doctrine to the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century. The story of Thomas’ efforts to overcome similar hurdles in the past will provide us with some solace and possibly some guidance, as we struggle to write our own chapter in the history of the Corps.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Theory.

*For the Common Defense* is the best overview of American military history currently in print. It does a first-class job of relating what went on inside the U.S. military institution (the preparation for war) to what took place on the battlefield. For that reason alone, it has been chosen as one of the central books assigned to students at the School of Advanced Warfighting. The lucid and, at times, lively writing style makes *For the Common Defense* a good choice for those who want thoroughness in their study of American military history. The selected bibliography at the end of each chapter provides a framework for a more ambitious course of study as well. Finally *For the Common Defense* is an excellent companion to more specialized studies in American military history.


Col; Policy.

The study of major military innovations in the 1920’s and 1930’s explores differences in the exploitation of innovation by the six major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred and explain much about the operational and tactical performance of the armed forces of the Axis and the Allies in the opening years of World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technologies and weapons and incorporated them into doctrine, organization, and styles of operation. They also explain much about why many military organizations failed to innovate and paid for their failure on the battlefield.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Heritage.
The history of the Marine Corps sometimes seems to get compressed into a few dozen names of places, people, and battles. As Millett shows so well in this book, our history is much more than that. *Semper Fidelis* remains the best one-volume account of our Corps’ history. Other books, focusing on a single event, may have greater depth, but only Millett covers the whole grand story so well. Millett’s discussion of the Corps’ struggle for institutional survival in the budget cutting that followed World War II makes for timely reading today. As the problems, struggles, people, and battles march through the book, the real strength of the Corps becomes clear: high-quality, rugged riflemen, led by imaginative, flexible, and stubborn leaders of Marines. Read the book. More than that, keep it nearby; when you have a tough day, flip it open at random, and you will surely gain some perspective.

Moore, Harold, and Galloway, Joseph  
*We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young: Ia Drang, the Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam*  (New York, NY. Harperperennial. 1993)

SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Leadership.

The book details the battle of Ia Drang, the first major engagement of U.S. forces in Vietnam and, ironically, what would prove to be the bloodiest. On 14 November 1965, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, an under-strength battalion of less than 500 men, engaged two full regiments of North Vietnamese Army Regulars numbering more than 2,000. The Americans found themselves fighting for survival on unfamiliar terrain, often in hand-to-hand combat. They were eventually relieved by the 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion, which itself was ambushed by three more North Vietnamese battalions. The descendants of the unit annihilated at the Little Big Horn found themselves reflecting on what the authors call “Custer’s Luck” during the 4-day campaign. At its conclusion, U.S. casualties exceeded 450; the North Vietnamese lost nearly 3,000.

The Battle was significant for a number of reasons. Not only was it the first major battle of the war, it was also the first real test of the air mobile concept using helicopters on the battlefield. Additionally, both sides drew lessons from the battle which would set the tone for the remainder of the conflict.

*We Were Soldiers Once . . .* is a graphic story of heroism and personal sacrifice. The authors themselves were important players in the engagement. Harold Moore, LtGen, USA (Ret), was commander of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. Joseph Galloway, now a senior writer for *U.S. News and World Report*, was then a reporter for United Press International. The *New York Times Book Review* finds “it thoroughly researched, written with equal ratios of pride and anguish, and it goes as far as any book yet written toward answering the hoary question of what combat is really like . . . as a reading experience, it’s a car crash of a book; you are horrified by what you’re seeing, but you can’t take your eyes off it.”

Moore, Molly  
*A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines*  (New York, NY. Charles Scribner Sons. 1993)

Gen; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

In *A Woman At War*, Moore recounts her experiences during the Gulf War, but as the subtitle indicates, devotes much detail to her three days with Gen Boomer and his mobile command element. Unlike most books published about Desert Storm thus far, it is neither a history nor a foreign policy analysis, but
rather an anecdotal memoir that will provide Marines a journalist’s inside look at warfighting from the senior command element perspective.

Though much of the book is based on Moore’s personal experiences, she chose a 1st Marine Division tank platoon for a microcosmic view of the land battle. The platoon, part of Task Force Ripper, was commanded by 1stLt William F. Delaney, who provided Moore access to detailed letters he wrote his family following the war. She also spices her book with dashes of harrowing aviation adventures, reconstituted after the war from interviews with MajGen Royal Moore (Commanding General, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing) and with Cobra pilots LtCol Mike Kurth, Capt Randy Hammond, and others. These slices of battle are perhaps the most gripping and revealing portions of the book. They underscore Moore’s prevailing theme that American forces did not beat the Iraqis because of superior technology. Rather, it was the boldness and tenacity of individual troops against an enemy that quickly lost the will to fight.

Too often we lose sight of how formidable the challenge must have seemed. Moorehead’s is the classic in-depth study on Gallipoli and, as the first post-World War II account of the 1915 disaster, was the first emotionally detached account. He was able to view dispassionately both sides of the war. Moorehead’s account ends with the battle, that is, with the problem unsolved. Yet there is no better means for appreciating what the Marines accepted as their challenge. It therefore becomes essential reading for fully valuing the Marine Corps developmental efforts that followed. These efforts are described in Isely and Crowl’s U.S. Marines and Amphibious War and Clifford’s Progress and Purpose. As a battle study, this book is an unusual self-contained single source that needs little or no supplement. Gallipoli is a battle Marines must know. Moorehead’s book is the way to know it.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Leadership.

Lord Moran’s purpose is “to find how courage is born and how it is sustained in a modern army of free people.” Most of his observations are drawn from his experiences as a medical officer with a British battalion in World War I. He refined his thoughts, though at a distance, while lecturing to pilots during World War II and serving as Winston Churchill’s doctor. Moran believes men enter combat with a certain store of courage which is steadily drawn upon in a manner analogous to a bank account. Some come with more in

Moorehead, Alan Gallipoli (Annapolis, MD. Nautical Aviation Publishing Co. of America. 1982)

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Theory.

The battle of Gallipoli is central to the development of the U.S. Marine Corps as it prepared itself for and fought World War II. This famous failed amphibious landing loomed after World War I as the insurmountable obstacle of future warfare. As such, it was the Mount Everest that the next generation of Marines would insist on climbing, as America inherited Britain’s responsibilities as protector of the free world.
their account than others, but all will exhaust their reserves if the experience of battle extends long enough. Moran classifies men’s courage four ways: “Men who did not feel fear; men who felt fear but did not show it; men who felt fear and showed it but did their job; men who felt fear, showed it and shirked . . . .” Considered a classic by many, the work is somewhat flawed by its strictly British viewpoint and by an often not-so-subtle ethnic prejudice. However, despite these shortcomings, it is a must-read book before leading Marines into combat.


SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Heritage.

Comprehensive, current, and easy-to-read, this history of the Marine Corps was written as a factual account of the Marine Corps’ involvement in contingency operations and war. It includes unit designations, missions, and individual names and contributions. It was not meant to be a critical analysis with lessons learned.


SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Civil-Military Relations.

After the Vietnam War, analysts commented on a deterioration of military standards, unit cohesion, and professionalism during the later stages of the conflict. Some of these trends were rationalized on the basis of peculiarities of Vietnam and the dramatic social changes taking place during the period. However, the phenomenon persisted. The term “occupationalism” was introduced by Charles Moskos in 1977 to describe the calculative influences that can force shifts in military professionalism. This shift is reflected in changing professional attitudes from “leadership” to “management,” from “generalist” to “specialist technician,” and from a “calling to serve” to “just another job.” Since the inception of the thesis, analysts have been able to measure aspects of the Moskos institutional/occupational (I/O) professional shift with some success. In this important book, not only is the I/O thesis conceptualized thoroughly for the reader, it is also statistically applied to specific areas within the U.S. military. Additionally, studies of the I/O shifts of eight other countries are presented in separate chapters. The results are revealing, insightful, and enlightening.

The Military: More Than Just a Job? is a scholarly, well-balanced, and readable book whose focus of effort concerns comparative research on changing professional military norms. Its final chapter offers holistic recommendations for influencing the occupational phenomenon. It is a valuable and timely source to professionals who seek to answer again the question of why we serve.

Murray, Williamson  Airwar in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD. Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. 1994)

Gen; Doctrine.

This study is based on a reworking of the operations volume of the Gulf War Air Power Survey sponsored by the Secretary of the Air Force in 1991 and 1992. It is based on an exhaustive examination of the planning and operational records of Air Force units and
headquarters responsible for the conduct of the air campaign against Iraq. Murray underlines how a small group within the air staff and in the planning staff grappled, not always successfully, with the problem of achieving operational-level effects against Iraq through the use of air power. The study also contrasts the air campaign against Iraq with other possible alternatives proposed in the summer of 1990 and with the air campaign waged in the Kuwait theater of operations. Finally, it suggests that friction, uncertainty, and ambiguity remained an integral part of the air war from its beginning through the end of the conflict.

Murray, Williamson  *Luftwaffe* (Baltimore, MD. Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. 1985)

Col; Air Power.

On the surface, *Luftwaffe* seems simply a comprehensive analysis of the Luftwaffe in the Second World War with major themes emphasizing the air war as a war of attrition and interpreting the Luftwaffe’s failure as symbolic of the failure of the Third Reich. However, in following the causes of the defeat of the Luftwaffe, the reader realizes that this work explains more than the downfall of an air force. The book is sprinkled with insights on the flawed thinking of the German air commanders. It presents clearly the failure of the German staff to recognize its poor strategic doctrine in relation to tactical reality. It also presents quite vividly the relationships among strategy, tactics, and technology and shows how difficult it is to recognize these relationships.

Marines should read *Luftwaffe* to better understand their own present doctrine. Murray has called the Luftwaffe “a child of its time.” In a period when our combat experience is limited, we must look for the historical combat insight in order to gain a window on the present and future. *Luftwaffe* is a book with this type of combat insight and one which presents many disturbing parallels between the past and the present.


MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Strategy.

In 1943, Edward Mead Earle of Princeton University edited a distinguished collection of essays entitled *Makers of Modern Strategy*, with a view to enabling “Anglo-Saxon readers to comprehend the causes of war and the fundamental principles which govern [its] conduct.” Forty-three years later, Peter Paret edited a much revised and expanded version to cover the nuclear era. The editors of *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, working through a seminar at the US Naval War College, had the excellent idea of complementing the Earle-Paret project by examining the full context in which a selection of national strategies has evolved at particular times and, most important, the process by which they are formed.

