The following comparative chart of Principles of War was published in the Fall 1960 edition of the Canadian Army Journal (Vol. XIV, No. 4). The chart accompanied an article on "The Principles of War" by Major M.J.W. Wright, Royal Engineers. It was previously published in the July 1960 edition of The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (United Kingdon).
Skill in measuring distances is an important branch in military education.
From: Field Service; The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, Australia, 11 May 1855
(From the Household Words)
A few hints for the transportation of troops by rail are drawn from the instructions issued by the Minster of War in France. One is to the effect that horses should be embarks in the train before feeding, and fed on the journey, which keeps them quieter. But with regard to the railway, it is found that when infantry travel by rail the expense is double that of a march; that of cavalry, six times; and that of artillery, fifteen times; for which reasons, as well as on account of the importance of keeping up the habit of long marches, the railway is resorted to only on particular emergencies.
Skill in measuring distances is an important branch in military education. The use of instruments, and certain mathematical rules, must, of course, be learnt; but without them, distance can be accurately reckoned by sound. The flash of a gun is seen before the report is heard; multiply every second of that interval by three hundred and eight yards, every beat of the pulse in health by three hundred and four yards, and you get an exact distance of yourself from the gun. There is "the peak of the cap" method; which is said to be good for distances under a hundred yards, on level ground. Suppose you want to measure the distance of an inaccessible point, say on the opposite side of a river, draw your cap over your eyes, till the peak just meets the point; then turn smoothly on your heels, keep your head stiff, and notice when the peak covers some other point which is accessible. You can then measure on the ground between yourself and that accessible point by pacing. The distance will of course be the same as that to the inaccessible point.
But the best, or rather the most useful of all calculators, is the eye itself; which, after repeated trials, will register distances with great accuracy. The value of musketry and artillery in action depends on an officer's judgment in this respect. His sketch of the field for the use of the general is executed with the eye, the pocket compass, and by pacing. An officer on service had better be without his watch than a compass. Yet mother-wit is all in all. When Marlborough was sent on a mission to Charles the Twelfth, he noticed a pair of compasses lying on the map, with the legs pointing toward St. Petersburg, and instantly concluded that the King's thoughts turned that way, which was the case. Major General Arthur Wellesley coming to a river which his guides insisted was impassible, was rather puzzled, his rear being exposed to an overwhelming force of the enemy's cavalry; but seeing a few cottages on its banks, he took what seemed the desperate resolution of making for the river, discovered a ford, and won the battle of Assaye; and all from guessing that men did not build villages on opposite sides of a stream without some means of communication between them.
Under the head of Marches, we are reminded of Marshal Saxe's profound dictum, that the whole secret of war is in "the legs."
From: Field Service; The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, Australia, 11 May 1855
(From the Household Words)
From an interesting chapter on strategical science, we learn, among other things, that "a gentle slope is the most advantageous ground to have in front of a battery;" and that "fifty to one hundred and fifty yards of soft marshy ground, where the enemy's shot would sink; gullies or ravines crossing the enemy's fire at right angles, with a terrace of six to ten feet elevation, about twenty paces in front of a battery; are all good obstacles to the enemy's fire." This almost describes, verbatim, the best points of the Russian position above the Alma.
Some curious facts and calculations relative to the distance and proximity of an enemy, so important to be judged of in warfare, are set forth by the same authority. It is calculated that if the enemy's cavalry are one thousand yards off when they begin to move, they will take about seven minutes to come up—first at a gentle trot, then at a round trot, and finally at a gallop; and, during this interval, each gun can discharge at them, with great precision, ten rounds of round shot and four of case shot (that is, shot put up in a cylinder); or about one round every half minute. This is exclusive of the fire of the infantry with their small arms. The effects of a steady fire may be instanced in what took place at Dresden under napoleon's eye. A body of eight thousand splendid Austrian cavalry dashed down an easy slope at the French—a terrible sight to a young recruit but on this occasion they were met by the Emperor's Old Guard, who were used to it. They reserved their fire till the enemy were close upon them; and when they did fire, and the smoke had cleared away, four thousand of that immense host were on the ground, either killed or dismounted by the death of their horses.
At two thousand yards off a single man or horse looks like a dot; at twelve hundred yards infantry can be distinguished from cavalry; at nine hundred the movements become clear; at seven hundred and fifty yards heads of columns can be made out. Infantry marching send out strong lights; and, if the reflection be brilliant, it is probable that they are marching towards you. The dust raised by cavalry and artillery forms a thick cloud; but this is fainter when caused by infantry.
Under the head of Marches, we are reminded of Marshal Saxe's profound dictum, that the whole secret of war is in "the legs." Marches preface the victories, which battles decide, and pursuit completes. The order of march of an army is this,—infantry, artillery, baggage, cavalry; and a column of thirty thousand men this disposed, would occupy three miles, and would require two hours at least to range in two lines of battle. A day's march with the lightly armed Romans was eighteen and a half miles; but, for ordinary armies in more modern times fifteen miles is allowed, in consideration of the artillery, baggage, and other impediments. But we must not overlook what can be done on extraordinary emergencies.