The seventeen case studies included cover some 2,400 years, from Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War to American strategy in the nuclear age, and a bewildering range of societies, including ancient Rome, medieval China, and contemporary Israel. Strategy is broadly defined as “the rational and reciprocal adjustment of ends and means by rulers and states in conflict with their adversaries,” though one of the most striking recurrent themes in the case studies is a large element of irrationality.
Myrer, Anton *Once an Eagle* (New York, NY. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 1968)

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Leadership.

This is a study, spanning several wars, of two diametrically opposed leadership styles: one the consummate staff officer and the other the field leader. Both officers rise to senior flag rank on the strength of their respective capabilities. The staff officer, typically cold, dispassionate, and calculating, accomplishes the mission with little regard for ethics or his men. His opposite leads his men as Marine leaders do: enduring all they endure and protecting them whenever possible.


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Leadership.

MajGen Aubrey Newman’s guide to military leadership has little to do with the great abstract principles so overworked by traditional writers and has everything to do with leadership and the stuff of life. His book is anecdotal, including lessons drawn from events in his own career before and during the Second World War. This is a man who clearly loves soldiers and soldiering. His book is an admirable companion to the more formal texts on the subject with which young and mid-career officers are often burdened. We learn our most important lessons from these sorts of tales.


MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Leadership.


Gen; Theory.

Retired Army MajGen Aubrey Newman provides an entertaining and enlightening collection of informal vignettes that illuminate the qualities found in successful general officers. His main interest, as in his other books, is in values and the human side of military leadership. His advice is eminently practical rather than esoteric theory. He writes from experience supplemented with broad research. By drawing upon both experience and research, he provides a primer for succeeding by learning from others’ mistakes.
SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt;  Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

On the morning of 2 July 1967, two undermanned companies from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, were ambushed in the shadow of Vietnam’s DMZ by a regiment of the North Vietnamese Army. Only a single platoon survived that meat grinder. Before nightfall, the remainder of the 1st Battalion had been committed and another battalion rushed in by helicopter. Within two days, two more Marine battalions had assumed positions and Operation BUFFALO, as the campaign was officially known, ground on for another week.

In his fifth book on the Vietnam War, Nolan presents the definitive account of one of the Marine Corps’ most blood-soaked battles: a tale of snipers and ambushes in blinding elephant grass; of tanks firing point-blank into tree lines swarming with enemy troops; of air strikes called within yards of friendly positions, and of individual Marines fighting isolated and outnumbered.

Nolan interviewed Marines who won the Navy Cross and multiple Purple Hearts as well as grunts so numbed with fatigue that they faked patrols. There are the gung-ho, hard-charging lieutenants here, as well as war-weary commanders. Operation BUFFALO may well be the most detailed and vivid description of any operation in the Vietnam War—a rare glimpse into the brutal, frustrating action on the DMZ that inflicted more casualties on the Marine Corps than did their famous island-hopping victories in the Pacific. Next to names like Tarawa and Peleliu should stand Operation BUFFALO.

SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt;  Leadership.

More than just one book on the Commandant’s reading list, Nye’s book is practically a reading list by itself. Packed with suggestions for study, Nye forcefully makes his case that in order to be a real leader, a leader must do much more than put on a uniform and insignia of rank. Only reading, contemplation, field exercises, and other combat training can produce a true leader. A true commander must be the tactician, warrior, moral arbiter, strategist, and mentor.

Nye gives a brief, insightful chapter on each aspect of command and follows each chapter with suggestions for further reading. Professional study, according to Nye, is the duty of all real leaders. Nye quotes General of the Army Omar N. Bradley describing how as a lieutenant he met one evening a week for nearly a decade with a group of other company-grade officers to study tactics. Said Bradley, “You cannot say later on in life, I will start studying. You have got to start in the beginning.” Nye’s book is a superb place to begin.

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt;  Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

In this book, O’Ballance brings out new and interesting information about the 1973 Middle East War heretofore unpublished. O’Ballance’s detailed research, combined with visits to battlefields, and discussions with partici-
pants from both sides, make this balanced and nonpartisan book mandatory reading for all who hope to understand this war and future events in the Middle East.

The discussion of war preparations by both sides is excellent, as are the descriptions of the various battles. The growing complexity of the modern electronic battlefield and the increasing proliferation of extremely lethal weapons systems are highlighted throughout.


**Col; Strategy.**

O’Neill presents a powerfully drawn portrait of an American democracy at peace and war—of the sudden, dramatic transformation from isolationism to the “great crusade” against Hitlerism, militarism, and totalitarianism wrought by the Japanese surprise attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. O’Neill attacks many myths about the American experience in World War II and thereby compels his readers to reexamine our national strengths and weaknesses—then and today.

O’Neill recounts and explains well-known factors contributing to America’s successes, triumphs, and victory in our last great “good war.” He proudly describes America’s great material strength made relevant by the heroic determination, gallantry, and sacrifices of countless ordinary GIs in battlefield hells from Tarawa and Normandy to Iwo Jima and the Ardennes. But these standard feel-good themes are dutifully and purposefully juxtaposed against a second, less flattering story line: one describing (and explaining) Sherman tanks that are death traps; ineffectual dud torpedoes; civilian leaders who mismanage the wartime battle of production; politicians who do not expect (and are therefore afraid to ask) the American public to make real, genuine wartime sacrifices; battles fought for questionable reasons and motives.

*A Democracy At War* is not predictable reading after a few chapters. Many readers in agreement with O’Neill on one chapter or theme will profoundly disagree with him on the next. Many will be disturbed by his chapter on “Air Power—The Democratic Delusion,” in which he decries not the desire to conduct strategic “precision” bombing but the means by which it was prosecuted and the lies and deceptions which accompanied it. Readers will also be expected to think critically about the capabilities of some popular and vaunted World War II weapons. O’Neill compares the B-17, for example, to the far less known (to Americans) Mosquito—a British (!) wooden (!) twin-engine aircraft “which carried a larger bomb load than a B-17 but was as fast as a fighter and so could attack at any altitude with little fear of [aerial] interception,” not to mention being radar unfriendly.

The multiple failures of the American democracy are one of the main theses of *A Democracy At War:* the lack of preparation (even halfway) for war before Pearl Harbor; “Official reticence and bureaucratic bungling [leading] to inferior and defective weapons”; “Too few infantrymen, [and] the squandering of GI’s lives in strategically useless attacks”; obstacles placed in the path of many Americans willing and eager to do more than their “fair” share to defend a socio-economic-political system, the benefits of which they had been permitted to share on a (more or less) disproportionately unequal basis.
Pagonis, William  
*Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*  
(Boston, MA. Harvard Business School Press. 1992)

MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Logistics.

This book is LtGen Pagonis’ personal account of how the United States successfully carried out what is generally agreed to be the largest military logistics operation in history. More than just a dry account of logistical planning and execution, *Moving Mountains* provides military leaders and corporate executives alike with a real-world lesson in the critical role that effective management and strong leadership play in the success of any large undertaking.

Palmer, Jr., Bruce  
*The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role In Vietnam*  
(Lexington, KY. The University of Kentucky Press. 1984)

Col; Strategy.

Bruce Palmer held important positions of responsibility during the Vietnam conflict, including command of Second Field Forces (a corps-level command), and deputy USARV commander under General Westmoreland. The book’s focus is from a unique perspective as a result of his Vietnam assignments and subsequent Army vice chief of staff position. Palmer is very critical of both the political and military at the senior levels throughout his book, while simultaneously offering a fairly positive account of the performance of American combat forces. Of particular interest to those who served in-country, and especially those on active duty today, is his thorough discussion and emphasis on strategic, diplomatic, and military policy and how it led to a terribly fragmented decisionmaking apparatus in Washington. Of course, this indecisiveness at the top levels of government had a disastrous effect on COMUSMACV directing the daily activities of the war. A unique comparison for those reading this book is to examine and compare the totally opposite relationship between the political and military leadership during the Gulf War. It would appear the Washington decision makers read *It Doesn’t Take A Hero*.

Paret, Peter  
*Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*  

CWO5/Maj; Strategy.

This is a very sophisticated collection of essays that is best taken in small doses. Alone, each essay is a classic. (If, for example, you read only one work on Machiavelli as a strategist, read Felix Gilbert’s article in *Makers of Modern Strategy.*) Together, the essays provide a short (but very intense) course in the development of strategic thought in the modern era. Because each essay is so dense, the reader will get much more out of it if he/she reads a good encyclopedia article on the subject before delving into the essay itself.

Peppers, Jerome  
(Huntsville, AL. Logistics Education Foundation Pub.1988)

GySgt/1stSgt/MSGt/CWO4/Capt; Logistics.

Peppers enlisted in the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1939 as an aircraft mechanic and during his career served in various positions from enlisted pilot to squadron engineering officer. His last 14 years were with the Strategic Air Command in maintenance and logistics plan-
ning. After retiring, he became a member of the contract faculty in the School of Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology. Relying on his 45 years of experience, Peppers has written a review of military logistics history spanning a 50-year period.

Throughout his book, Peppers describes the real problems of logisticians and the solutions they derive in their efforts to support combat forces. He is able to relate the history of military logistics in a meaningful and interesting manner without filling the pages with numbers, statistics, and names. The extensive bibliography and reference notations (342 are listed) can take the interested reader to additional sources to satisfy a thirst for more knowledge.

The book is divided into six easy-to-read chapters, each depicting a period of time (pre-World War II through post-Vietnam). Peppers concludes each chapter with a “lessons learned” segment which presents both the successes and failures of the logistical endeavors. He points out that the tools of war have become so complex that dependence on logistics has become ever more critical.

This book easily holds one’s attention as it does not get bogged down with data but rather illustrates the important lessons to be learned from history. Peppers shows that military personnel of all MOSs can profit from an understanding of the complex relationships between combat actions and logistics efforts.

Potter, E.B. Nimitz (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1976)

Col; Biography.

This is the story of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, from his early naval career through his rise to chief of naval operations, focusing on his actions as commander of the Pacific Fleet in World War II. Some readers will find the book slow at times and will have to get beyond the author’s obvious worship of his subject, but they will be richly rewarded with many penetrating perspectives on Nimitz the warrior. Besides a thorough biography of a truly outstanding naval officer, the book provides worthwhile study for the student of warfare. It abounds with lessons on maneuver, campaigning, and strategy in a naval war, lessons which are easily extended to all warfare by the insightful reader. The story also renders an alternate view, not generally available in history texts, on the events of World War II. In all, an excellent choice for broadening the reader’s perspective in preparing for war.


Gen; Leadership.

This is the memoir by the officer who may be the most unabashedly “American” soldier since Dwight Eisenhower. Immensely popular and politically astute, Colin Powell is also perhaps the most influential American soldier in recent decades. His book provides a step-by-step look at the personal growth and professional development that have made him a trusted advisor and leader at the highest levels of the Federal government. The book is not fluff; for example, the account of his combat service in Vietnam is both riveting and instructive for serving military professionals.

Running throughout the book is the concept of professionalism as a means of serving the
larger American society. He believes that, as an American citizen, he has a debt to his country that can never be fully repaid nor ignored. Because Powell articulates values that are at the very heart of the American character, this is a valuable book for everyone in and out of uniform.


CW05/Maj; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

This is a superbly written story about the conception, planning, and execution of Operation HAWAII, the surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet by the Imperial Japanese Navy on 7 December 1941, and the contributions of two American senior military leaders—Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short—toward making the attack a spectacular (and on the morning of 7 December, an easy) Japanese tactical and operational military success.

No single Japanese officer believed it possible to catch the Americans so completely unaware (literally asleep) as happened on that fateful morning. All Marines need to know the difference between “readiness” and “alertness” in any context similar to that of 7 December. They need to ponder why the American Hawaiian command was so completely “not alert” to this threat, despite the Martin-Bellinger Report of 31 March 1941 accurately diagnosing “the most likely and dangerous form of attack”; despite the twin 27 November 1941 “War Warnings” from the U.S. War and Navy Departments; despite known movements of Japanese warships and troop transports indicating imminent attacks against an array of targets from the Philippines to British Malaya; and despite the unknown location of Japan’s six largest and most far-ranging aircraft carriers.

Operation HAWAII was a brilliant tactical and operational feat of arms, but we should never forget that it was also a monumental political and strategic blunder which transformed a divided and hesitant America into an enraged nation, bent on revenge, and united as never before or since on a morale crusade against the “evils” of Hitler and Japanese militarism.

Puller, Jr., Lewis *Fortunate Son* (New York, NY. Grove Weidenfield. 1991)

GySgt/1stSgt/MSGt/CWO4/Capt; Heritage.

Lewis B. Puller is a legend among Marines. To this day, a mention of “Chesty” brings “arrugehns” from the ranks. And no wonder, for Puller was a remarkable Marine. In 37 years of service (1918-1955), which included operations in Haiti, Nicaragua, Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and the Inchon and Chosin Reservoir campaigns, he won five Navy Crosses for heroism—a singular achievement.

But this book is not by or about the legendary Chesty Puller. Rather, it is a remarkable and memorable autobiography by his only son and namesake, Lewis B. Puller, Jr. Born late in his father’s life, young Puller was part of the Vietnam generation. He received a student deferment to attend William and Mary College, and upon graduation in 1967, he willingly followed his father’s footsteps into the Corps—but for a career destined to be vastly shorter and profoundly tragic.

Puller wrote his story with abundant skill, clarity, and feeling. Without literary pretension, he was candid, open, and willing to share
his most personal feelings. He shunned self-pity, preaching, interpreting, and excessive analyzing. Readers are drawn into his experiences and become emotionally involved with almost every phase of the story.

Ridgway, Matthew  *The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today’s War Objectives Must Be Limited*  (New York, NY. Da Capo Press. 1986)

Col; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

The Korean War, a misunderstood and often-forgotten conflict, is remembered by a distinguished field commander in this superb work that was published while our country was fighting another misunderstood Asian war in Vietnam. Although General Ridgway’s sound advice and detailed commentary center on Korea, civil-military relations, and the nature of limited war, the lessons for contemporary professionals are timeless. In a lesson on leadership, Ridgway demonstrates how one man can restore the morale and fighting spirit of an army. He cared for his soldiers and exhorted his commanders to take bold and aggressive offensive action. Repeatedly, he used the ancient army slogan . . . “Find them!! Fix them!! Fight them!! Finish them!!”

On the nature of limited war, Ridgway discusses the brief period that took the United States from the total war of World War II to the limited war of Korea. Why was this nation so unprepared? What were the defects in our military policy? Why did we fail to match military objectives to political goals? Why did we continue to seek total victory and unconditional surrender?

Ridgway answers these questions while presenting us with even more questions by such statements as “We forgot that our diplomacy could be no stronger than the military muscle we maintained to support it.” Strategy, operations, and tactics are all tied together and expertly blended with the personal recollections of a genuine combat leader.

Robertson, Terence  *Dieppe; The Shame and the Glory*  (Boston, MA. Little, Brown and Co. 1963)

CWO5/Maj; Tactics.

Robertson recounts a superbly written story of bravery and heroism in battle wasted by poor military judgment and planning. During the brief 8-hour battle at Dieppe, numerous acts of heroism and inspired small-unit leadership by Canadians and British of all ranks and services did not (and could not) compensate for an unrealistic and inflexible battle plan. The Germans could scarcely believe how easy it all was or—in their after-action critique—how many mistakes the “raiders” had made.

The disaster which befell the 2d Canadian Division during its amphibious “raid” on the German-held French port of Dieppe on 19 August 1942, is often largely (and wrongly) attributed to a British conspiracy acting to deflect Russian and American pressure for an early, and primarily British, cross-Channel invasion. But the Canadians themselves bore a great responsibility for their own terrible fate. True, high-level British decisions denied them heavy bombers and battleship (or cruiser) naval gunfire. But arrogance, amateurism, and (an unwarranted) disrespect for the enemy continued to characterize the approach of too many senior officers in the 2d Canadian Division.
Robertson’s story is about Major General John “Ham” Roberts. As division commander, Roberts had the right to refuse the operation if he believed it was not feasible. Denied heavy fire support, he nevertheless agreed to substitute “surprise” for “firepower.” During his only chance to speak in the presence of Churchill himself, Roberts asserted that, even without heavy bombers and battleships, the plan had “a reasonable chance for success” provided that the Navy could land his battalions (on a strange, distant shore and in near total darkness) precisely “at the right places and at the right times.” After the war, Roberts indicated that he had rejected the option of “refusing the mission.” Knowing the determination of the Canadian chain of command (all the way back to Ottawa) to proceed with the mission, had he refused, Roberts anticipated his immediate replacement and the attendant lowering of division morale and confidence—making a bad situation only worse. Dieppe graphically illustrates an ageless leadership dilemma.

Rommel, Erwin *Attacks* (Vienna, VA. Athena Press. 1979)

SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Tactics.

Recounting his First World War experiences, Rommel does for tactics in *Attacks* what Manstein did for operations and campaigns in *Lost Victories*: he takes the reader inside the thought processes of a small-unit leader under fire and describes the considerations that shaped his decisions. The tactics described are maneuver tactics and make the book practical and relevant for us today. The valuable chapter-ending “Observations” synthesize the experiences into practical lessons. It is amply illustrated by diagrams.


SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Heritage.

Iwo Jima is undoubtedly the Marine Corps’ most famous battle, and it is arguably the nation’s single most notable military achievement. *Legacy of Valor* documents and provides insight into every aspect of the planning and execution of the island assault. From the inter-Service rivalries that complicated planning and execution and undoubtedly increased the number of killed and wounded to the superhuman endurance and bravery of the Marines and sailors common throughout the 86-day campaign, Ross vividly relates the how and why of Iwo Jima.

The work provides a great service to the student of military history and operations. It clearly describes the strategic and operational considerations that ultimately led to the decision to assault an island known to be one of the most heavily fortified bastions on earth. The more timeless message, however, is the lesson of what superbly trained and led American fighting men are capable of achieving.

*Legacy of Valor* is very much the story of two wild animals in a cage, with quarter neither asked for nor given. Ross writes: “Iwo Jima was a landmark of mass courage and individual valor. It was a battle the likes of which mankind most probably will not witness again.” It is important for Marines today to appreciate this holocaust, as it is part of the legacy that we have inherited from the 75,000 of our brothers who stormed the beaches, from the 25,852 who were casualties, and the 6,821 who died there. It is important for Marines to read this book.
Royster, Charles  

**Gen; Memoir.**

William Tecumseh Sherman experienced more of the American Civil War “than any score of other generals,” and his *Memoirs* provide an extraordinary window into the nature and character of that war and into the heart, mind, and soul of one of its best generals. Clear, powerful, relevant anecdotes combine with Sherman’s wartime orders and reports to make this one of the great classics not only on the Civil War but any war. The highlight is Sherman’s campaigns of 1864-65. Focused on the Southern society that supported the Confederate field armies, Sherman shunned traditional supply lines and conventional battles and struck directly at the economic and psychological underpinnings of Confederate resistance. “You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will,” he told the citizens of Atlanta before expelling them from their homes. “War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.” But Sherman’s philosophy regarding war and morality was anything but simple; it was in fact riddled with complexities.

A central theme is Sherman’s special relationship with Ulysses S. Grant. Many of Grant’s letters and orders are reprinted and serve to illustrate how these two great men forged one of the greatest partnerships in military history. Sherman became Grant’s most trusted and capable subordinate; each taught the other essential lessons in war and strategy.

Sherman’s memoirs are clear and vivid. They are rich in detail and insight regarding the vision, motives, and single-minded, ruthless determination which drove Sherman’s strategies and actions during the waning years of the American Civil War. And, they are anything but dull. (It has been said that “Sherman very likely could have written a telephone book, and made it a best seller.”) So much the better, and much less the excuse for passing them by.

Ryan, Cornelius  

**Col; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.**

Courage alone is not enough to win at the operational level of war. There has to be thorough planning and skillful execution of those plans—and luck. Cornelius Ryan makes these points in this very readable study of Operation MARKETGARDEN in September 1944. He presents the battle through the eyes and words of participants, including members of Allied, German, and Dutch Underground forces.