For instance, General Crawford astonished even the Duke of Wellington, when he joined him after the battle of Talavera, with his light brigade, having marched sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours. Lord Lake's cavalry gallop of seventy-three miles, to the scene of Holkar's defeat at Furruckaband, was performed in the same number of hours. In forces marches, the greatest obstacle to the infantry is blistered feet, to prevent which, feet should be greased well beforehand. Tallow dropped from the candle into common spirits, and rubbed well into the feet, is a cure of blisters already raised. The ordinary quick step is equal to three miles an hour; but this race cannot be kept up after the first hour or two. Double quick is at the rate of seven miles an hour. On parade, a military pace is thirty inches, two thousand one hundred and twelve of which equal a mile.
Where troops sleep without cover—as we know will sometimes happen with the best-regulated armies—and must often happen in armies under red-tape rule, in which the men are governed by the general, their food by the commissariat, and their tents by the ordnance; each department utterly independent of the other—they sleep with their feet towards the fire (one fire to six men); but in a marshy country they should be made to sleep between two fires, which promotes a free circulation of air—the great secret of health where fever and ague are prevalent. A useful cookery hint:—Take your ration of meat, wrap it in a piece of paper or cloth, and cover it with a crust of clay; then you may bake it in any sort of holes well covered over with red-hot embers; and with good economy too, for not a jot of the juice of the meat is lost.
In the seige of the Peninsular war, next to the sappers, the guards, we are told, were found to be the best workmen; and this is the character they bear at Sebastopol.
From: Field Service; The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, Australia, 11 May 1855
(From the Household Words)
From fire we pass to ice, to mention a recipe for improving the passage across a frozen river. When ice is thick enough to bear a man, lay six inches of straw down, and pour water on it; and when the whole mass has frozen together, lay down planks, and it will be strong enough to bear a train of field artillery. Great caution is used in passing a pontoon bridge, as well as a suspension bridge; and, to counter-act the dangerous rocking to which there is a tendency, the troops should never keep step, or halt upon it, unless it has begun to rock. In swimming a horse, give him his head; and, if he is distressed throw yourself off and hold on by the mane, or the tail; for he cannot kick in the water. But, as he swims nearly upright, the mane is more convenient.
Temporary works in the field are hastily raised to afford protection to the camp, and to enable the troops to annoy the enemy more effectually. The main features are a parapet breast high, for a screen; and a ditch or trench outside. The cubical contents of these two are about equal; so that what is thrown out of the trench just serves to make the parapet; as in planning a railway, the great art of the engineer is to lay his line at a such inclinations, that the stuff taken from the cuttings shall suffice to form the embankments. One to two cubic yards per hour is the allowance for each soldier, who under these circumstances works without additional pay; the use of the spade, pickaxe, and barrow being as essential for the defensive, as that of the musket and bayonet for the offensive operations of the army. An exception is however justly made for the performance of certain duties at sages—say, the siege of Sebastopol—and in special cases. Where the soil is unfavourable, or time forbids its use, artificial parapets are raised with piles of gabions, fascines, and sandbags. To obstruct the enemy, sharp palisades are stuck in the ground here and there; and abatis, or small trees in the rough state, are dispersed in all directions.
The fascine is a large faggot, the full size of which is eighteen feet, and the weight one hundred and forty pound; the gabion is a coarse basket, a foot and three-quarters high, weighing when filled forty pounds. Along with tarred sandbags, these are used in immense quantities to build up the extempore walls of batteries, made on the same principle as field-works. It is the proper business of the sappers and miners of the engineer department to construct such batteries, and it is usually performed in the night-time, that the men may be less exposed to the enemy's fire. Working parties are at the rate of eleven to fourteen per gun, assisted by volunteers from the rest of the army. In the seige of the Peninsular war, next to the sappers, the guards, we are told, were found to be the best workmen; and this is the character they bear at Sebastopol. Such is the zeal of their officers, that they do not disdain to act the part of foremen over their men, under the direction of the engineers.
Field Service Regulations, Volume II; Operations, 1920 (Provisional), General Staff, War Office
1. The tank is a mechanically propelled armoured vehicle which affords protection to its crew, armament, and machinery from ordinary rifle and machine gun fire and from shrapnel bullets. Its fire power and mobility make it essentially a weapon of offence. Its capability of delivering a large volume of accurate fire during movement is an important characteristic. Its moral effect on hostile troops is very great.
2. The tank can move over country where roads and tracks do not exist; it can cross trenches and surmount obstacles; when moving through entanglements it crushes down the wire to form lanes passable by infantry in single file. The weight of the tank can be utilized to destroy hostile weapons and personnel by passing over them.
Deep cuttings, swamps, very heavily shelled ground, rocky mountainous country, and thick woods are serious obstacles.
3. The size of the tank makes it a conspicuous object, and the noise of its engine, when running at high speeds, necessitates driving at low speed in the vicinity of the enemy when surprise is intended. The track of a tank make a distinctive mark on ground which is not very hard.
4. The limiting factors of the tank are its visibility and its vulnerability to shell fire, which render effective counter battery support of great importance. The radius of action is governed by the amount of petrol, &c., that can be carried on the tank and the physical endurance of the crew.
5. The power of delivering successful surprise attacks against almost any type of defences is one of the most important advantages of the use of tanks in large numbers.
6. The size, weight, speed, armament, strength of crew, and other factors vary with the different types of tanks. These details are given in the training manual of that arm.