The Allied plan called for three airborne divisions (the American 82nd and 101st and the British 1st) to seize three key bridges to clear the way for a British armored thrust into Germany and a quick end to the war. Things went wrong from the start, especially for the 1st Airborne Division. A German panzer division, undetected by Allied intelligence, by chance was refitting near the 1st Airborne Division’s objective at Arnhem. Communications did not work well, and the Allied high command was for some hours unaware of the division’s situation. Airborne reinforcements were not sent quickly. The armored column, whose route forward was over an elevated causeway exposed to German antitank fire, advanced cautiously. In the end, the Germans virtually destroyed the 1st Airborne Division as a fighting organization. Overall Allied casualties exceeded those of the Normandy Invasion, and the war dragged on in Europe until the following spring.

SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Memoir.

A riveting memoir of one man’s ordeal as a German infantryman in the Second World War, this is not a book about tactics, although there are some tactical insights for the reader who has studied tactics. It is a book about the experience of war: the meaning of fear, courage, unit cohesion, morale. It is war as seen through the eyes of the dirty, tired, hungry grunt, a view that any Marine, general or private, must appreciate. This book is a classic in describing the human spirit in war.


SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Small Wars.

This easily readable work addresses the use of firepower in limited war using a historical perspective. The first three chapters chronicle the American way of war in both the Indochinese wars. The next two chapters focus thoughtfully on the “firepower” aspect of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the British use of force in the Falklands. It smacks of maneuver warfare. Identify the problem and adapt. The last chapter sums up well and warns the reader to not overestimate the effects of firepower in the limited war environment. This work is full of valuable suggestions to make and keep a fighting force ready to win “low intensity conflicts,” against determined Third World adversaries with both technique and doctrine.

Schell, Adolf von *Battle Leadership* (Quantico, VA. Marine Corps Association. 1988)

Cpl/Sgt; Leadership.

A “must read” classic on leadership, this book reaffirms the importance of the individual soldier on the battlefield as timeless and unaffected by technology. Schell addresses battlefield psychology—the knowledge of men and their first reactions to combat. He includes numerous invaluable anecdotes, including one about a commander who issued three versions of the same order to three officers requiring varying degrees of guidance and supervision. His point is especially relevant today as the Marine Corps comes to grips with mission tactics. In many respects, this book is an inspirational and eminently practical leadership primer, no matter at what level you command. Make room in your pack or briefcase for *Battle Leadership*.


Gen; Heritage.

This well-written volume has high professional value on several levels. On one, it presents the life of one of the most colorful and controversial officers ever to wear the uniform of a U. S. Marine. Smedley Darlington Butler was a forceful, outspoken personality, a recipient of the Medal of Honor, and the son
of a powerful member of Congress. His combat exploits in the Caribbean are legendary. He was a successful but unorthodox leader. Strapped for funds to complete Butler Stadium at Quantico, and learning of a supply of free lumber, he marched his command to the site and every Marine, Butler included, picked up a board and hiked back to the base.

This book also is valuable for the larger view it takes of the crucial developments within the Marine Corps in the first three decades of the 20th century. This was the period on which the status and nature of the modern Marine Corps rest.

The final valuable aspect of this book is Hans Schmidt’s critique of both American military history and his objective analysis of American military policy during Butler’s career (1898-1931). Reading Schmidt with an open mind will shape how the reader evaluates all other military histories, and assist in assimilating knowledge of practical value on the battlefield.


CWOS/Maj; Memoir.

Other than General Colin Powell, General Norman H. Schwarzkopf is the most known and popular general officer with the American public since World War II. As Schwarzkopf himself would say, without Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, he would have culminated his career as an unknown commander-in-chief, Central Command. Instead, he led an international force of United States, allied, and coalition states to victory in a major conventional war in the Middle East.

Hence, who is Norman Schwarzkopf, and what prepared him for this accomplishment?

His memoir is a complete work, covering his life from childhood, including living in Iran, his time at the United States Military Academy, disillusionment with the post-Korean War Army, the Vietnam conflict, duty in the Pentagon, and service as a flag officer culminating in his command of the victorious coalition forces. However, the book is a memoir and not a biography by an unbiased historian, a fact that should be remembered when reading it.

There is much of value here for Marines of all ranks and experience, ranging from how to cope with disillusionment with an institution (if you leave, “they” win, and you have no opportunity to contribute to change); to the role of chance (on his first day in Vietnam, had he dined as planned, Schwarzkopf might have been killed by two well-timed and well-placed terrorist bombs in the initial restaurant of his choice); to honestly evaluating oneself, friends, and foes (Schwarzkopf writes that the most brilliant tactical commander he ever knew was a South Vietnamese Army officer: Colonel Ngo Quang Truong); to insights ranging from service at the Pentagon to combined and joint operations. His discussion on dealing with the Gulf War from the joint and combined operational level of war perspective becomes a treatise on the subject.

Schwarzkopf provides an interesting and well written account of his life and career—admittedly from his perspective. *It Doesn’t Take a Hero* is a memoir which can provide insight into the profession of arms—and should be read more than once as a Marine rises in rank, acquires experience, and assumes positions of increased responsibility.

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt;  Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

Marines fought in the Civil War and, since the 1920s, have studied that conflict. Of the major battles and campaigns in the Virginia-Maryland-Pennsylvania area, Antietam probably is studied the least. *Landscape Turned Red* is an account of the 1862 campaign which resulted in the most casualties suffered by the United States on one day: almost 23,000. Sears also notes that this was a campaign of failure: for Lee, failure to win southern independence, and for McClellan, a lost opportunity to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia—this, despite the Confederate capture of Harper’s Ferry with its garrison of 11,500 men, and McClellan’s having Lee’s order of battle and operational plan.

The Antietam campaign is indeed worthy of study. As a study in commandership, reflection upon the command decisions of Lee, McClellan, and their subordinates (how they operated, the decisions they made, and the ramifications of these) can lead to perspective and insight. A related issue is the crucial role of intelligence, terrain, logistics, and chance. Sears clearly emphasizes that, ultimately, the ability and personality of the commander is the key. Finally, there is a detailed account of the actual battle and the high cost of that one day clash of “American” armies.


SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt;  Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

In compelling detail, Shaara retells the historical record of 4 critical days of Gettysburg. He writes of the struggle between brothers and presents unforgettable portraits of Americans like Lee, Longstreet, John Buford, and Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. The focus of the novel is Lee’s daring but also ultimately failed attempt to draw out and mortally wound the Army of the Potomac led by the unknown General George Meade. This book offers valuable insight into this momentous event by delving into the personalities that shaped it.

This Pulitzer Prize-winning book is the best Civil War book ever written. It tells clearly the human dimension that was so important in determining the outcome of Gettysburg, the most important battle of the most important war that this nation has yet fought.


Gen;  Small Wars.

An extremely popular best seller on first publication, this book is sharply critical of the U.S. military. It deserves—in fact demands—reading by serving professionals. The author is a journalist. His story focuses on a professional U.S. Army soldier, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, disillusioned by the war, who had served repeated tours in Vietnam and returned there as a civilian with the State Department after he resigned from the Army.

Whether or not we in the military agree with the views of the author or John Vann is not material to the value of the book. What the book does, clearly and accurately, is to allow
us to see ourselves as others see us—at least some others. Given that the image of the U.S. military in the eyes of the American public was indeed a factor in the outcome of the war, introspection on our part is essential. Because so many Americans have read *A Bright Shining Lie*, the military professional would do well to recognize that many of our citizens may see us through lenses provided by the author. This realization raises such questions as: Is this image acceptable? If not, can we change it, and how do we change it? Are any of Sheehan’s criticisms applicable to us today? If so, how can we change?

The book includes an opportunity to study tactical events on the battlefield, the conduct of generalship in Saigon, and the bureaucracies both in Saigon and Washington. It is especially important for officers moving towards senior grade to learn to make connections between what goes on in the Pentagon and high-level staffs and what happens on the battlefield. War preparations and plans as they are made in Washington will inevitably have an effect on the 18-year-old Marine we commit to battle. Though the high-level staffs cannot control with certainty whether the young Marine lives or dies, they have a great deal to say about the cause for which he lives or dies. Not only do the planners influence whether or not the objective will be achieved; they can decide whether it is a cause worth fighting for. They can determine whether our Marines’ sacrifices serve the nation or not. Many of these planners will be senior Marines. *A Bright Shining Lie* takes the reader into this issue. It must be read.


**CWO5/Maj; Air Power.**

This detailed and thorough account of all the Marine aviation units which fought in the Pacific War is by a man who reported the events as they happened. As background, Sherrod summarizes the pre-World War II history in the first two chapters. The rest of this lengthy book (nearly 500 pages) chronicles the battle-by-battle and island-by-island exploits of the flying leathernecks from Pearl Harbor to the final Pacific campaign. Sherrod effectively paints the “big picture” while at the same time capturing small-unit and individual exploits. Like Isely and Crowl’s *U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*, this is not a book most readers will want to read cover to cover, but it is an extremely useful reference tool for readers who wish to learn about the air actions of a particular phase of the war. Because Sherrod carefully ties in Marine air actions to the land and naval campaigns they supported, this is a valuable overall history of the Pacific War.

**Sherrod, Robert** *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle* (Fredericksburg, TX. Admiral Nimitz Foundation. 1973)

**SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt; Heritage.**

Few books capture as well as this one the experience of high intensity combat. *Tarawa* was initially published only 4 months after the battle was fought. In a preface to the 1973 edition, the author relates how he was confronted with the question: “Should I rewrite in light of history, improve its accuracy, or should the text be allowed to stand as it was written?” He decided to let it stand. “If the reader wants fact or fiction,” he reasoned, “he will have to go elsewhere. What he gets in this book is atmosphere.”

What we have is the sharing of an almost incredible experience by a division of Marines, which to most of them—as it would be to
most of us—was indescribable. Sherrod, ac-
claimed journalist, historian and author, is the
rare individual who could and did describe it.
He lived with the Marines aboard ship, be-
came friends with them, and waded ashore
with the assault waves, sharing their risks,
bravery, and fear. Thus, he sensed and knew
their camaraderie and spirit. Sherrod went to
Tarawa intent on discovering that intangible
quality that makes Marines. He found it. It re-
mains intangible, and fundamentally indescrib-
able, unless you read the book. The only way
to convey it to someone else is to share the
book with him.