Field Service Regulations, Volume II; Operations, 1920 (Provisional), General Staff, War Office
1. Decisive success in battle can be gained only by offensive action. Every commander, therefore, must be determined to assume the offensive sooner or later. If the situation be temporarily unfavourable for such a course it is wiser to manoeuvre for a more suitable opportunity; but when superiority in moral, armament, training, or numbers has given a commander and advantage he should turn it to account by forcing a battle before the enemy has restored the balance. Superior numbers on the battlefield are an undoubted advantage, but greater skill, better training, and above all, a firm determination in all ranks to conquer at any cost, are the chief factors of success.
2. Half-hearted measures never attain success in war, and lack of determination in the most fruitful source of failure. A commander who has once decided either to give or to accept battle, must act with energy, perseverance, and resolution.
3. Time is an essential consideration in deciding whether an opportunity is favourable or not for immediate offensive action. A commander who has gained a strategical advantage may have to act at once in order to prevent the enemy bringing about conditions more favourable to himself. On the other hand, ample time may be available before any material change can occur in the strategical situation, and it may then be more effective to act deliberately, or to aim at manoeuvring and enemy out of a strong position with a view to forcing him to fight later under conditions which admit of more certain or more decisive results.
The main objective of the infantry, therefore, to which all other operations are merely preliminaries, is to close with the enemy and destroy him by killing or capture.
Field Service Regulations, Volume II; Operations, 1920 (Provisional), General Staff, War Office
1, Infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles. The co-operation of the other arms is necessary, but neither separately nor together can they defeat the enemy.
2. The weapons of the infantry consisting of the rifle and bayonet, the Lewis gun, the rifle grenade, the hand grenade, and the light mortar enable it to develop rapidly in any direction a large volume of fire, to combine fire and movement, and to engage an enemy at a distance or hand to hand.
3. The movements of infantry on foot are slow, and the distance it can cover in a day is relatively small. On the other hand, infantry is capable of moving over almost any ground by day or night, and can find cover more readily than the other arms. When roads permit, it can be moved with rapidity in motor vehicles, and brought fresh into action at distant points.
4. Fire alone will seldom force determined troops out of their position. To drive an enemy from the field, assault or the immediate threat of it is necessary.
5. The main objective of the infantry, therefore, to which all other operations are merely preliminaries, is to close with the enemy and destroy him by killing or capture. It is this power of closing with the enemy which makes infantry the decisive arm in the fight.
Field Service Regulations, Volume II; Operations, 1920 (Provisional), General Staff, War Office
1. The tank is a mechanically propelled armoured vehicle which affords protection to its crew, armament, and machinery from ordinary rifle and machine gun fire and from shrapnel bullets. Its fire power and mobility make it essentially a weapon of offence. Its capability of delivering a large volume of accurate fire during movement is an important characteristic. Its moral effect on hostile troops is very great.
2. The tank can move over country where roads and tracks do not exist; it can cross trenches and surmount obstacles; when moving through entanglements it crushes down the wire to form lanes passable by infantry in single file. The weight of the tank can be utilized to destroy hostile weapons and personnel by passing over them.
Deep cuttings, swamps, very heavily shelled ground, rocky mountainous country, and thick woods are serious obstacles.
3. The size of the tank makes it a conspicuous object, and the noise of its engine, when running at high speeds, necessitates driving at low speed in the vicinity of the enemy when surprise is intended. The track of a tank make a distinctive mark on ground which is not very hard.
4. The limiting factors of the tank are its visibility and its vulnerability to shell fire, which render effective counter battery support of great importance. The radius of action is governed by the amount of petrol, &c., that can be carried on the tank and the physical endurance of the crew.
5. The power of delivering successful surprise attacks against almost any type of defences is one of the most important advantages of the use of tanks in large numbers.
6. The size, weight, speed, armament, strength of crew, and other factors vary with the different types of tanks. These details are given in the training manual of that arm.
Introduction to the Principles of War, Japanese Ground Defence Force Staff College, 1969 (Translated by Dr. Joseph West, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth)
War is a clash of opposing wills, a struggle between beliefs, and victory goes to the party that crushes the enemy's will and destroys his "beliefs.
In other words, the warfare discussed here is a struggle for victory, using "power" to cause the opponent's will to yield and our will to prevail.
Hence, "the essence of warfare" is "power" and its maximum use. Its objective is to crush the opponent's power of resistance and cause him to submit to our will, and its measures are to use power to destroy the opponent's fighting power (material, spiritual). In other words, it is nothing less than the seizure of victory.
The first essential element of warfare is the fact that, "in warfare, there are opponents." Moreover, both parties are characterized by having free will.
The second is that both parties have the will to overthrow the opponent (enemy). War is a struggle between the free wills of both parties, and victory is determined by which one has confidence in it. In other words, it also can be said to be a struggle of faith.
The third is that power is used to cause submission of the opponent's will. The direct instrument for fighting is "power," and when this power is brought to bear against the opponent, it is used for the violent effect of causing submission of the opponent's will.
The fourth is the actual battlefield situation, which is extremely important for our study of tactics and is a basic condition. The actual battlefield situation arises from the above essential elements of warfare and varies according to the time period, the place of combat, and the type and scale of warfare, etc.
The most important of these are that, in warfare, the situation always is uncertain, unstable, and unclear, and the normal state is that there is a succession of inconsistencies and mistakes, danger to life is ever-present, mental and bodily difficulties of fear, exhaustion, etc., are encountered, the situation does not develop as expected, etc.
In the study of the principles of war and in the study of tactics, if thorough consideration is not airways given to the actual battlefield, one will end up in worthless speculation.
The Florence Times Daily, Florence, Alabama, 20 March 1927
London (UP)—Conclusions drawn by military experts based on the most advanced practice in British and continental army maneuvres in 1926 indicate that the next war is likely to be almost entirely a matter of machine guns, aircraft and tanks. The role of the infantryman seems to be taken over by the machine gunner.
The present trend of the French and German armies to have one machine-gun company to every three of ordinary infantry—a far bigger proportion of machine guns to rifles than was used in the Great War—is expected during 1927 to continue to progress in favor of the machine-gun. Some experts prophesy that within the next ten years the proportional figures will be reversed, and that 1937 will see three companies of machine-gunners to every company of infantry in an efficiently organized army.
Increasing reliance of the machine gun as a weapon of offence and defence, is due to marked improvements that have been made since the war, both in increasing the reliability of the machine-gun and decreasing its weight. For readily mobile forces the Browning machine-gun, it is said, seems likely to entirely replace both the Lewis and the Hotchkiss machine-guns.
By Captain B.H. Liddell Hart
The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, Australia, 11 October, 1939
[In the following article, Captain Liddell Hart, who has for long been regarded as one of the most brilliant military critics in Britain, examines the basic problem of modern warfare with results which both illuminate and vindicate the course taken by the Allied High Command on the Western Front.]
The idea of an irresistible offensive dominates the official doctrines of the Continental military machines which admit no aim less than that of victory achieved by the complete destruction of the opposing forces in battle.
German military literature is lit up with the theme of the "blitzkrieg"—the lightning war. The Italian military authorities made the pronouncement only a few years ago that "trench warfare is obsolete"—because "the first onslaught of tanks and fast-moving vehicles would break through trench-lines, force fighting into the open and make movements so rapid that nothing would be gained by digging new trenches." Their experience in Spain may have disillusioned them—but the military hierarchy everywhere has hitherto shown a much greater capacity for explaining away its mistakes than for overcoming more concrete obstacles.
The new Field Service Regulations of the Russian Army, issued after the Spanish War had been in progress for some time, declare: "the fundamental aim of the Soviet Union in any war which is forced upon it will be to secure a decisive victory and utterly overthrow its enemy … The enemy must be caught throughout the whole depth of his position and there encircled and destroyed. Modern technical means make possible the simultaneous defeat of the enemy along the whole of his battle front and throughout the whole depth of his position." The steam-roller of 1914 has become, in theory, the mechanized avalanche of 1939.
The case for the offensive is so obvious that it can be expressed briefly. Indeed, it can be epitomised in a single sentence—only by the offensive can an enemy country, or position be occupied, and its surrender compelled. It is thus the only way in which a war, or a battle, can be won in the precise sense of the term. Furthermore, the offensive has great psychological advantages as a means towards this end—because it keeps the initiative over the opposing command, and acts as a tonic to one's own troops so long as it produces result proportionate to the effort expended.
The offensive, however, is the more exhausting form of action. Nothing does more to ruin any force, or nation, then offensives which show no profit commensurate with their cost. The sands of history are littered with the wrecks of kingships which set their compass on an offensive course. Napoleon is the greatest of all these wrecks. Yet his career came to its disastrous end before the tide of the attack itself was on the ebb.
While recent wars have provided abundant examples of offensives failing, they have provided a few examples of these succeeding—up to a point. But it is difficult to find any cases where the attacker has not had an immense superiority of armament or the defender has not been in a state of declining morale from other causes. Even the best offensive technique developed from prolonged experiment in the course of the last war required a quantitative superiority of nearly three to one to make an offensive effective. There appears little likelihood of such favourable odds in the Western theatre of war. To organise and train an army primarily for the offensive is therefore to stake the national fortunes on a very dark horse.
Soldiers who oppose the idea of defence by defence commonly support their abstract argument against it by citing the experience of the 1870 war as proof of its dangers. They assert that the French suffered defeat by adopting the defensive as a deliberate policy on the assumption that it would enable them to profit by their superior firearms, the needle-gun in particular. Even if such a belief were well founded the argument from it would not be a credit to the mental adaptability of those who employ it. For, in view of the immense development in weapons, a failure of the tactical defensive more than half a century back, even if it were true, would not be a reasonable ground for dismissing all the evidence of the power of defence under modern conditions. The weapons of 1870 were not the weapons of 1914, still less the weapons of 1939. But it is not even true that the French doctrine was defensive.
The notion that the French came to disaster by relying on the tactical defensive is merely a myth which gained currency by constant repetition on the part of the French advocates of the "offensive a outrance" during the generation which preceded the last war. The myth does not stand examination. While the German successes mere maintained merely due to strategic manoeuvre, helped by their great superiority of numbers, the French vied with them in attempting attacks—which were crushed by the superior German artillery. The actual policy which the French adopted was the tactical offensive combined with the strategic defensive—if what was really strategic paralysis caused by epidemic incompetence can be thus described. This combination was the opposite of what I suggest. Only on rare occasions did the French take up a defensive position proper, and then repulsed attacks with striking success. The disregard of these lessons by the "offensive" zealots of the next generation showed how often military theory is built on faith instead of a dispassionate analysis of facts. Likewise, the repetition of this 1870 myth as an argument to-day shows how far the case against the defensive is based on emotional repugnance rather than on scientific investigation.