Shulimson, Jack The Marine Corps’
Search for a Mission, 1880-1898
(Lawrence, KS. University Press of Kansas.
1993)

Col; Heritage.

Thoroughly researched and well-written, this
book by one of the Marine Corps’ most pro-
lific historians provides a clear picture of how
the Marines embarked upon the course that
led to its present prominence. In these eight-
een years the Marine Corps, once little more
than a guard force for the Navy, broke free of
the constraints posed by obsolete equipment
and leadership by superannuated Civil War
veterans.

The introduction of a modern steel-hulled,
steam-powered fleet created the need for a
force that could seize and defend advance na-
val bases and coaling stations in wartime. Ag-
ing Civil War veterans, some still company
grade officers, left the ranks to be replaced by
graduates of the Naval Academy. These found
common cause with forward-thinking Navy
officers and gradually formulated a new mis-
sion for the Marine Corps. The dream of the
new mission, backed by national adulation fol-
lowing Marine success in the Spanish-
American War, made the advance base force a
reality not long after the start of the new cen-
tury.

Shy, John A People Numerous and
Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle
for American Independence (Ann Arbor,
MI. University of Michigan Press. 1990)

CWO5/Maj; Small Wars.

With the passage of time, detailed knowledge
of the American Revolution amongst the gen-
eral public has declined. While this war led to
the independence of the 13 colonies, it also
raised many issues pertaining to American
military tradition which have remained con-
stant throughout our history. The basic title of
this book addresses one such issue—the fact,
role, and implications of an armed citizenry.

This book contains 10 essays by one of the
nation’s leading authorities on the American
Revolution, covering such diverse subjects as
the grass roots perspective of both rebels and
loyalists, the role of the militia, and the mili-
tary conflict viewed as a “revolutionary war.”
This volume, however, is much more than just
a “military history” of the conflict.

A central theme woven into the essays is the
linkage between war and society. Professor
Shy stresses the interaction of war and soci-
ety, the interrelationship between military op-
erations, policy, and politics, and the nature of
the war as a revolution (in its reliance on
popular support and voluntary service).
Skillfully written, the book addresses the com-
plexity of the American War of Independence,
notes its diverse heritage throughout Ameri-
can history, and stresses that even in a simpler
age, issues, decisions, and action were not
simple or easily resolved.

Pvt/PFC/LCpl; Heritage.

This comprehensive narrative history of the United States Marine Corps ranges from the American Revolution to Vietnam, citing Marine actions in such places as Bladensburg, Guantanamo, Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Inchon, and Lebanon. This is the story of the Corps. As one reviewer notes, General Simmons’ book is “popular history in the best sense, authoritative and immensely readable.” Enough said.


Col; Theory.

The late Richard Simpkin is not only the most significant conventional theorist of the 1980’s; he is also the most thorough. He has the unusual gift of integrating the separate disciplines of mechanical design, military history, psychology, geography, Soviet studies, and tactics into a coherent vision of future warfare. Because of this richness, *Race to the Swift* must be read three or four times to be fully appreciated. With his emphasis on expeditionary warfare, Simpkin’s works are of special value to Marines. (Note: while *Race to the Swift* can stand on its own merit, it is best read as the last of a series of Simpkin’s books—*Tank Warfare, Mechanized Infantry, Anti-Tank*, and *Deep Battle.*)

Sledge, Eugene *With The Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* (Novato, CA. Presidio Press. 1981)

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Heritage.

The author was barely in his twenties in 1944 when he landed on the beach at Peleliu. Politics and strategy were of no concern to him. The essence of his story is what it meant to be a fighting Marine in the best tradition of the Corps. What began as an enlistment full of patriotism, idealism, and youthful courage became in the field a fight for survival. Mincing no words and sparing no pain, Sledge describes the miracle of getting through the fighting alive when so many of his buddies did not. For Sledge, the reality of battle was mud and mire and the stench of death. It is a reality no Marine can afford to lose sight of. *Old Breed* is a vivid reminder not to romanticize war.

Slim, Sir William *Defeat into Victory* (New York, NY. D. McKay. 1961)

CWO5/Maj; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

This is the story of victory in Burma as seen through the eyes of the man most responsible for it. In frank, unadorned, and often witty language, a great captain recounts the bitter fighting and the considerations that led him to his operational decisions. Although it reflects a different kind of warfare, *Defeat Into Victory* compares interestingly to Manstein’s *Lost Victories*—even the titles are similar—and is every bit as valuable and essential for the same reasons. Slim’s final, decisive campaign is an example of creative brilliance. Slim’s conclusions (in 1956) about the future of warfare have rung true and should be of particular interest to Marines today.
Smith, Stuart  *Douglas Southhall Freeman on Leadership*  (Shippensburg, PA. White Mane Publishing Co. 1993)

**GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Leadership.**

This book is a collection of fourteen of the many speeches Douglas Southhall Freeman delivered on leadership. It provides an excellent addition to the massive Freeman corpus and a welcome addition to available works on military leadership. Most of these speeches were delivered at various institutes of higher professional military education, notably the Army War College, the Naval War College, and the Armed Forces Staff College, during the time Freeman was writing his greatest biographies. They address the attributes of leadership and character using Lee, Lincoln, and Washington as exemplars. Each speech is unique, for Freeman felt obligated to change his presentations each year. Aside from the historical lessons taught and the ethical principles defended, these speeches tell us a great deal about the extraordinary man who was the speaker.

Smythe, Donald  *Pershing: General of the Armies*  (Bloomington, IN. Indiana University Press. 1986)

**Col; Biography.**

This biography of General John J. Pershing covers the last 31 years of his life, starting in 1917 and ending in 1948. The first chapter contains some background information so that the reader who has not read any other book on Pershing is not lost. The book focuses on Pershing’s World War I experience, covering his activity in Europe, month by month from his arrival in June 1917 until the war’s end in November 1918. The book is easy to read as the chapters are succinct and flow evenly from start to finish.

Smythe does an admirable job of presenting Pershing both as a soldier and as a person, highlighting his strength as a leader. Of particular interest are the problems, difficulties, successes, and failures of his effort to form and field the American Expeditionary Force. The conflicts of will, personality, military necessity, and political maneuvering are all addressed and provide the reader an excellent appreciation of the magnitude of Pershing’s role in Europe. This book is excellent as an overview, but because of its relatively short length for such a long span of years, it at times leaves the reader looking for more detail or wanting to spend more time in a particular area. As such, it will provide motivation and direction for more detailed study of both Pershing, the people with whom he dealt, and the war itself.

Spector, Ronald H  *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*  (New York, NY. Free Press. 1985)

**CWO5/Maj; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.**

Ronald Spector has written an unparalleled study of the U.S.-Japanese conflict in the Pacific during World War II. It is presented primarily from the American point of view, but includes important information from recently declassified cryptographic records, oral history, memoirs, and private collections. With this wealth of new knowledge, Spector questions the leadership of the Pacific War (most notably, General Douglas MacArthur), and casts doubt on the strategic wisdom for a two-pronged advance across the Pacific.
Marines will be especially interested in his analysis of the Tarawa Campaign: i.e., that Nimitz hastened the assault to pressure Britain into devoting more resources to the Pacific. *Eagle Against the Sun* places strong emphasis on the strategy and operational aspects of the war. It is also highlighted with unique insights into the personalities of the war (both Japanese and American). This is an important and valuable book about American operations in the Pacific in World War II.


_GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt_; Strategy.

There are several views on what went wrong in Vietnam. Blame is placed, varyingly, on the government’s lack of clear policy, flawed strategy at the JCS or Presidential-level, lack of national will, an undermining of resolve by academicians on our campuses, uncontrolled news media that valued sensational publicity above success in the war effort, insensitivity on the part of the military towards the real demands of the war such as the need for popular support for the Vietnamese, and the military’s focus on false measures of success such as the body count. Summer’s book is the classic rendition of the first view.

Written while the author was still on active duty, it accurately reflects much of the institutional thinking of the U.S. military as it emerged from the war and started to look back. The tendency was to blame the government. The book’s organizational structure is the J.F.C. Fuller list of principles of war that so drove U.S. Army doctrine from 1925 through the Korean and Vietnam War years. Clausewitz’s *On War* is held as the definitive work on strategy and policy, and the U.S. government’s failure to declare war is the focus of Summers’ criticism of U.S. policy.

Nearly all of Summers’ arguments parallel those of General David Palmer in his historical interpretation of the war, *Summons of the Trumpet*. Though Summers’ and Palmer’s arguments are questionable, Marines must be familiar with them. They serve as a useful starting point in the study of what went wrong. Military professional literacy requires reading this book.

**Sun Tzu** *The Art of War* (New York, NY. Delacorte Press. 1983)

_SSgt/WO/CWO2/CWO3/2Lt/1Lt_; Theory.

This is only the most significant work ever on the subject of war. *The Art of War* is more insightful than Clausewitz’s *On War* as well as more concise, straightforward, and simple. It takes the form of direct and pithy statements of practical advice, each and every one a gem. Every bit as valuable today as when written some 2,500 years ago, Sun-Tzu is useful to students of maneuver warfare. Read this book repeatedly; each reading offers new insights. Read *The Art of War* before reading anything else. *The Art of War* is available in various translations and editions, some of which differ significantly from others. The standard is Griffith’s translation, although the most recent translation, Cleary’s, is also very good.


_Cpl/Sgt_; Tactics.
This is a deceptively simple and entertaining lesson in small-unit defensive tactics in the clever form of the trials and tribulations of Lieutenant Backsight Forethought. A British platoon commander in the Boer War, Forethought is ordered to hold the shallow river crossing of the book’s title. Through a sequence of dreams, he learns the valuable lessons that will ultimately bring him success. Essential reading for any small-unit leader.

Thomason, John  *Fix Bayonets!* (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1994)

Cpl/Sgt; Heritage.

Colonel John W. Thomason himself is an essential part of U.S. Marine Corps tradition as well as a recorder of traditions established by others. He won the Navy Cross and Silver Star for heroism in World War I, but he is best remembered as an author and artist. His short stories, full-length novels, and pencil and pen sketches were published nationally in book form, and in periodicals, most notably the *Saturday Evening Post*.