Under present conditions it would be unwise for Britain and France to attempt an offensive strategy in the West, at any rate, in the early stages of the war. This should become clear when the potential strengths of the rival armies is considered, since no skill of general ship would be likely to achieve a local concentration of sufficient superiority.
In the West, the ratio of space to force is such as to offer no adequate scope for an offensive strategy against opponents who are at least equal in equipment. Battering rams also, are out of date. In face of such conditions, nothing could be more dangerous to the capacity of Britain and France than to indulge in a combined general offensive which suffered a costly repulse. In the tactical sphere, the costliest fiascoes of the last war were the attempt to carry out the old conception of a "holding attack"—in which more slender resources are used than those required for a decisive attack. By 1918, all the armies had learnt by hard experience the uselessness of this method. It would be madness to reproduce it on a greater scale in the strategic sphere.
On the other hand, the advantage of the general defensive could be enhanced, its risks diminished, and its common value increased by combining it with a "harassing offensive." This could be pursued by:—
(1) Carrying out local or limited attacks, carefully mounted as a surprise, and with the maximum fire-power, against weak points on the main front;
(2) Utilising artillery fire and air bombing to harass the enemy's routes of supply and rest camps;
(3) Utilising sea power to isolate, and then to concentrate a decisive superiority of land force against detached bases and territories which the opponent cannot reinforce. As regards this, it must be appreciated, however, that a landing on a hostile shore has become almost impossible unless the defender's air force can be dominated.
Wellingtons_squares_crop_rd700px.jpg(4) Utilising sea power and air power combined to cause a general disturbance of the enemy's system of supply and internal life. So far as there is any scope for the offensive in modern war between more or less evenly matched opponents it seems it lie in developing such a super-guerrilla form of warfare.
Above all, it should be realised that defence is a psychological attack—on the mind and morale of the enemy's peoples. Now that professional armies have been superseded by nations in arms, these have to be convinced of the justification for the war aims of their Governments and High Commands. Nations contain far more discordant elements than professional armies, and are inherently more susceptible to internal disruption. It is easier to launch a nation into an aggressive war than to hold together its multitudinous components in a prolonged struggle, and maintain their will to continue fighting for palpably aggressive aims. If such an attack is met by attack the aggressor Government is enabled to consolidate its people by representing to them that they are fighting to defend their homes.
Such misrepresentation becomes far more difficult to maintain if the attack is met by defence. This tends to weaken the will of the enemy people, and foster unrest among them, by making it clear that their rulers are the aggressors and are responsible for keeping alight the cauldron in which the nation's manhood is consumed. This state of mind, and loss of spirit, will develop all the sooner if the offensive campaign produces no results comparable with its cost. There is nothing more demoralising to troops than to see the corpses of their comrades piled up in front of an unbroken defence, and that impression soon filters back to the people at home. Locally, where conditions are favourable, it may still be true that "attack is the best defence." But, on the whole, in a modern war of peoples a new truth is becoming apparent—that defence is the best attack.
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden:---
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;
(c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
(d) To declare that no quarter will be given;
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(f) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention;
(g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(h) To declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.
A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war.
Leadership Principles for the new ADP 6-22; A Monograph by Major Gregory W. McLean, US Army, SAMS, AY 2012-001
General Robert E. Lee, one of the most revered generals in the history of the United States, did not have a checklist, but he did teach maxims which he used to teach his subordinates. Lee had seven basic and universal rules:
1. Never underestimate your adversary.
2. Try to know what your adversary is going to do before he knows what you are to do.
3. The offensive calls for surprise by inferior forces and for superior concentration at the critical point by equal forces.
4. Every movement must be measured in terms of an early start, accurate staff work, the endurance of the troops, and the marching capacity of their leaders.
5. The commander must have a good eye for ground.
6. Always interpret strategy in terms of available position and line of march.
7. Know your subordinates.
Instructions to the Third United States Army, General George S. Patton, Jr., 3 April 1944
1. There is no approved solution to any tactical situation.
2. There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is: "To so use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum time."
3. In battle, casualties vary directly with the time you are exposed to effective fire. Your own fire reduces the effectiveness and volume of the enemy’s fire, while rapidity of attack shortens the time of exposure. A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood!
4. Battles are won by frightening the enemy. Fear is induced by inflicting death and wounds on him. Death and wounds are produced by fire. Fire from the rear is more deadly and three times more effective than fire from the front, but to get fire behind the enemy, you must hold him by frontal fire and move rapidly around his flank. Frontal attacks against prepared positions should be avoided if possible.
5. "Catch the enemy by the nose with fire and kick him in the pants with fire emplaced through movement."
6. Hit hard soon; that is, with two battalions up in a regiment, or two divisions up in a corps, or two corps up in an army—the idea being to develop your maximum force at once before the enemy can develop his.
7. You can never be too strong. Get every man and gun you can secure, provided it does not unduly delay your attack. The German is the champion digger.
8. The larger the force and the more violence you use in the attack, whether it be men, tanks, or ammunition, the smaller will be your proportional losses.
9. Never yield ground. It is cheaper to hold what you have than to retake what you have lost. Never move troops to the rear for a rest or to reform at night, and in the daytime only where absolutely necessary. Such moves may produce a panic.
10. Our mortars and artillery are superb weapons when they are firing. When silent, they are junk—see that they keep firing!
Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, 2004
Common principles of military operations stated in chapter 4 of this doctrine, fully apply to combat operations too, for which the following principles are specific:
Mobility represents the armed forces elements capabilities to redeploy from one place to another one within required time limits, while maintaining the readiness (capability) to accom- plish assigned combat tasks.
Information superiority. Success in the operation (combat) will depend on the amount of information and its appropriate and timely use. This requirement will depend on the level of communication and information systems and their connection with the weapon systems. The commanders should endeavor, based on effective information utilization, to beat the opponent to his intents, and at the same time to eliminate his access to information, which he needs for his decisions.
Air space domination is one of the air force s most important tasks during joint operations conduct. It creates conditions in which land-, air- and naval operations can be conducted.
Offensive. In all combat operations, even in those where the opponent initially has the activity and freedom of action, commanders at all levels should employ every opportunity to maintain or gain the initiative and strike the opponent. Success in the operation depends directly on the troops’ individual and collective determination to clash with the enemy and break his will to fight.
Combat capabilities preservation represents the requirement, that commanders should take pains to preserve the combat capabilities of their troops until combat tasks are completed and make an effort to achieve the operational objective with minimal friendly losses. Every opportunity should be taken to rest the troops and to provide all-round support. Relief of fight-exhausted units, troop reinforcement and material replenishment are important for restoring the unit's combat capabilities.
Flexibility represents the requirement, that commanders must always be able, during combat operations, to respond quickly and in an optimal way to the actual combat situation develo- pment bearing in mind the necessity of successfully achieving the final operational objectives.
Elimination of the opponent. The operation s objective can be achieved by physically eliminating the adversary, or bringing about the loss of his combat capabilities. The significance of physical elimination of the adversary gradually decreases in current operations (combat), the alternative is to defeat the adversary by breaking the cohesion of his activity through combining manoeuvre and fire power in such a way that he no longer has opportunity or loses the will to continue combat.
Breaking the will to fight. The use of deceptive measures, psychological warfare, stratagems and selective use of force and surprise undermines the enemy s will to fight. In this way, a commander can avoid the large-scale physical destruction of enemy forces and he can even defeat a stronger enemy.
Selective destruction. Current combat activity is not conducted only to the forward edge of the battle area, but throughout the depth of the enemy s battle formation. Selective destruction of the adversary's combat power is based on disruption of his operational or combat formation elements cohesion, (that means disruption of functionality of elements ensuring his mobility, command posts, logistic systems, communication and information systems etc.), both in contact and in the depth of his operational (combat) formation.
Appendix A, On Combat, Lt. Col., Dave Grossman, 2004
From the Enchridion, Militus Christiani: A Guide for the Righteous Protector, by Erasmus, 1503, extracted by Sergeant Chris Pascoe, Michigan State Police
First Rule
Increase Your Faith
Even if the entire world appears mad.
Second Rule
Act Upon Your Faith.
Even if you must undergo the loss of everything.
Third Rule
Analyze Your Fears.
You will find that things are not as bad as they appear.
Fourth Rule
Make Virtue The Only Goal Of Your Life.
Dedicate all your enthusiasm, all your effort, your leisure, as well as your business.
Fifth Rule
Turn Away from Material Things.
If you are greatly concerned with money you will be weak of spirit.
Sixth Rule
Train Your Mind To Distinguish Good And Evil.
Let your rule of government be determined by the common good.
Seventh Rule
Never Let Any Setback Stop You In Your Quest.
We are not perfect—this only means we should try harder.
Eighth Rule
If You Have Frequent Temptations, Do Not Worry.
Begin to worry when you do not have temptation, because that is a sure sign that you cannot distinguish good from evil.
Ninth Rule
Always Be Prepared for an Attack.
Careful generals set guards even in times of peace.
Tenth Rule
Spit, As It Were, In The Face Of Danger.
Keep a stirring quotation with you for encouragement.
Eleventh Rule
There Are Two Dangers:
One Is Giving Up, The Other Is Pride.
After you have performed some worthy task, give all the credit to someone else.
Twelfth Rule
Turn Your Weakness Into Virtue.
If you are inclined to be selfish, make a deliberate effort to be giving.
Thirteenth Rule
Treat Each Battle As Though It Were Your Last.
And you will finish, in the end, victorious!
Fourteenth Rule
Don't Assume That Doing Good Allows You To Keep A Few Vices.
The enemy you ignore the most is the one who conquers you.
Fifteenth Rule
Weigh Your Alternatives Carefully.
The wrong way will often seem easier than the right way.
Sixteenth Rule
Never Admit Defeat Even If You Have Been Wounded.
The good soldier's painful wounds spur him to gather his strength.
Seventeenth Rule
Always Have A Plan Of Action.
So when the time comes for battle, you will know what to do.
Eighteenth Rule
Calm Your Passions By Seeing How Little There Is To Gain.
We often worry and scheme about trifling matters of no real importance.
Nineteenth Rule
Speak With Yourself This Way:
If I do what I am considering, would I want my family to know about it?
Twentieth Rule
Virtue Has Its Own Reward
Once a person has it, they would not exchange it for anything.