Thomason has been much written about, including in full-length book form, but to fully understand him, one must read his work. *Fix Bayonets!* stands as the best single-volume work for getting to know Thomason. It begins with an illuminating introduction by Robert Leckie, describing Thomason’s life and career as soldier, illustrator, and writer. Everything else in the book is written and drawn by Thomason.

This compilation of stories, written between 1925 and 1940, captures the essence of Marines in war and peace, at Belleau Wood, on the Rhine, in Peking, on the Gobi Desert, and in the republics of Central America.

The reader will quickly realize the origin of what stands today as the unfathomable mystique of the U.S. Marine Corps. It is important for Marines to identify with these roots. There are a number of reasons for this including the historically validated correlation between a sense of tradition and unit cohesion in combat. The sands of Iwo Jima alone are not enough. Neither is the memory of the brotherhood we felt in Vietnam enough by itself. In many ways, the Marine Corps’ utility today can be better likened to that of the 1920’s and 30’s than the 1940’s, 50’s, or 60’s. A one- or two-war tradition tends to engender a myopic outlook. The Marine Corps has a character unlike any other military institution. Since 1775, the Marine Corps’ character is the character of the United States itself but magnified. It is a brotherhood of common men drawn by a common cause. Also, it is a Corps of warriors with the unassuming and understated toughness of the professional soldier who knows he’s good, but doesn’t have to say so. Reading Thomason is the best way to grasp this, and his illustrations which appear in the book capture the spirit as well.


Col; Strategy.

This historical and literary classic has insights on war and politics as useful today as they were over 2,300 years ago. Writing at a time of intellectual revolution in Athens, Thucydides provides a vivid account of the deadly struggle between Athens and Sparta. His is the first history to place such a contest in a secular context; human will, not mythology, becomes fundamental to the explanation of important events. Moreover, the
connection between military and political activity is recognized. Though scholars still debate the accuracy of his account, Thucydides set a new standard of professionalism for the period. Length and complexity of detail make for slow reading. A modern study aid will ease the task.

Timberg, Robert  The Nightingale’s Song  
Gen; Memoir.

The lives of five distinguished Annapolis graduates and Vietnam-era veterans are explored in depth in this exposé of the generation gap that existed between those who served in the armed forces and those who did not. Timberg’s subjects include: Senator John McCain, Navy pilot and POW; James Webb, a Navy Cross recipient from service as a Marine Corps rifle platoon commander and an acclaimed author who became the Secretary of the Navy; and three men embroiled in the controversy of Iran-Contra: Oliver North, Robert McFarlane, and John Poindexter. The strained idealism of these five extraordinary citizens and their moralistic dilemmas during the “Reagan Years” make for poignant reading.

Travers, Timothy  How the War was Won:  Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918  
MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Tactics.

This book continues Travers’ study of the British on the Western Front in World War I (see The Killing Ground below). It has, as the subtitle suggests, two main themes: an examination of the effectiveness of the British High Command and the role of technology in the British forces during the second half of the war. Illustrating his points required Travers to analyze British and German tactics, and the resulting insights have practical value to today’s military professional. For example, he gives a clear discussion of the reasons German infiltration tactics—the basis for blitzkrieg tactics in World War II—were so successful early in 1918, yet proved so costly in German casualties that, in Traver’s estimation, German defeat was a foregone conclusion by mid-1918. In one sense, Travers uses the events of 1917-18 to validate the superiority of combined arms in modern war.

Travers, Timothy  The Killing Ground:  The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare—1900-1918  
(Boston, MA. Allen & Unwin. 1987)  
Col; Tactics.

The story of the British Army in the First World War contains a rich lode of insights for the modern Marine. The Killing Ground is one of the best ways for a reader with a basic knowledge of World War I to get to the heart of that story. The book begins with a detailed examination of the British professional military education system of the late 19th century. This system had the unenviable task of taking members of an anti-intellectual, semi-professional officer corps and turning them into commanders and staff officers who could deal with modern war. The result was a situation all too familiar to too many Marines—a frantic search for a “school solution” that could be imposed on any military problem. The second half of The Killing Ground documents the disaster that resulted when British generals tried to impose their solutions on an uncooperative battlefield.

GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

This book carries a striking message: be ready and have the courage to do what has to be done. While on an orientation visit to Military Region 1 during the Vietnam War, Turley took action on his own initiative when others would not. This discussion of the events of the Easter Offensive reflects the strength of character required to lead and raises many tough questions for the military professional to ponder. Interspersed throughout are many other practical lessons on military advisor duty.

Twining, Merrill  *No Bended Knee*  (Novato, CA. Presidio Press. 1996)

Gen; Heritage.

This is a superb book written by one of the finest intellects and most influential officers produced by the Marine Corps in the first half of the 20th century. It chronicles only a part of Twining’s remarkable career, focusing on the accomplishments of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal in World War II. Twining, then a lieutenant colonel, was the assistant division operations officer at the start of the campaign, but became the division G-3 (D-3 in World War II parlance) before leaving the island. The unusually high quality of this book derives from that perspective and Twining’s skill as a storyteller. Its greatest value to military professionals comes from the insights Twining provides on the problems and solutions inherent in the first days of a campaign.

The title of the book derives from a Japanese operation order captured by the Marines on Guadalcanal. A portion of that order detailed the procedures to be followed when the Marine commander on Guadalcanal surrendered his forces “on bended knee.”


GySgt/1stSgt/MSgt/CWO4/Capt; Small Wars.

As a historical guide to the Marine Corps’ philosophy and methodology of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, the *Small Wars Manual* is a milestone in the operational art of low intensity conflict. Written before World War II, the manual now serves as an information source for present-day Marines and should not be considered directive in nature.

When reading the *Small Wars Manual*, the reader should place it in context with pre-World War II politics and operational methods. While the operational events described in the manual are not relevant today, the terms, concepts, and methods still are. For example, the term “small war” is defined as those “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interest as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation.” Upon reading that definition, Marines will see relevance to today’s events and the historical connection between intervention in Haiti in the first decade of the 20th century and America’s current involvement in Haiti and Somalia.

While this book is recommended for those whose job it is to lead company-size units into
military operations other than war (MOOTW) environments, every officer, company grade and above, should take time to study the manual. The American military is faced with being drawn into more and more operations that require civil action in conjunction with military action. As the nation’s force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps will often provide the first American units involved in a crisis. Therefore, the more knowledgeable a leader is on the workings of small wars, the better prepared he or she will be in accomplishing the mission and explaining to subordinates the relevance of what they are being asked to do.

Uris, Leon  

Cpl/Sgt; Heritage.

This exciting and inspiring novel is based on the author’s experiences as a young Marine serving in a communications squad with the 2d Marine Division during World War II—from the nervous high of entering boot camp, to infantry training, and ultimately into combat. Once you begin reading, you find yourself reliving many of the experiences common to all those who have earned the title “Marine.” Remember saying goodbye to your spouse or girlfriend/boyfriend as you were leaving for boot camp? For those of us who have never been shot at in combat, a gifted storyteller who is also a Marine veteran offers insight into the way people think and feel before, during, and after combat.

Van Creveld, Martin  
*Command in War* (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. 1985)

CWO5/Maj; Command.

If you plan to read only one book on command and control, this is it. If you plan to make command and control a lifetime study, this is the first book you should read. Van Creveld recognizes that understanding the
Van Creveld, Martin  *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*  
(New York, NY. Cambridge University Press. 1977)

**CWO5/Maj; Logistics.**

This is the most readable as well as the most significant work on logistics currently in print. Reading *Supplying War* will free the logistician from the tyranny of the computer printout as well as remind those armed with grease pencils of the mundane realities that lie beneath their pretty blue arrows. Although previous knowledge of the campaigns discussed in *Supplying War* is useful, it is not essential to the reader’s understanding of the book. As with most other works concerning the operational level, *Supplying War* is best read with the aid of large-scale maps such as those found in a good world atlas.

Van Tien Dung  *Our Great Spring Victory: An account of the Liberations of South Vietnam*  

**Col; Small Wars.**

This book, written by the commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese Army during the successful 1975 invasion which resulted in the final victory in Vietnam, will prove depressing for readers who served in Southeast Asia. However, from a strategic vision perspective, it offers a classic account of how Hanoi’s national military strategy never wavered during the Second Vietnam War, regardless of setbacks. Dung presents an unusually clear analysis of how the Central Political Bureau and Central Military Committee developed a strategy and subsequent campaign plan which were brilliantly executed. Dung is quick to credit the ill-fated 1973 Paris Agreements for the victory, for there was no doubt in the minds of Hanoi’s leadership that once the United States pulled out, there would be no return—thus, this was a victory for the North.

This is a one-sided account of the overthrow of the South Vietnamese military; however, there are lessons to be learned by those who may one day deploy to a combat theater. Among these lessons are those associated with fighting an enemy whose rules are different, i.e., one who has no compunction at hurling thousands of soldiers to their death as long as the political objective is gained, and who takes full advantage of a peace agreement, loudly complaining about violations by the other side, while using the lull to buildup forces and move them into base areas in preparation for an attack. The Afterword, written by Cora Weiss and Don Luce, is a sad commentary, whose authors belong in the same category as Jane Fonda and other disloyal Americans who extolled the virtues of
Hanoi while loudly denouncing the South Vietnamese and Americans who fought in-country. It does not add to the book and is best ignored. In summary, the value of this book is its treatment of the unique relationship at the national level between political and military leaders.


Col; Heritage.

This is an inspirational story of a Marine’s career and character development. Ordinary beginnings build to a stellar finale as Vandegrift assumes command of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal and then becomes Commander later during World War II. It contains a firsthand look at how promotions, assignments, and mistakes were dealt with and how the Corps functioned in war and peace in the early days, before zero-defects and careerism, and through some of the most austere days the Corps has known. We also see the Corps during the unprecedented buildup of World War II. This is the story of one of our country’s most perceptive, selfless, modest, and effective warriors—one whose name is well known but not well enough. Vandegrift’s life should serve as a model for today’s Marines.

**Vaux, Nick Take That Hill! Royal Marines in the Falklands War** (Washington, DC. Brassey’s (U.S.) Inc. 1990)

MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; Operations, Campaigns, and Battles.