Twenty-first Rule
Life Can Be Sad, Difficult, And Quick:
Make It Count For Something!
Since we do not know when death will come, act honorably everyday.
Twenty-second Rule
Repent Your Wrongs
Those who do not admit their faults have the most to fear.
The Lonely Leader; Monty, 1944-1945, Alistaire Horne, 1994
In Britain, Monty's own training programme was reaching a new pitch of intensity, but what substitute could there be for the actual battlefield, with all its brutality, surprises and lessons? He became the first British commander to develop close tactical support with the air force, something which the Germans had already raised to a high state of perfection by 1940. In close conjunction with Brooke, he saw to it that each of the new British armoured divisions contained at least one lorry-borne infantry brigade—as had the Germans when they crossed the Meuse in 1940. He studied successful Soviet techniques of carrying infantry into the attack on the backs of tanks. (Meanwhile, in Russia, the Germans were now bringing up their infantry close behind the Panzers in cross-country armoured troop-carriers.) He developed the lessons he had gained in the First World War, the need for flexibility in regrouping—what later came to be closely linked with the key Monty formula of 'balance'—and the need to operate, on the offensive, by means of one or more concen-trated attacks on relatively narrow fronts, instead of mass efforts against a wide front. 'Concentration—control—simplicity' was the secret formula he dinned into his officers. Above all, he was crystallizing his philosophy of leadership. The leader, as he developed the theme in his memoirs, has to see his objective clearly and let everyone else know what he wants; he must begin with a very firm 'grip' on his military machine; he must never bring his subordinates back to confer with him, he must go forward (a view that would cause much conflict with the Americans from Normandy onwards); he himself must live in tranquillity, removed from all the exhaustion imposed by detail; he must be able to exercise 'direct and personal' command, to which end would follow his famous system, like his hero Wellington's, of fast-moving young liaison officers.
Journals of Major Robert Rogers, as published in a 1769 Dublin edition.
1. All Rangers are to be subject to the rules and articles of war; to appear at roll- call every evening, on their own parade, equipped, each with a firelock, sixty rounds of powder and ball, and a hatchet, at which time an officer from each company is to inspect the same, to see they are in order, so as to be ready on any emergency to march at a minute's warning; and before they are dismissed, the necessary guards are to be draughted and scouts for the next day appointed.
2. Whenever you are ordered out to the enemies forts or frontiers for discoveries, if your number be small, march in a single file, keeping at such distance from each other as to prevent one shot from killing two men, sending one man, or more, forward, and the like on each side, at the distance of twenty yards from the main body, if the ground you march over will admit of it, to give the signal to the officer of the approach of an enemy, and of their number &c.
3. If you march over marshes or soft ground, change your position, and march abreast of each other to prevent the enemy from tracking you (as they would do if you marched in a single file) till you get over such ground, and then resume your former order and march till it is quite dark before you encamp, which do, if possible, on a piece of ground which that may afford your centries the advantage of seeing or hearing the enemy some considerable distance, keeping one half of your whole party awake alternately through the night.
4. Some time before you come to the place you would reconnoitre, make a stand, and send one or two men in whom you can confide, to look out the best ground for making your observations.
5. If you have the good fortune to take any prisoners, keep them separate, till they are examined, and in your return take a different route from that in which you went out, that you may the better discover any party in your rear, and have an opportunity, if their strength be superior to yours, to alter your course, or disperse, as circumstances may require.
6. If you march in a large body of three or four hundred, with a design to attack the enemy, divide your party into three columns, each headed by a proper officer, and let those columns march in single files, the columns to the right and left keeping at twenty yards distance or more from that of the center, if the ground will admit, and let proper guards be kept in the front and rear, and suitable flanking parties at a due distance as before directed, with orders to halt on all eminences, to take a view of the surrounding ground, to prevent your being ambuscaded, and to notify the approach or retreat of the enemy, that proper dispostions may be made for attacking, defending, &c. And if the enemy approach in your front on level ground, form a front of your three columns or main body with the advanced guard, keeping out your flanking parties, as if you were marching under the command of trusty officers, to prevent the enemy from pressing hard on either of your wings, or surrounding you, which is the usual method of the savages, if their number will admit of it, and be careful likewise to support and strengthen your rear-guard.
7. If you are obliged to receive the enemy's fire, fall, or squat down, till it is over; then rise and discharge at them. If their main body is equal to yours, extend yourselves occasionally; but if superior, be careful to support and strengthen your flanking parties, to make them equal to theirs, that if possible you may repulse them to their main body, in which case push upon them with the greatest resolution with equal force in each flank and in the center, observing to keep at a due distance from each other, and advance from tree to tree, with one half of the party before the other ten or twelve yards. If the enemy push upon you, let your front fire and fall down, and then let your rear advance thro' them and do the like, by which time those who before were in front will be ready to discharge again, and repeat the same alternatively, as occasion shall require; by this means you will keep up such a constant fire, that the enemy will not be able easily to break your order, or gain your ground.
8. If you oblige the enemy to retreat, be careful, in your pursuit of them to keep out your flanking parties, and prevent them from gaining eminences, or rising grounds, in which case they would perhaps be able to rally and repulse you in their turn.
9. If you are obliged to retreat, let the front of your whole party fire and fall back, till the rear hath done the same, making for the best ground you can; by this means you will oblige the enemy to pursue you, if they do it at all, in the face of a constant fire.