*Take that Hill* is a tremendously enjoyable read on one unit’s engagement in the 1982 Falklands conflict in the South Atlantic. The Royal Marines’ 42 Commando, under the command of then-Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux, receives the call to respond to the Argentine move against the Falkland Islands.

What follows is an intriguing account of the Royal Marines’ involvement in this unique military action. Their story unfolds in the company of Paras, Gurkas, and Scots Guards and the most challenging climatic and geographic circumstances. Even more importantly, now-Major General Vaux shares important lessons in combat leadership. For all these reasons, the book is an enjoyable “must read.”


Pvt/PFC/LCpl; Leadership.

James Webb, a well-known Marine Corps Navy Cross recipient in Vietnam and former Secretary of the Navy, conveys the experience of combat with rare lucidity through fiction. In fact, *Fields of Fire* is less fictional than most realize. It is the Vietnam War as the author lived it, and the reader sees and feels it through the eyes of the book’s main character, a platoon commander in Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

The novel is about the reality of war that Marines must come to grips with today as we prepare for the future. *Fields of Fire* is the story of the young, enlisted Marines who fought under then Lieutenant Webb. The reader should note carefully their emotions, motivations, courage, and fears for they are the men who have served us best in every war. Their social backgrounds vary, and many of our best warriors came from the lowest of stations. In terms of the brotherhood of those
who bleed together and the nobility of sacrifices made for friends, the characters in Webb’s novel are timeless. He succeeds brilliantly in making them real. Webb creates a doctrine of combat leadership and a creed for the succeeding generation on how and why Marines fight.


**Col; Leadership.**

Weigley professes to model this book along the lines of Douglas S. Freeman’s *Lee’s Lieutenants*. Though there is considerable discussion of the character and personality of the key commanders who served under General Eisenhower, this is actually an operational history with a central thesis. That thesis is: the American Army lacked a clear conception of war. It had resolved neither upon a doctrine of winning the war by way of the direct application of superior power in the manner of Ulysses S. Grant, nor upon a doctrine of winning by a means of superior mobility and facility in maneuver in the indirect approach of the British military critic B.H. Liddell Hart. Firepower versus maneuver! Weigley maintains that this paradox was a result of the Army’s contrasting history as a mobile force in the frontier days and as an annihilating force in the Civil War and World War I. As you might expect, his argument has made this book controversial in some quarters. Regardless, it is worth reading for its analysis of the European campaign alone.

**West, Francis** *The Village* (Madison, WI. University of Wisconsin Press. 1985)

**Cpl/Sgt; Small Wars.**

Intertwined in U.S. planning for Vietnam were two strategies: one had to do with strengthening South Vietnamese resolve at the grass roots, the other with tallying up dead enemy bodies. Though the former was not totally abandoned, it never prevailed over the latter. The strategy of attrition clearly guided our course throughout the war to its final outcome.

How did the strategy of “hearts and minds” work? It is questionable if in fact it did work, if it could have worked, or if it was even a fitting employment for combat soldiers and Marines.


**MGySgt/SgtMaj/LtCol; History.**

Advocates of a strong professional development program will discover in Scharnhorst a hero of formal military education. Educated at the military academy of Count Friedrich Wilhelm, he became a revered military professional who possessed an extraordinary understanding of warfare and a keen recognition of the need for educated, well-trained military leaders. It was on this premise that Scharnhorst developed his reform-minded ideas.

One such concept, learned at the academy, was that of Bildung—the idea that the cultivation of the character and intellect (professional military education) facilitated a progressive response to the changing art of war. Even though this was a lifelong process, formal education was in fact the key component. Scharnhorst considered Bildung fundamental
for all soldiers and carried these ideas forward as a reformer in the Hanoverian and Prussian armies. Yet it took the military disasters of the Prussian Army at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 before his reform firmly took hold.

This book details the development of his philosophy as well as his establishment of the Militarische Gesellschaft, a formal society with the purpose of instructing its members through the exchange of ideas in lectures, discussions, and readings.

Willock, Roger  *Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late General Roy S Geiger, USMC* (Quantico, VA. Marine Corps Association. 1983)

Woodward, Sir John Forester  *100 Days; The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*  (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1992)

Willock’s biography of Roy Geiger is a lesson on leadership, courage, and forward thinking. The Corps’ fifth aviator, Geiger brought Marine aviation from infancy to the all-weather, six-function role that currently exists. He became the single voice of integrating aviation into supporting arms. With great tenacity and against much opposition, he pushed the concept through to acceptance. He was the first proponent of night tactical flying, believing that to be truly effective, Marine aviation would need to be able to support ground operations in any weather, night or day.

Willock describes a true hero (two Navy Crosses) who fought in every conflict that Marines were involved in from Nicaragua to World War II. The reader meets a proven combat leader whose strength of character and gutsy determination drove him to the highest levels of command, to include command of the 10th U.S. Army during the invasion of Okinawa. The “old man” that Willock unveils is testimony to leadership by example. The reader may be left questioning Geiger’s gruffness, but never his effectiveness.

This is not just another biography. It is an inspiring account of one Marine’s impact on Corps and country. There are two places to be if you want to succeed in the Marine Corps: In time of peace, go to school and prepare for war, in time of war, get to the front and apply what you have learned.
Appendix A

Books By Title, Book Titles By Grade, and The Commandant's Complete Reading List

(F) = Fiction

Books by title

Acts Of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle, Holmes
Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, Van Creveld
Airwar in the Persian Gulf, Murray
American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889, Hagan
(The) Anatomy of Courage, Moran
(The) Army and Vietnam, Krepinevich
Art of War, Sun Tzu
At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Prange
Attacks, Rommel
Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne: From Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest, Ambrose
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, McPherson
Battle Cry (F), Uris
(The) Battle for the Falklands, Hastings and Jenkins
Battle Leadership, Schell
Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, Ardent Du Picq
(The) Best and the Brightest, Halberstam
(The) Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940, Doughty
(The) Bridge at Dong Ha, Miller
(A) Bridge Too Far, Ryan
(A) Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, Sheehan

(The) Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West, Leckie
(The) Campaigns of Napoleon, Chandler
(The) Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence, Nye
Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare, Guevara
Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War, Hammel
Command in War, Van Creveld
Common Sense Training, Collins
Company Command: The Bottom Line, Meyer
Company Commander, MacDonald
Defeat Into Victory, Slim
(The) Defense of Duffer's Drift (F), Swinton
(The) Defense Of Hill 781: An Allegory Of Modern Mechanized Combat (F), McDonough
(A) Democracy At War: America's Fight At Home and Abroad in World War II, O'Neill
Dieppe; The Shame and The Glory, Robertson
Diplomacy, Kissinger
Douglas Southhall Freeman on Leadership, Smith
(The) Dynamics Of Doctrine: The Changes in the German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Lupfer
Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, Spector
Eagle And Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802, Kohn
(The) Easter Offensive: Vietnam, 1972 Turley
Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945 Weigley
Ender's Game (F), Card
(The) Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805, White
(The) Face of Battle, Keegan
Fields of Fire (F), Webb
Fire in the Streets: The Battle for Hue, Tet, 1968, Hammel
Firepower in Limited War, Scales
Fix Bayonets!, Thomason
Flights of Passage: Reflections of a World War II Aviator, Hynes
Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership Newman
Follow Me II: More on the Human Element in Leadership Newman
(The) Forgotten Soldier: The Classic WWII Autobiography, Sajer
For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, Millet and Maslowski
Fortunate Son, Puller
Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam, Griffith
Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stockdale Course, Brennan
From Beirut To Jerusalem, Friedman
Gallipoli, Moorehead
(The) General (F), Forester
(The) Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Gordon and Trainor
Generalship; Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command, Fuller
General of the Army George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman, Cray
George Washington and the American Military Tradition, Higginbotham
Giap: The Victor in Vietnam, MacDonald
Grant and Lee: A Study in Personnality and Generalship, Fuller
Grant Takes Command, Catton
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, Frank
Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, Chaliand
Hell In A Very Small Place, Fall
History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, Sherrod
How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, Travers
How We Won The War, Giap
Infantry In Battle, U.S. Infantry School
In Many A Strife; General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps, 1917-1956, Millett
In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, McNamara
It Doesn't Take A Hero, Schwarzkopf
Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor, Ross
(The) Killer Angels (F), Shaara
(The) Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare—1900-1918, Travers
Knight's Cross: A Life Of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, Fraser
(The) Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today's War Objectives Must Be Limited, Ridgway
Landscape Turned Red: The Battle Of Antietam, Sears
Lejeune: A Marine's Life, 1867-1942, Bartlett
Logistics in the National Defense, Eccles
Luftwaffe, Murray
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Paret
(The) Making of Strategy, Murray
Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, Hooker
Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Lind
Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, Mao
MARINE! The Life of LtGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, USMC (ret), Davis
(The) Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898, Shulimson
Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History, Schmidt
Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, Royster
(A) Message To Garcia, Hubbard
(The) Middle Parts of Fortune: Somme and Ancre, 1916, Manning
(The) Military: More Than Just a Job?, Moskos
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Millett & Murray
Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, Cohen & Gooch
Morale: A Study of Men and Courage, Baynes
Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, Pagonis
My American Journey, Powell
(The) Nightingale's Song, Timberg
Nimitz, Potter
No Bended Knee, Twining
No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War, O’Ballance
(The) Old Man's Trail, Campbell
On Infantry, English & Gudmundsson
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Summers
On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Kagan
On War, Clausewitz
Once a Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Marine Raiders, Hoffman
Once A Marine: The Memoirs Of General A.A. Vandegrift, USMC, Vandegrift
Once An Eagle (F), Myrer
One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy 1890-1990, Baer
Operation Buffalo: USMC Fight for the DMZ, Nolan
Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam, Van Tien Dung
Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, Mellenthin
Paton: A Genius for War, D'Este
Pegasus Bridge: June 6, 1944, Ambrose
(The) Peloponnesian War, Thucydides
(A) People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence, Shy
Pershing: General of the Armies, Smythe
Personal Memoirs Of U.S. Grant, Long
(The) Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare, Keegan
(The) Price Of Glory: Verdun1916, Horne
(The) Profession Of Arms, Hackett
(The) Quiet Warrior: A Biography Of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Buell
Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Simpkin
(The) Red Badge of Courage (F), Crane
Reminiscences MacArthur
(The) Reminiscences of a Marine, Lejeune
Rifleman Dodd (F), Forester
(The) Right Kind of War (F), McCormick
(The) Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Kennedy
(The) Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Kennedy
(A) Savage War Of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962, Horne
(The) Seeds Of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939, Doughty
Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, Millett
Small Wars Manual NAVMC 2890
Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation, Marshall
Starship Troopers(F), Heinlein
Strategy, Liddell Hart
Street Without Joy Fall
Strong Men Armed: The United States Marines Against Japan, Leckie
Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Van Creveld
(The) Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ambrose
Take That Hill! Royal Marines in the Falklands War, Vaux
Tarawa: The Story of a Battle, Sherrod
(The) Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology, Laqueur and Alexander
This Kind Of War, Fehrenbach
To Lose A Battle: France 1940, Horne
Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign, 1944-1945, Bennett
Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Willock
Uncommon Men: The Sergeants Major of The Marine Corps, Chapin
United States Constitution
(The) U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and its Practice in the Pacific, Isely & Crowl
U.S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present, Merskey
(The) U.S. Marine Corps Story, Moskin
U.S. Marines: 1775-1975, Simmons
(The) Village, West
Victory At High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign, Heinl
War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Asprey
(The) War of the American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice 1763-1789, Higginbotham
(The) War Of The Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, Barber
War Secrets in the Ether: The Use of Signals Intelligence by the German Military in WWII, Flicke
We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang, the Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam, Moore and Galloway
What Are Generals Made Of?, Newman
With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa, Sledge
(A) Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines, Moore
(The) Years of MacArthur, James
(The) 25-Year War: America’s Military Role In Vietnam, Palmer
100 Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, Woodward
Book titles by grade

**Lance Corporal and below.** Read at least 2 books annually from the following list:

- Forester, *Rifleman Dodd* (Courage and Commitment)
- Heinlein, *Starship Troopers* (Training)
- Hubbard, *A Message to Garcia* (Memoir)
- Miller, *The Bridge at Dong Ha* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
- Simmons, *The United States Marines: 1775-1975* (Heritage)
- United States Constitution (Policy)
- Webb, *Fields of Fire* (Leadership)

**Corporal/Sergeant.** Read at least 2 books annually from the following list:

- Campbell, *The Old Man's Trail* (Small Wars)
- Card, *Ender's Game* (Tactics)
- Chapin, *Uncommon Men: the Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps* (Leadership)
- Crane, *The Red Badge of Courage* (Tactics)
- Davis, *MARINE! The Life of LtGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, USMC (et)* (Biography)
- Leckie, *Strong Men Armed: The United States Marines Against Japan* (Heritage)
- Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
- Marshall, *Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation* (Tactics)
- McCormick, *The Right Kind of War* (Heritage)
- Schell, *Battle Leadership* (Leadership)
- Swinton, *The Defense of Duffer's Drift* (Tactics)
- Thomason, *Fix Bayonets!* (Heritage)
- Uris, *Battle Cry* (Heritage)
- West, *The Village* (Small Wars)

**Staff Sergeant/Warrant Officer/Chief Warrant Officer-2/Chief Warrant Officer-3/Second Lieutenant/First Lieutenant.** Read at least 3 books annually from the following list:

- Ambrose, *Pegasus Bridge: June 6, 1944* (Leadership)
- Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (Small Wars)
- Collins, *Common Sense Training* (Training)
- English & Gudmundson, *On Infantry* (History)
- Fuller, *Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
- Giap, *How We Won the War* (Small Wars)
- Hynes, *Flights of Passage: Reflections of a World War II Aviator* (Heritage)
- Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (History)
- Laqueur and Alexander, *The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology* (Small Wars)
- Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (Strategy)
Moore & Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young: Ia Drang, the Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam* (Leadership)

Moskin, *The U.S. Marine Corps Story* (Heritage)

Moskos, *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* (Civil-Military Relations)

Nolan, *Operation Buffalo: USMC Fight for the DMZ* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

Nye, *Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence* (Leadership)

Rommel, *Attacks* (Tactics)

Ross, *Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor* (Heritage)


Scales, *Firepower in Limited War* (Small Wars)

Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

Sherrod, *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle* (Heritage)

Sun Tzu, *Art of War* (Theory)

United States Constitution (Policy)

Willock, *Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late General Roy S. Geiger, USMC* (Heritage)

**Gunnery Sergeant/First Sergeant/Master Gunnery Sergeant/Chief Warrant Officer-4/ Captain.** Read at least 4 books annually from the following list:

Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* (Tactics)

Chaliand, *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan* (Small Wars)

Doughty, *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

Fall, *Street Without Joy* (Small Wars)

Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (Memoir)

Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands* (Sea Power)

Heinl, *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)


Hoffman, *Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders* (Heritage)

Hooker, *Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology* (Theory)


Infantry School (U.S.), *Infantry in Battle* (Tactics)


Keegan, *The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare* (Sea Power)

Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Heritage)

Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in the German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War* (Doctrine)

MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (Memoir)

MacDonald, *Company Commander* (Memoir)

Mao Tse-tung, *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (Small Wars)


Meyer, *Company Command: The Bottom Line* (Training)


Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (Heritage)
Moorehead, *Gallipoli* (Theory)
Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage* (Leadership)
Myrer, *Once an Eagle* (Leadership)
Newman, *Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership* (Leadership)
Puller, *Fortunate Son* (Heritage)
Sears, *Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
Sledge, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* (Heritage)
Smith, *Douglas Southhall Freeman on Leadership* (Leadership)
United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (NAVMC 2890) (Small Wars)
Van Creveld, *Air Power and Maneuver Warfare* (Air Power)

**Major/Chief Warrant Officer-5** Read at least 4 books annually from the following list:

Catton, *Grant Takes Command* (Leadership)
Clausewitz, *On War* (Theory)
D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War* (Biography)
Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place* (Small Wars)
Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (Tactics)
Frank, *Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
Fraser, *Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel* (History)

Griffith, *Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam* (Tactics)
Guevara, *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare* (Small Wars)
Hammel, *Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War* (Heritage)
Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition* (Strategy)
Lejeune, *Reminiscences of a Marine* (Heritage)
Merskey, *U. S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present* (Air Power)
Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Strategy)
Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
Robertson, *Dieppe; The Shame and The Glory* (Tactics)
Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (Memoir)
Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II* (Air Power)
Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (Small Wars)
Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Command)
Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Logistics)

**Master Gunnery Sergeant/Sergeant Major/Lieutenant Colonel.** Read at least 4 books annually from the following list:

Baer, *One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990* (Sea Power)
Bennett, *Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign, 1944-1945* (Intelligence)
Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Biography)

The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

James, The Years of MacArthur (Leadership)


Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (Policy)

Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Small Wars)

Long, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (Memoir)

Millett, In Many a Strife; General Gerald C. Thomas and the U. S. Marine Corps, 1917-1956 (Heritage)

Murray, The Making of Strategy (Strategy)

Newman, Follow Me II: More on the Human Element in Leadership (Leadership)

Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War (Logistics)

Travers, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918 (Tactics)

Vaux, Take That Hill! Royal Marines in the Falklands War (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805 (History)

Woodward, 100 Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander (Memoir)

Colonel. Read at least 4 books annually from the following list:

Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Memoir)

Brennan, Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stockdale Course (Leadership)

Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

Cohen & Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (Theory)

Cray, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (Memoir)

Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Tactics)

Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (Logistics)

Flicker, War Secrets in the Ether: The Use of Signals Intelligence by the German Military in WWII (Intelligence)

Forester, The General (Leadership)

Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (Small Wars)

Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (Small Wars)

Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Sea Power)

Millett & Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Policy)

Murray, Luftwaffe (Air Power)

O'Neill, A Democracy At War: America's Fight At Home and Abroad in World War II (Strategy)

Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role In Vietnam (Strategy)

Potter, Nimitz (Biography)

Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today's War Objectives Must Be Limited (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)

Shulimson, The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898 (Heritage)
Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (Theory)
Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Biography)
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Strategy)
Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare—1900-1918 (Tactics)
Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam (Small Wars)
Vandegrift, Once a Marine: The Memoirs of General A.A. Vandegrift, USMC (Heritage)
Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945 (Leadership)

**General.** Read the books from the following list:

Bartlett, Lejeune: A Marine’s Life, 1867-1942 (Heritage)
Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command (Theory)
Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Policy)
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (Sinews)
Kissinger, Diplomacy (Strategy)
MacDonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam (Small Wars)
McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (Strategy)
Moore, A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines (Operations/Campaigns/Battles)
Murray, Airwar in the Persian Gulf (Doctrine)

Newman, What Are Generals Made Of? (Theory)
Powell, My American Journey (Leadership)
Royster, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, (Memoir)
Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History (Heritage)
Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (Small Wars)
Timberg, The Nightingale’s Song (Memoir)
Twining, No Bended Knee (Heritage)
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<th>Rank</th>
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<td>1996</td>
<td><strong>Commandant's Reading List:</strong></td>
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<td>Battle Cry (F), Uris Fix Bayonetist, Thomason Strong Men Ahmed, Leckie*</td>
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<td>Battle Leadership, Schell Marine! (Puller), Davis</td>
<td>Uncommon Men: SGTs Major of the Marine Corps, Chapin</td>
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<td>SSgt, WO, CWO2, CWO3, 2LT, 1LT</td>
<td>The U.S. Marine Corps Story, Moskin Tarawa, Sherrod Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor, Ross</td>
<td>Flights of Passage, Hynes Unaccustomed to Fear, Willock</td>
<td>Acts of War, Holmes Challenge of Command, Nye The Forgotten Soldier, Sajer We Were Soldiers Once... And Young, Moore &amp; Galloway Pegasus Bridge, Ambrose Band of Brothers, Ambrose</td>
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<td>CW05, Maj</td>
<td>Reminiscences of a Marine, Lejeune Chosin, Hammel</td>
<td>Grant Takes Command, Catton Morale: A Study of Men and Courage, Baynes It Doesn’t Take a Hero, Schwarzkopf Patton: A Genius for War, D’Este</td>
<td>On War, Clausewitz Knight’s Cross, Fraser</td>
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* Out of print. All other books are available from a Marine Corps Exchange or the Marine Corps Association, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Telephone: (703) 640-6161
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<th>Operations, Campaigns, and Battles</th>
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<th>&quot;Sinews&quot; of War: (Air Power, Command, Geography, Intelligence, Logistics, Sea Power)</th>
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<td>The Yom Kippur War,</td>
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