10. If the enemy is so superior that you are in danger of being surrounded by them, let the whole body disperse, and every one take a different road to the place of rendezvous appointed for that evening, which must every morning be altered and fixed for the evening ensuing, in order to bring the whole party, or as many of them as possible, together, after any separation that may happen in the day; but if you should happen to be actually surrounded, form yourselves into a square, or if in the woods, a circle is best, and, if possible, make a stand till the darkness of the night favours your escape.
11. If your rear is attacked, the main body and flankers must face about to the right or left, as occasion shall require, and form themselves to oppose the enemy, as before directed; and the same method must be observed, if attacked in either of your flanks, by which means you will always make a rear of one of your flank-guards.
12. If you determine to rally after a retreat, in order to make a fresh stand against the enemy, by all means endeavour to do it on the most rising ground you come at, which will give you greatly the advantage in point of situation, and enable you to repulse superior numbers.
13. In general, when pushed upon by the enemy, reserve your fire till they approach very near, which will then put them into the greatest surprize and consternation, and give you an opportunity of rushing upon them with your hatchets and cutlasses to the better advantage.
14. When you encamp at night, fix your centries in such a manner as not to be relieved from the main body till morning, profound secrecy and silence being often of the last importance in these cases. Each centry therefore should consist of six men, two of whom must be constantly alert, and when relieved by their fellows, it should be done without noise; and in case those on duty see or hear any thing, which alarms them, they are not to speak, but one of them is silently to retreat, that proper dispositions may be made; and all occasional centries should be fixed in like manner.
15. At the first dawn of day, awake your whole detachment; that being the time when the savages chuse to fall upon their enemies, you should by all means be in readiness to receive them.
16. If the enemy should be discovered by your detachments in the morning, and their numbers are superior to yours, and a victory doubtful, you should not attack them till the evening, as then they will not know your numbers, and if you are repulsed, your retreat will be favoured by the darkness of the night.
17. Before you leave your encampment, send out small parties to scout round it, to see if there be any appearance or track of an enemy that might have been near you during the night.
18. When you stop for refreshment, chuse some spring or rivulet if you can, and dispose your party so as not to be surprised, posting proper guards and centries at a due distance, and let a small party waylay the path came in, lest the enemy should be pursuing.
19. If, in your return, you have to cross rivers, avoid the usual fords as much as possible, lest the enemy should have discovered, and be there expecting you.
20. If you have to pass by lakes, keep at some distance from the edge of the water, lest, in case of an ambuscade or an attack from the enemy, when in that situation, your retreat should be cut off.
21. If the enemy pursue your rear, take a circle till you come to your own tracks, and there form an ambush to receive them, and give them the first fire.
22. When you return from a scout, and come near our forts, avoid the usual roads, and avenues thereto, lest the enemy should have headed you, and lay in ambush to receive you, when almost exhausted with fatigues.
23. When you pursue any party that has been near our forts or encampments, follow not directly in their tracks, lest they should be discovered by their rear-guards, who, at such a time, would be most alert; but endeavour, by a different route, to head and meet them in some narrow pass, or lay in ambush to receive them when and where they least expect it.
24. If you are to embark in canoes, battoes, or otherwise, by water, chuse the evening for the time of your embarkation, as you will then have the whole night before you, to pass undiscovered by any parties of the enemy, on hills, or other places, which command a prospect of the lake or river you are upon.
25. In padling or rowing, give orders that the boat or canoe next the sternmost, wait for her, and the third for the second, and the fourth for the third, and so on, to prevent separation, and that you may be ready to assist each other on any emergency.
26. Appoint one man in each boat to look out for fires, on the adjacent shores, from the number and size of which you may form some judgment of the number that kindled them, and whether you are able to attack them or not.
27. If you find the enemy encamped near the banks of a river or lake, which you imagine they will attempt to cross for their security upon being attacked, leave a detachment of your party on the opposite shore to receive them, while, with the remainder, you surprize them, having them between you and the lake or river.
28. If you cannot satisfy yourself as to the enemy's number and strength, from their fires, &c. conceal your boats at some distance, and ascertain their number by a reconnoitering party, when they embark, or march, in the morning, marking the course they steer, &c. when you may pursue, ambush, and attack them, or let them pass, as prudence shall direct you. In general, however, that you may not be discovered by the enemy upon the lakes and rivers at a great distance, it is safest to lay by, with your boats and party concealed all day, without noise or shew; and to pursue your intended route by night; and whether you go by land or water, give out parole and countersigns, in order to know one another in the dark, and likewise appoint a station for every man to repair to, in case of any accident that may separate you.
FM 100-1, The Army; Washington, June 1994
The Army formally adopted a set of Principles of War in 1921 that endure today. Briefly stated they are:
Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Mass. Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.
Economy of Force. Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
Unity of Command. For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.
Security. Never permit the enemy to gain an unexpected advantage.
Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.
Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
Yu Chi Can (Guerilla Warfare), by Mao Tse-Tung, translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (retired), from the United States Marine Corps FRFRP 12-18, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, 1989.
In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in a war waged for the emancipation who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, he development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must coordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.
These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution, said: "A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable." We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war be cause they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing solution to the struggle.
Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare, we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.
During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.
Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semicolonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:
1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.
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